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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis estimates the cost of electricity outages in Zimbabwe for the year 2009. 
Much reference is made to government, the power utility - Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA) and other countries in the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), also 
experiencing electricity outages. 
 
An electricity outage is a complete loss of power supply to an area. An outage may 
result from planned or unplanned load shedding or faults. Load shedding is accelerated 
by power supply shortages. The shortages are experienced during peak demand times. 
In 2009, Zimbabwe’s peak demand was about 1574MW. ZESA had the capacity to 
supply 1080MW and imported 100MW (guaranteed from Mozambique), leaving a 
shortfall of 394MW. This shortfall is worsened by transmission losses (about 108MW) 
and consumption by ZESA properties (about 200MW) bringng down the supply to 
customers of about 700MW. 
 
The supply shortage is the result of a lack of investment in the power sector by 
government for expanded generation capacity, incorrect pricing, droughts, internal 
conflicts, skills flight, government energy sector regulation, vandalism of equipment 
and under supply of coal to thermal power stations. Consumers in all sectors are 
experiencing power outage incidences of different duration. The severity of the 
inconvenience depends on the load shedding time table, preferences of the power 
utility and arrangements that can be made with the utility. Power outages negatively 
affect (and result in cost to) the productive sectors (industry, mining and farming) and 
households. The main objective of the thesis is to estimate the cost of power outages 
to the sectors. Sub-objectives of the study include: to identify the main features of 
power crisis in Zimbabwe and government response to it with a regional power 
generated setting; to formulate a model that clearly identifies the different cost 
components of power outages in Zimbabwe; to identify appropriate methods by which 
to estimate these cost components; to estimate the cost of power outages to the 
productive sectors (mining, agriculture and industrial) and households of Zimbabwe; to 
critically analyse the credibility of these estimates, and to consider the saving of the 
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costs of outages achieved through increased investment in generating capacity in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
ZESA undertook reforms (institutional and tariff) in order to improve management 
efficiencies and supply. It was divided into five entities resulting in management and 
financial improvement, but its reform of tariffs has been stiffled by subsidies and price 
regulations. ZESA adopted the cost plus rate of return pricing strategy in 2004 but 
regulation kept the tariff below cost. The regulation is pro-poor in aim but it 
encourages wasteful consumption. Similar supply shortages are affecting the whole 
SAPP group. The power pool load shed 758MW in 2009. In Zimbabwe alone load 
shedding was 315MW. In an attempt to solve the problem, member utilities engage in 
bilateral contacts and short-term trading through Short Term Energy Markets (STEM). A 
number of Southern African countries have to load shed - the average frequency being 
three to five (3-5) times per week for the region.  
 
A number of studies have been carried out by different scholars attempting to assess 
the impact and cost of outages. The general conclusion is that power outages cause 
significant costs to consumers, both direct and indirect. From a global perspective, the 
increase in the quality of electricity supplied has fallen behind the increase in quantity 
demanded, causing an increase of incidence in power outages . An analysis of Sub-
Saharan Africa shows that the causes of supply shortages are natural (drought), oil 
price shocks, conflict and the lack of investment in generation capacity.  
 
This generates two outage cost estimates – a direct cost (welfare loss) and indirect cost 
(backup cost). The sum of these estimates is the total outage cost. The direct cost 
estimate is based on direct loss incurred during the power outages - lost production, 
lost materials, and lost time or leisure. In order to derive an estimated direct cost, it is 
necessary to obtain an accurate respondent self-assessment, which, in turn depends on 
the keeping of good records of hours of outages and losses incurred during outage 
times. 
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The estimated indirect cost (backup cost) is derived from the cost of investment in 
backup sources and running of these sources as a mitigating measure during a power 
outage. The expected gain from self-generated kWh is assumed to be equal to the 
expected loss from the marginal kWh electricity not supplied by the utility (the outage). 
The annualised capital cost of backup source plus the variable cost of generating 
electricity by the backup source are another element of the cost of power outages. The 
prices of backup sources were obtained from the two leading retailers , Tendo Power 
and Ellis Electronics. To the extent that the captive generation includes investment in 
emergency or optional plant (as part of normal production infrastructure), it may 
overestimate cost. 
 
The sample frame for which the costs were estimated were all the ZESA customers. 
From this an adequately large sample size was randomly selected following the method 
used by Yamane (1967). The selected respondents were surveyed and the responses 
captured and analysed using Eviews and Statistical Packages for Social Scientist (SPSS).  
A summary of the results of the cost and impact assessment for the two costs 
estimated is shown in the table below [Direct cost (C1) and Indirect cost (Backup Cost) 
(C2)]. 
 
Table 1: Per annum cost and impact assessment for electricity outages in 
Zimbabweanfour major sectors in 2009 
 
 
The mining sector was found to incur the highest outage cost per kWh lost and the 
household sector the least, irrespective of the type of cost calculated. The industrial 
sector was found to incur the highest total electricity outage cost. The total outage cost 
 
 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
Cost per kWh  
(US$) 
 
 
Direct and Indirect 
(Backup) cost (US$) 
 
 
Total outage 
cost 
Sector 
outage 
to GDP 
C1 C2 C1 C2 US$ % 
Agriculture 2.79 1.64 52116305 32224459 84340764 1.5 
Industrial 7.94 5.15 747281135 432237491 1179518626 22.1 
Mining 8.06 6.20 249736248 162107136 411843384 7.7 
Households 0.23 0.30 32448700 20693766 53142466 1.24 
TOTAL  
- - 
1081582388 677114044 1758696432 32.6 
x 
 
of all four sectors in 2009 was estimated to be US$1.76 billion. The total outage cost 
impact as a percentage of GDP generated varied per sector. It was 1.24% for 
households and 22.1 percent for industry; 32.6 percent in total.  
 
Zimbabwe does not have to bear these costs. If ZESA were to invest a once off US$1.5 
billion in increased power generating structures (which would accumulate to US$1.878 
billion with interest) it can all but eliminate the power outage problem in the country 
for the immediate future – a figure just more than the total estimate per annum cost 
imposed on users by power outages in Zimbabwe.  
 
Electricity outages imposed significant costs in Zimbabwe and it is clear that there is an 
economic need to increase electricity supply capacity and increase the efficiency of the 
allocation of electricity. The government and the power utility must invest in large scale 
power generation capacity expansion and maintenance of the current grid system in 
order to minimise transmission losses and faults , and the pricing structure and systems 
will have to be changed so as to reduce distortions. 
 
For other countries in the SAPP and Sub-Saharan Africa, the cost estimated for 
Zimbabwe is a wake-up call in terms of cost incurred by electricity consumers from 
power outages currently being experienced. 
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UNITS OF ELECTRICITY MEASUREMENT 
 
Unit   Equivalent  
1Kilowatt (kW)  1 000   (One Thousand)  Watts  
1Megawatt (MW)  1 000 000  (One Million)  Watts  
1Gigawatt (GW)  1 000 000 000  (One Billion)  Watts  
1Terawatt (TW)  1 000 000 000 000  (One Trillion)  Watts  
1Gigawatt  1 000 000  (One Million)  Kilowatts  
Thousand Gigawatts  1 000 000 000  (One Billion)  Kilowatts  
1Kilowatthours (kWh)  1 000  (One Thousand)  Watthours  
1Megawatthours (MWh)  1000 000  (One Million)  Watthours  
1Gigawatthours (GWh)  1 000 000 000  (One Billion)  Watthours  
1Terawatthours (TWh)  1 000 000 000 000  (One Trillion)  Watthours  
1Gigawatthours  1 000000  (One Million)  Kilowatthours  
Thousand Gigawatthours  1 000 000000  (One Billion)  Kilowatthours  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE EMERGENCE OFAN ELECTRICITY CRISIS IN 
ZIMBABWE, REFORM RESPONSE AND COST 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
1.0 MOTIVATION 
 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the cost of electricity outages in Zimbabwe 
during the year 2009.  This cost will be assessed as the extra expenditure incurred as 
a result of the public utility choosing not to increase its generating capacity. The base 
case or status quo is one of under-supply, and a cost structure identified in Figure 1.1 
below as SACB (Shortrun Average Cost). The alternative case, against which this 
thesis compares, is one of optimally satisfying demand (D1), by installing extra power 
generating capacity and having a cost structure identified in Figure 1.1 below as 
SACA. The model assumes declining and then constant Longrun Average Cost (LAC) – 
a natural monopoly situation. 
 
Figure 1.1: Base and Alternative Cases Cost Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the base case QB is supplied at tariff P1, while in the alternative case QA is supplied 
at P1. 
 
Cost/ 
Price 
SACB  
SACA 
D1 
LAC 
Power Generated  QA QB 
P1 
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The secondary objectives of this thesis are to: 
- identify the main features of power crisis in Zimbabwe and government 
response to it with a regional power generated setting;  
- formulate a model that clearly identifies the different cost components of 
power outages in Zimbabwe;  
- identify appropriate methods by which to estimate these cost components ;  
- estimate the cost of power outages to the productive sectors (mining, 
agriculture and industrial) and households of Zimbabwe;  
- critically analyse the credibility of these estimates; and 
- consider the saving of costs of outages achieved through increased 
investment in generating capacity in Zimbabwe. 
 
The thesis addresses these objectives in the following way and with the following 
structure. Chapters 1 and 2 identify the main features of the crisis and the 
government response to it. Chapter 3 models the outage cost. Chapters 4 and 5 
identify the methods of estimation. Chapters 6 to 9 apply these methods to estimate 
the cost in the productive and household sectors. Chapter 10 critically analyses the 
credibility of the estimates. Chapter 11 calculates the saving in power outage cost 
that can be realised through increased power generation, concludes and makes 
recommendations. 
 
The motivation for estimating the outage cost is to reveal the economic importance 
of attending to the problem of under power generation. The outage cost information 
can be used in three kinds of decision making related to supply. Firstly, it can show 
the economic impact of under investing in the electricity generating and distribution 
structures. Secondly, it can inform tariff setting so that there is less distortion in the 
allocation of electricity. Thirdly, it can be used to guide ZESA in respect of which 
areas, regions and sectors there should be load shedding. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Zimbabwe is a land locked country in the centre of Southern Africa. It has a surface 
area of 390 757 km2 and a population of approximatly 13.2 million people (CSO 
2008).  Between 1980 and 2007, there was an 80 percent growth in electrification in 
urban areas, 20 percent in rural areas and 41 percent overall (CSO 2008). Available 
information indicates that only 40 percent of Zimbabwe’s population had access to 
the public utility power supply in 2008 and consumed electricity per capita was 
430kWh (see Table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1: Statistical Features of Electricity Supply in Zimbabwe 
Indicator   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Maximum Daily Peak Demand (MW) 2028 2028 2040 2045 2045 2040 2034 
Energy Sales (GWh) Annual 10225 10321 10367 10116 10408 10307 10028 
Consumption per Capita (kWh) 818 828 864 798 826 496 430 
New Connections (domestic)  5248 6794 7453 10245 13926 12094 8162 
Total Number of customers 201073 228465 245859 284562 338954 415667 500083 
Source: ZESA (2009); CSO (2008)  
 
There is only one producer and seller of electricity, namely the Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority (ZESA). For about 50 years the industry operated as a regulated 
monopoly (Mangwengwende 2005:5; World Bank 2008). The public monopoly 
operates under difficult circumstances (Mangwengwende 2005:2): power generation 
limitation, declining investment and aging hydro and thermal plants. Of the installed 
capacity (ZESA 2009): 
• 25% is over 45 years old (Kariba Hydro-power Station). 
• 50% is over 20 years old (Hwange and Bulawayo Thermal Power Stations)  
• 25% is over 25 years old. (Harare and Munyati Thermal Power Stations)  
Most of the generators are in need of rehabilitation.  
 
1.2 SOURCES OF ELECTRITY AND INDUSTRY DECOMPOSITION 
 
Zimbabwe’s electricity generation, transmission and distribution are handled by 
ZESA, a government parastatal under the Ministry of Energy and Power 
Development (MEPD).  
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1.2.1 Sources of Electricity Generation 
 
Figure 1.2: Electricity Generation Plant Locations 
 
Source: ZESA (2009) 
The locations of the generation plants are shown in Figure 1.2. The country has two 
major sources of domestic electricity supply: thermal (coal fired) and hydro sources. 
ZESA used to generate electricity from five plants: four thermal power stations (TPS) 
and one hydro-power station (HPS) (ZESA 2009). Zimbabwe relies mainly on coal 
fired thermal power generation. This source accounts for about 68% of domestic 
electricity supply in terms of total available generation capacity as of 2000 (Kayo 
2002). The other 32% is generated from hydro resources of the Zambezi River (the 
Kariba Hydro Power Station). The generation capacity available from the potential 
(installed) capacity for the years 2000 and 2009 is shown in Table 1.2. In 2009, the 
sources accounted for 52% thermal and 48% hydro as some of the coal fired plants 
were not generating as they were decommissioned. 
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Table 1.2: Power Generation Capacity in Zimbabwe: 2000 and 2009 
Station Name Plant type 
Nameplate 
capacity(MW) 
Available 
Capacity (MW) 
by 2000 
Available 
Capacity (MW) 
by 2009 
Hwange Coal-fired 920 800 560 
Kariba Hydro-electric 720 470 420 
Harare Coal –fired 135 60 0 
Bulawayo Coal-fired 120 90 0 
Munyati Coal-fired 150 60 0 
Total  1975 1480 1080 
Sources: ZESA(2000); ZESA(2009) and UNDP (2009) 
Zimbabwe also imports electricity from other countries. Zimbabwe was importing 
40% of its electricity requirements in 2005 (ZESA 2009), but imports dropped 
dramatically after that. The power imports and their sources are shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Zimbabwe’s Power Imports: 2000, 2005 and 2009 
 
Country 
 
 
Interconnection 
Voltage (kV) 
 
 
Maximum 
capacity(MW) 
Available 
Capacity 
(MW)2000 
Available 
Capacity 
(MW)2005 
Available 
Capacity 
(MW)2009 
Mozambique 400 500 500 200 100 
South Africa 400 500 150-500 100 0 
Zambia 300 700 100-500 50 0 
D.R. Congo 220 250 159 100 0 
Botswana 220 100 60 0 0 
Source: ZESA (2000); ZESA (2005) and ZESA (2009) 
 
Zimbabwe has several stand-alone mini-hydro schemes with small capacities - see 
Table 1.4a (Kayo 2002). These schemes have been developed with financial 
assistance from donor agencies and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such 
as the Intermediate Development Technology Group (ITDG) and ENDA-Zimbabwe. 
There were also partnerships with foreign companies like Rusitu. The other major 
stand-alone generating systems are privately owned sugar estates such as the 
Triangle Ltd (32 MW) and Hippo Valley Estates (26 MW) (Kayo 2001; ZESA 2009).  
Hippo Valley entered into a deal with ZESA to sell 11 MW (Table 1.4b) during the 
cane crushing season with the installation of a new turbo-alternator (Mutsambiwa 
2001; ZESA 2009). 
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Table 1.4a: Mini-hydro sites in Zimbabwe 
Name Capacity (kW) End Use 
Svinurai 20 Electrification of households 
Mutsikira 25 Drives a hammer mill, irrigation water pump, saw and grinder 
Aberfoyle 25 Electrification of households 
Nyarufu 40 Electrification of households 
Kuenda 74 Irrigation water pumping 
Kwenda 80 Irrigation water pump, electrification of households 
Claremount 250 Electrification of households 
Rusitu 750 Electrification of households 
Source: Mapako (2001); Kayo (2002); Mbohwa (2001); ZESA (2006) and ZESA (2009) 
 
Table 1.4b: Installed Capacity of Sugar Mills 
Mill Cane Crushing Capacity (TCH) Available installed Capacity (MW) 
Hippo Valley 480 26 
Triangle 430 32 
Source: Mutsambiwa (2001) and ZESA (2009) 
 
Power generation at Hippo Valley, using a 20MW turbo-alternator is as follows: 9 
MW for mill consumption and Estate Feeder and 11MW sold to ZESA. A number of 
small-scale wind power projects have been set up in the eastern part of the country. 
Solar photovoltaics (PV) have not played a significant role in Zimbabwe's electricity 
generation and use. However, large-scale solar PV dissemination has been 
undertaken in Zimbabwe with some level of success. For instance, the GEF/UNDP 
Project disseminated over 10,000 systems in Zimbabwe between 1993 and 1999 
(Mulugeta, Nhete & Jackson 2000; Kayo 2002; ZESA 2009), mostly to rural 
institutions, rural businesses and high-income households. 
 
Local private sector companies have not played a significant role in the financing of 
power sector projects in Zimbabwe. A lack of an enabling legal and regulatory 
framework has constrained the entry of the private sector (Mangwengwende 2005). 
Even though the Electricity Act was revised in 1996, the revisions required that new 
entrants intending to build power plants with a capacity above  100 kW, apply and 
seek approval from the utility and the responsible Government department (Kayo 
2002; Mangwengwende 2005; World Bank 2008). 
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1.2.2 Functional Decomposition of Electricity Industry 
 
 
The electricity supply industry can be functionally divided into generation, 
transmission, distribution, and supply (Steiner 2000:8; ZESA 2008). These functions 
are differentiated technologically and economically.   
1.2.2.1 Generation  
 
Generation involves the transformation of one form of energy into electrical energy. 
Generating technologies are differentiated according to their cost structure and 
generating input. The main cost components of electricity generation are fuel cost, 
capital cost, and operating and maintenance cost. Cost is also influenced by the 
performance of the generating technology (capacity factor, thermal effic iency, and 
operating life) (ZPC 2009): 
 In the hydro-power plant, water under high pressure (from gravity and water 
weight) spins turbines that drive generators. The process is efficient, 
extracting between 60 and 65 percent of the input into usable electricity (ZPC 
2009). Water is a renewable resource. Hydro generation costs depend largely 
on geography and climate.  
 In a coal fired power plant, the prime agent of power generation is steam. 
Water is heated, turns into steam and spins a steam turbine which drives an 
electric generator. The process is inefficient, extracting between 30 and 35 
percent of the input energy into usable electricity (ZPC 2009). Coal is a non- 
renewable resource and burning coal causes damage to the environment. 
However, coal is abundant in Zimbabwe (Ministry of Mines and Power 
Development 2009).  
1.2.2.2 Transmission 
 
The transmission of electricity is along cables, which as a network is called a power 
grid (Ruibal 2006:12). As soon as electricity is generated, it is transformed into high 
voltage electricity and transported along lines of up to 770 kV; the motivation being  
to reduce energy losses in the transmission process (ZPC 2009). Transmission 
involves delivering of electricity from the power generation plants to high voltage 
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receiving stations. Transmission also involves the management of dispersed 
generators in a grid to maintain voltage and frequency and to prevent system 
breakdowns. Transmission is a natural monopoly as competition in transmission 
would result in wasteful duplication of power grids. 
1.2.2.3 Distribution   
 
After the electricity has been transmitted and received, high breaking voltage 
transformers reduce the voltage to less than 11 kV for distribution purposes (ZETDC 
2009). Voltage reduction is done in consecutive steps in stations, substations and 
small transformers until a low voltage of 110V to 220V is reached, one suitable for 
most end users. Like transmission, it is generally considered to be a natural 
monopoly as competition would entail duplication of the existing set of transformers 
and distribution wiring. Distribution also involves the retailing of electricity to end-
users through managing the connection, metering, billing, and marketing.  
 
1.3 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE GENERATION OF 
POWER IN ZIMBABWE 
 
1.3.1 Institutional Reforms 
Before 1985, the Zimbabwe power sector retained strong links to the Zambian 
power system (Kayo 2002:2). The government adopted the colonial policies 
governing electricity supply. The Central African Power Corporation (CAPCO), jointly 
owned by Zimbabwe and Zambia, had the responsibility for generating and 
transmitting power to both countries. The Electricity Supply Commission (ESC) was 
responsible for electricity transmission in Zimbabwe. The ESC was also involved in 
the distribution of power to the rural areas and other smaller towns. The 
municipalities of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare (Zimbabwe's major cities) 
were responsible for their own distribution (Dube 1999:2). 
 
The Electricity Act of 1985 (Chapter 13:19), established the current ZESA - a vertically 
integrated monopoly with the functions of generation, transmission and distribution  
of electricity.  
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The five publicly owned power utilities were amalgamated to form the current ZESA 
with the aim of streamlining the administration of the electricity s ector, improving 
efficiency, reducing duplication of functions and facilitating centralised planning. 
Under this structure a national tariff structure was created that allowed cross 
subsidisation.  
 
The Act gave the following powers to ZESA: 
 To generate, transmit, distribute and sell electric power throughout the 
country; 
 To acquire, hold and dispose of land for purposes of effective operation and 
attainment of the objective of regular power supply; 
 To suspend electric power supply to consumers for such periods as may be 
necessary for carrying out inspections, tests or repairs and making of new 
connections; and 
 To license Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to generate electricity and to 
set the purchase price for purchasing electricity from the producers. 
 
The Act did not provide room for third party access , nor other uses of the grid by 
third parties such as the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP 
2000). 
 
In 1987 Zimbabwe and Zambia signed an agreement in Harare (28 July) concerning 
the utilisation of Zambezi River. The two countries desired to obtain, for economic, 
industrial and social development, the greatest possible benefit from the natural 
advantage offered by the water of the Zambezi River and to improve and intensify 
utilisation of the water for the production of energy and for any other purpos e 
beneficial to the two countries. In terms of Article 2 sub-article 2 of the agreement, 
each contracting state agreed to: 
a. repeal the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in Council, 1963, in 
respect of its own territory;   
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b. repeal the legislation specifically relating to the Central African Power 
Corporation and replacing it with new legislation more suitable to the new 
arrangements specified in the Agreement; and  
c. amend any of its other existing laws to give full effect to the provisions of the 
Agreement. 
The corporation’s services to the consumers were sufficient in the 1980s, but they 
have fallen short since the 1990s. ZESA faced numerous problems in early 1990s in 
the form of overstaffing, operational inefficiencies and electricity power shortages 
due to droughts. To turn around the organisation, the government of Zimbabwe 
instituted a Performance Improvement Programme (PIP) between 1993 and 1995. Its 
aim was to improve operational performance in the areas of finance, customer 
services, generation, transmission, distribution and human resources management. 
In addition, the formulation and institution of the Corporate Business Plan in July 
1995 laid the foundation for sustainable performance improvements. 
In 1996, the government revised the Electricity Act in order to create room for 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Little response was achieved, as the revised 
Act required IPPs of 100kW and above to apply for approval. In 1996 the 
privatisation and expansion of the Hwange Thermal Power Station (TPS) was 
proposed. It was also recommended that in order for this project to be economically 
viable, the long run marginal cost (LRMC) pricing principle should be adopted. The 
government agreed in principle to adopt the LRMC pricing principle, but did not 
implement it (DOE 2002). The initiative to privatise several power stations, including 
the Hwange project, was subsequently abandoned (Energy Policy 2002). 
 
In 1999, the Zimbabwean government established a regulator and a Rural 
Electrification Fund (REF) and in 2002 Parliament passed two Acts, the Electricity Act 
and the Rural Electrification Fund Act to complement the previous reforms. The new 
Electricity Act allowed for the establishment of the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (ZERC) and the restructuring of the ZESA into a holding company.  
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The government decided to appropriately restructure ZESA in a phased manner in 
2003. The Electricity Amendment Bill of 2003 also recommended the formation of 
five successor companies under ZESA holdings: the Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC), 
Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission Company (ZETCO), Zimbabwe Electricity 
Distribution Company (ZEDC), ZESA Enterprises and Powertel Communications. 
Recognising the ever increasing duplication of activities between ZEDC and ZETCO, 
ZESA decided to reunite the two into Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution Company (ZETDC) in 2008. The functions of the other arms of ZESA 
remained the same. The rationale for the restructuring was to increase efficiency 
and provide the opportunity to correct previous imbalances in management and 
operations in the electricity sector. 
 
A revised legal instrument for ZESA was passed in 2008 vesting it with the sole 
responsibility of electricity generation in Zimbabwe (ZESA 2009). This did not help 
and a deterioration in the supply source continued. The private sector’s response to 
the poor quality of ZESA’s electricity supply was  increased effort to provide its own 
electricity. In recent years, virtually all major new establishments, whether privately 
or publicly owned, commercial or individual enterprises, have undertaken 
substantial investment in private electricity supply arrangements. The impact of this 
investment was to increase costs and reduce the competitiveness of the country’s  
production, both locally and internationally. 
1.3.1.1. Zimbabwe Electricity Legislation  
 
The legislative structure under which the electricity systems are managed influences 
the reliability and security of electricity supply (Steiner 2000:8; Wall 2001:12 & 
Mangwengwende 2005:7). 
 
The Energy Draft Policy of 2007 recognises electricity provision as a means to 
alleviate poverty. It stipulates that electricity should be provided in a way that 
promotes development, recovers costs and is sensitive to demand (Energy Draft 
Policy 2007:5). 
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The Electricity Amendment Bill of 2007, Section 24 (1) stipulates that “… any player 
may recover the cost or any part of the cost of acquiring or constructing any works 
of electricity generation and supply after considering the benefits from the works 
and any contribution that the player made to electricity supply in partnership with 
the government or electricity utility.” The intention of government was to encourage 
public-private partnerships. One such project, the Nyangani mini-hydro in 
Manicaland province, was commissioned in 2007 for the Nyanga business 
community and the nearby rural areas. 
1.3.1.2 The Zimbabwe Energy Institutional Framework 
 
According to section 5 of the Zimbabwe Electricity Act (2002), the duties of managing 
electricity are vested in the government under the Ministry of Energy and Power 
Development (MEPD). The ministry’s structure is laid out in Figure 1.3 (next page). 
The leading government agency for electricity under the ministry is the Directorate 
of Power Development. The department has three sub-divisions: 
 ZESA Holdings (Pvt) Ltd., an organisation created through an amendment to 
the Act, the Electricity Amendment Act (No. 3) of 2003. It is responsible for 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity to final consumers .  
 Rural Electrification Fund (REF), a subdivision responsible for electricity 
delivery in the rural areas. The department has two other sections, the 
Expanded Rural Electrification Programme (EREP) and Electricity End-Use 
Infrastructure Development (EEUID). The EREP seeks to extend the electricity 
grid into rural areas. The EEUID endeavours to empower rural communities 
socio-economically by promoting the use of electricity-intensive equipment, 
for example, irrigation pump sets and agro-processing machines. 
 Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC), a statutory body 
established in terms of the Electricity Act (No. 3) of 2002, (the act) as 
amended by the Electricity Amendment Act (No.3) of 2003. The Commission 
regulates those involved in generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity.  
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1.3.2 Tariff Reform 
 
In 1986, the government commissioned consultants to undertake a tariff policy-study. 
The consultants recommended that the LRMC pricing principle be adopted. The LRMC 
covering price required to support this development programme was estimated in the 
year 1990 to be between 6 and 7 US c/kWh, depending on the level of imports 
(AFREPREN 2000). Another study was done in 1988 by different consultants , which 
reached similar conclusions (Mangwengwende 2001:6). The government did not 
implement either of the recommendations (Kayo 2002:5). Tariffs have stayed well below 
this level, as shown in Table 1.5. 
 
Table 1.5: Average Electricity Tariff Trend: 1998-2009 
Year Av.Price (USc/kWh) Year Av.Price(USc/kWh) 
1998 3.49 2004 4.67 
1999 1.40 2005 4.78 
2000 2.35 2006 4.92 
2001 4.06 2007 5.20 
2002 4.86 2008 5.05 
2003 4.95 2009 3.45 
Source: Energy Policy (2002 and 2009) 
An Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was introduced in 1991, in terms 
of which the Ministry of Finance agreed with the World Bank to a phased introduction of 
tariff adjustments.  The objective was to attain LRMC levels by 1995/96 (Kayo 2002:5). 
The target date was later moved to 2000, after several revisions and updates to the 
System Development Plans (SDP). However, due to the political unpopularity of raising 
the tariff, successive Ministers of Energy have failed to implement the LRMC tariff 
programme. 
 
In January 1999, ZESA decided to develop an automatic tariff-adjustment formula as a 
way of divorcing the tariff-setting process from politics (Kayo 2002:5). The Electricity Act 
empowered ZESA to negotiate tariffs for special customers whose ope rations were 
incompatible with the standard tariffs. It was agreed to implement a new tariff formula 
with effect from 1 August 1999, after giving formal written notice to each customer (Kayo 
2002:6). The result of the formula was a dramatic improvement in the financial 
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performance of ZESA. Monthly revenue jumped from Z$600 million to over Z$1 billion 
within the first 2 months of introducing the formula (Kayo 2002:7). By December 1999, 
ZESA reported that its net deficit had shrunk from Z$6.6 billion (in 1998) to Z$1.7 billion 
(ibid). 
 
While the tariff adjustment formulae helped to raise the average tariff levels, it did not 
address the problem of untargeted subsidies implicit in the tariff structure. The LRMC 
pricing study recommendations advocated for the removal of any cross subsidies in order 
to achieve economic efficiency. Had the government adopted the LRMC pricing principle 
as the official tariff policy, it would have lost its scope for instituting cross-subsidisation. 
 
In line with the reforms, the following tariff pricing objectives were developed in 2004 for 
the stakeholders, namely customers, the power utility and the government (Table 1.6): 
 
Table 1.6: Tariff pricing objectives 
 
Expectations Tariff Objectives Description 
Customer Affordable Least cost option 
Non-discriminatory Tariff should be applicable to all customers on equal and 
fair basis. 
Predictable and stable Customers should be kept informed and real price 
adjustments should be gradual. 
Transparent Easy to read and apply and contains no hidden cost. 
Utility Cost reflective Cover the costs of the business plus rate of return (profit) 
component. 
Encourage efficient use Appropriate price signals that will stimulate efficient use. 
Implementation cost Implementation and transaction cost should be low. 
Government Social support Tariff levels and structures should accommodate social 
programmes. 
Self sufficient in 
generation capacity 
Expansion through development of own resources. 
 
Source: Zimbabwe Economic Society (ZES) (2009) 
 
The objectives were inconsistent (Table 1.6) – the affordability, cost coverage and social 
support objectives clashed. 
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 With the assistance of a consultant, several other Economic Regulation Options were also 
considered in 2004 (Figure 1.4). 
Figure 1.4: Economic Regulation Options 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zimbabwe Economic Society (ZES) (2009)  
 
Among the economic regulation and price formation choices, ZESA adopted the cost-plus-
rate of return option. This option is the most widely used in the region and the rest of the 
world. ZESA adopted the option as it is a tried and tested one. However, the option 
requires the establishment of revenue requirement. The revenue requirement formula is 
provided in equation 1.1. 
 
                                                                 
1.1 
 
Expenses (Cost of Sales) include operation and maintenance cost, customer service cost, 
overhead cost and asset depreciation cost, while Return on Assets (ROA) is the Net assets 
value (historic/current) X Rate of Return (nominal/real). 
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The Cost + rate of return approach, did not work. The limiting factor was government’s 
reluctance, due to concerns over social support and affordability to the rural people and 
farmers. A comparison of ZESA’s tariff and other countries ’ tariffs is shown in Figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.5: Price comparison of ZESA and other countries 
 
 
Source: Eskom (2009) 
Compared with other countries Zimbabwe has a low price (Figure 1.5).  
 
1.3.3 The Impact of the Reforms 
 
1.3.3.1 Impact on ZESA 
 
During the first three years of operation of the reform programme, the expected 
improved efficiencies were not achieved and ZESA operated at a loss (Mangwengwende 
2005:5). As a result, it was forced to curtail some of its initiatives on rural electrification.  
1.3.3.2 Impact on Access to Electricity 
 
Access to electricity grew from 27 to 34 percent of the population between 1996 and 
1999, and to 39 percent by 2002 (World Bank 2003:75). The positive impact on 
electrification access rates is evident in the statistics in Table 1.7. The electrification 
access statistics are based on the proportion of the population who are connected to the 
grid. Surveys have established that the average number of people who benefit from each  
domestic connection are 10 to 12 (Mangwengwende 2005).  
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Table 1.7: Electrification Access Statistics 
 
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 
Urban % of total 72 74 78 80 81 82 84 84 85 86 85 80 80 40 
Rural % of total 12 14 16 17 18 20 22 23 25 21 22 20 20 20 
National % of total 27 29 31 34 36 37 39 41 41 42 41 41 40 40 
 
 
Source: Mangwengwende (2005), ZESA (2008) and ZESA (2009) 
 
If account is taken of people who are not connected, but have a direct and indirect 
benefit (by living within 10 to 20 kilometres of an electrified centre) it would appear that 
about three quarters of the Zimbabwe population enjoy the benefits of access to grid 
electrification (Mangwengwende 2005:4; ZESA 2008 & ZESA 2009).  
 
1.3.3.3 Impact on Subsidies 
 
The utility is facing financial subsidy a burden as it is obliged to provide certain categories 
of customers’ electricity below cost and with no compensation from government (Kayo 
2002:11; Mangwengwende 2005:5; ZESA 2008; ZESA 2009). Lifeline electricity tariff 
subsidies in Zimbabwe entail preferential pricing to domestic consumers. Subsidies are 
also extended to the connection fees, where by ZESA charges below the true connection 
cost. Subsidies are based on an assessment of consumers’ ability to pay and the cost of 
alternative fuel. The ability to pay is established within a range of 5 to 10 percent of take-
home pay for the household (Energy Policy 2002). Total ZESA annual electricity subsidies 
were reported to be in the range of 42 to 55 percent of the total revenue in 2002 (Dube 
2003:5) and 50 percent in 2006 (ZESA 2007). 
 
The subsidies also extend to productive sectors for small and newly established firms. 
Such tariff subsidisation is done in order to stimulate industrial growth (Dube 2003:5). 
Tariffs are structured in such a way that industrial or commercial and mining tariffs are 
higher than domestic and agricultural tariffs (Davidson & Mwakasonda 2003:30). The 
subsidies make the electricity cheaper to a large pool of consumers.  
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1.3.3.4 Financial Impact on ZESA 
 
An indication of the financial impact on ZESA during power sector reform and 
electrification phases is provided in Table 1.8. The table describes net profit and 
electrification access as a percentage of the population connected to the grid.  
 
Table 1.8: Revenue, Profit and Debt Collection  
 
Year 
Revenue 
(US$ Million) 
Operating Profit 
(US$ Million) 
Net Profit 
(US$ Million) 
Debtors 
(Days) 
1990 223.6 64.1 (0.8) 70 
1991 184.9 62.6 (24.1) 74 
1992 279.2 67.8 (14.5) 85 
1993 305.7 101.8 6.7 99 
1994 234.1 101.3 9.9 61 
1995 265.2 104.3 10.0 50 
1996 303.5 105.7 10.0 56 
1997 331.7 100.3 9.6 32 
1998 260.3 (2.0) (174.1) 25 
1999 230.9 40.4 (44.1) 32 
2000 428.3 124.6 54.2 33 
2001 521.1 120.8 33.0 39 
2002 349.8 76.2 3.1 52 
2003 178.4 (24) (173) 52 
2004 176.3 (25) (210) 56 
2005 150.2 (35) (250) 60 
2006 120.7 (45) (275) 65 
2007 95.7 (55) (320) 68 
 
 
 
Note: US$ equivalent based on parallel exchange rate to give realistic equivalent figures. 
Source: Mangwengwende (2005:5); CSO (2007); ZESA (2008) and Own Calculations 
 
 
Table 1.7 shows a steady growth in access from 20 percent in 1991 to 41 percent in 2004 
to 42 percent in 2005 and 41 percent in 2006-2007. Table 1.8 shows that for the same 
period, the utility had positive operating profits until 2002 with the exception of 1998. 
The operating profit represents the financial viability without capital cost. Due to the 
utility’s heavy debt financing the net profit was negative in the early 1990’s, in 1998 and 
1999 and from 2003 to 2007 (Table 1.8). 
 
The electrification phase was not only effective in increasing access, but also in 
generatingnet operating profit. The net losses recorded in 1998 and 1999 were due to the 
revaluation of the foreign currency denominated liabilities , following the devaluation of 
the Zimbabwe dollar between November 1997 to early 2000 and not due to the 
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electrification programme (ZESA 2001). The adverse effects of the devaluation were 
reversed within 16 months through a series of (quarterly) tariff adjustments (ZESA 2003). 
 
The positive trend in financial performance was reversed in 2002 when political pressure 
forced ZESA to incur heavy short-term debt to finance an expanded rural electrification 
programme (Mangwengwende 2005:6). Many of the projects were selected for political 
expediency rather than economic and financial viability, as was recommended in the 
master plan. The cost of the expanded programme was estimated at Z$25 billion, which 
was the equivalent to US$450 million at the official exchange rate at that time 
(Mangwengwende 2001:5). Although there was a six-fold increase in the Rural 
Electrification (RE) levy, the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) was still only able to raise 
about US$18 to US$30 million per year. The REA did not have the borrowing capacity to 
bridge the finance gap. 
  
To overcome this constraint the REA operated as a subsidiary of the utility, which was 
directed by government to borrow on behalf of the REA in a contravention of the Rural 
Electrification Fund Act. The latter stated that “The Board (of the Fund) shall ensure that 
in any financial year expenditures and commitments from the Fund shall not exceed the 
annual income of the Fund” (section 36). This provision was made to maintain the 
financial viability of the REA. 
 
By the end of 2004 ZESA had borrowed more than Z$55 billion on the domestic market 
and US$110 million on the international market to finance the expanded rural 
electrification programme (ZESA 2004). These loans were all high interest short-term 
facilities with maturities ranging from 90 days to 5 years (ibid). Debt service on the loans 
exceeded the utility’s capacity to service them, forcing the government to assume the 
responsibility of direct financial subsidies to keep the utility from bankruptcy.  
 
The institutional supportive framework for the generation of power remains inadequate – 
with the result that electricity shortages contribute to the economic crisis faced by 
Zimbabwe. 
21 
 
1.4 A CRISIS UNFOLDS 
 
At the time of writing (2009-2011) Zimbabwe was a country in crisis. The crisis had many 
dimensions - poverty traps with a declining Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an AIDS 
epidemic, continuous electricity outages, international isolation, high emigration of skilled 
labour and ongoing internal conflicts and political differences of what (indeed) was the 
collective choice of the Zimbabwean people. There were a multitude of the causes of the 
crisis. This thesis only examined one factor of the crisis - the contribution made by 
electricity outages. Specifically, it investigated the cost imposed on Zimbabwe’s 
agriculture, mining, industry and households due to unreliable power supply.  
 
For many developing countries unreliable supply of electricity is the norm rather than the 
exception (Jyoti, Ozbafli & Jenkins 2006:1). Electricity power problems are not unique to 
Zimbabwe alone. Most countries in SADC region and Africa as a continent were 
experiencing power outages during the period 2008 to 2010. Unreliable electricity supply 
is a serious problem because electricity is irreplaceable for the sustainable development 
of a country, as it laterally drives the economy (Eto, Divan & Brumsickle 2001:1). It is a 
powerful tool for uplifting people's livelihoods (Rose, Oladosou & Salvino 2004).   
 
The availability of affordable and reliable electricity supply in the SADC region is critical 
for attracting sustained flows of investment. Power utility companies in South Africa and 
Zambia, in a bid to minimally satisfy demand in Zimbabwe, resorted to load shedding, 
much to the chagrin of their own domestic and commercial consumers (Clement & 
Shanaka 2008). The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP 2006:2) indicated that power 
deficits in the region would persist between 2008 and 2012. SAPP identified projects 
aimed at providing adequate and reliable power supply to the region amounting to 6 550 
MW to be commissioned at a cost of over US$ 5 billion (ibid).  
 
The generation of electricity in 2009 was at 55% of the potential capacity (ZPC 2009). To 
meet local demand the rest had to be imported (ZESA 2009). Total electricity supply fell 
well below demand. To manage the load, the power utility provider (ZESA) resorted to 
planned and unplanned load shedding. The supply of electricity in Zimbabwe depends on 
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weather conditions because the latter affects water levels for electricity generation at the 
Kariba Hydro Power Station (HPS) and reliability of coal supply to Hwange thermal power 
station (TPS). The latter consumes about 6 000 to 9 000 tonnes of coal per day (ZESA 
2009).  
 
The causes of outages are mainly load shedding due to limited supply. The power utility,  
ZESA, switches-off some load in order to balance supply and demand in the event of loss 
of internal generation or power imports. Outages are experienced during peak hours. 
ZESA has to balance power during peak, standard and off-peak hours of a day and these 
are shown in Table 1.9. 
 
Table 1.9: The Time of Use Periods 
 
 Hour 
Day 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
S/Ha O O O O O O O S S S S S S S S s S P P p S S O O 
WDb O O O O O O O P P P P P S S S s S P P p P S O O 
Sac O O O O O O O P P P P S S S S s S P P P S S O O 
 
 
aS/H –Sunday or Holiday; bWD- Week Day; cSa- Saturdayp-Peak time; s-Standard time; 
o- Off-peak 
 
Source: ZESA (2009) 
 
The different times and patterns of use translates to the daily load curve. Load shedding 
times are required when supply falls below demand, namely when there is peak demand 
(Figure 1.6). 
 
Figure 1.6 shows when load shedding is required. When available supply capacity 
improves towards the potential supply of 1975Mw (blue line shifts upwards towards the 
green line), there is less targeted load shedding required. If supply worsens (blue line 
moves downwards towards the red line), outages increase due to an increased need for 
load shedding. 
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Figure 1.6: Daily Load Curve in 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Source: ZESA National Control Centre (2009) 
Due to predictability of peak demand per day, ZESA drafted a load shedding programme 
for its customer sectors showing the times they would be cut off from power supply 
(Table 1.10). 
Table 1.10: Load shedding programme for 2009 and beyond 
 
Customer category 
PERIOD 
Morning Time  
(0400-1030 hrs) 
During The Day 
(1030-1700hrs) 
Evening Times 
(1700-2100hrs) 
Night Time 
(2100-0400hrs) 
Industrial and 
mining (24 hour) 
ON (reduced 
demand by 50%)  
ON ON (reduced 
demand by 50%)  
ON 
Industrial-12 hour  OFF ON OFF OFF 
Commercial (CBD) OFF ON OFF ON 
Agricultural  OFF ON/OFF OFF ON 
Domestic: Urban ON ON/OFF ON ON 
Domestic: Rural OFF ON/OFF OFF ON 
 
Notes: 1. Load shedding applies to all  areas in the country; 2. The programme applies for all  days  of the week; 
3.Essential services (water works , sewers , hospitals and CBD of Harare and Bulawayo) will not be load shed;  4. Business 
customers  on residential feeders  follow domestic time table; 5. Growth points  and small  towns  follow rural  timetable; 
6. Industrial  customers to be switched off i f they do not reduce demand during off peak. 
Source: ZESA (2009) 
 
  
04:00 10:30 17:00 21:00 
DemandCurve  
Time of Day 
MW 
Available supply 
capacity 1080MW 
1220MW (Peak) 1574MW (Peak) 
Targeted Load Shedding 
Supply 650 MW 
Potential Supply 
capacity 1975 MW 
1975 
1120 
650 
2045 
Installed capacity 
2045MW 
Fall in Supply  
Increase in Supply  
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Some industrial and mining consumers have electricity at all times. Agricultural and urban 
consumers are only guaranteed electricity during the night. Agricultural and domestic 
consumers have electricity supply made available during the day only if there isavailable 
supply capacity.  
 
Electricity outages can also be caused by faults. Such outages are often for long periods 
and not routine, like outages caused by load shedding (ZETDC 2009). The power supply 
shortages have their roots in a mix of energy policy miscues, faulty regulation, ineffective 
electricity demand planning and increasing cost of generation, transmission and 
distribution (Beenstock & Goldin 1997). The Zimbabwean load shedding triggered outages 
are as a result of the following undermining supply factors (ZPC 2009) - lack of investment 
by government in the power utility for expanded electricity generation, internal conflicts, 
drought reducing water supply to the hydro-electric power station, under supply of coal 
to the thermal power station, vandalism of equipment and transmission wires, incorrect 
pricing, excessive regulation and skills flight (ZESA 2009). 
 
All the productive sectors and households are negatively affected by unreliable electricity 
supply (Mayo 2004; Zimmerman, Lave, Restrepo, Dooskin, Hartwell, Miller, Remington, 
Simonoff, & Schussler 2005) and Zimbabwe’s producers and consumers experience very 
high levels of electricity unreliability (Mangwengwende 2005:1). In 2008 and 2009, most 
industries were operating below capacity as a result of power outages and other 
problems (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) 2009). Firms were forced to invest 
in generators as a back-up source of power, although they too have proved to be 
unreliable because of shortages of fuel (ibid). The result was a substantial contraction in 
work time and multiple contractions in the demand for other factors used in the 
production of electricity and production in the productive sectors. Electricity consumers 
responded to unreliable electricity supply through choice of location, factor substitution, 
private provision, choice of business and output reduction.  
 
In most urban areas, power cuts averaged six hours a day during 2009 (Consumer Council 
of Zimbabwe (CCZ 2009). Farmers mostly had electricity during night (Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU 2009).  Firms were constrained to six hours of productive time due to 
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outages (CZI 2009). The average number of hours per day consumers in sectors had to 
operate without electricity in 2009 is shown in Table 1.11. 
 
Table1.11: Average Daily Outage Hours and Percentage of Lost Time per Sector 
 
Sector 
Average  
hours of 
outage 2007 
% of Work 
day Lost 
2007 
Average hours 
of outage in 
2008 
% of Work 
day Lost 
2008 
Average hours 
of outage in 
2009 
% of Work 
day Lost 
2009 
Agriculture 2 25 4 50 6 75 
Mining 0 0 0.5 6.25 1 12.5 
Manufacturing 1 12.5 1 12.5 4 50 
Commerce 1 12.5 1 12.5 4 50 
Domestic: Urban 2 25 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Domestic: Rural 2 25 4 50 6 75 
 
 
Source: CZI (2009) and CCZ (2009) 
 
The average period of electricity outages per day for the three years from 2007 to 2009 
was calculated by the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry (CZI) and Consumer Council 
of Zimbabwe (CCZ) to be two (2) hours in some sectors (see Table 1.11). The Mining 
sector was less affected by the outages due to payment of bills in foreign currency from 
mineral proceeds. Mining companies were able to negotiate their interruptions 
depending on the nature of their business and its importance to the economy 
(Department of Mines 2009). The domestic sector was the worst affected as it could not 
negotiate reduction in its outage time (CCZ 2009). 
 
1.5 THE REGIONAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION CRISIS 
 
Reforms have not solved the crisis  for Zimbabwe. Electricity shortages have also affected 
almost all Southern African Power pool (SAPP) members. 
 
1.5.1 The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
 
The Southern African Power Pool was established in 1995 through an Inter Governmental 
Memorandum of Understanding (IGMOU) as a regional SADC body with the objective of 
optimising the use of available energy resources in the region and supporting one another 
during emergencies (SADC 1995). The member countries and their respective utilities are 
Angola (ENE), Democratic Republic of Congo (SNEL) Tanzania (TANESCO), Malawi 
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(ESCOM), Zambia (ZESCO), Zimbabwe (ZESA), Namibia (NamPower), Botswana (BPC), 
Mozambique (EDM), South Africa (Eskom), Lesotho (LEC) and Swaziland (SEB).  SAPP is a 
regional energy organisation that integrates regional national utilities with the aim of 
addressing the disparities in electricity supply and consumption, and promoting regional 
energy (electricity) trade (SAPP 2005:1). 
 
Prior to the establishment of the SAPP, the SADC region had two smaller power pools, 
one in the north (SNEL, ZESCO and ZESA) with Eskom and the other utilities in the south. 
The strengthening of links between South Africa and Zimbabwe and between 
Mozambique (Hydro Cahora Bassa) and Zimbabwe made it possible to have the one 
regional pool, SAPP. Thereafter, the SADC Utilities signed an Inter Utility Memorandum of 
Understanding (IUMOU) in order to facilitate and develop power pooling and trade in the 
region. SAPP is funded by subscriptions paid by the member utilities. The SAPP Co-
ordination Centre is based in Harare, Zimbabwe and SAPP operations are run through 
subcommittees. The procedures within SAPP for implementing new policy are based on 
each of the utilities having equal voting rights. SAPP facilitates optimal utilisation of 
regional hydro and thermal energy resources and reduces capital and operating costs 
through coordination. 
 
The executive council of SAPP falls under the authority of SADC. Each of the individual 
national utilities in SAPP is owned by their respective government. A regulatory 
framework needs to be put in place before major changes in ownership of the utilities 
take place. In 1999 only two of the 12 countries had full-time appointed electricity 
regulators, South Africa and Zambia. In 2001 a Short Term Energy Market (STEM) was 
operationalised. Since then it has grown from strength to strength. STEM facilitates 
contracts of periods of up to a month long for the supply of electricity to individual 
utilities. It is the ‘Stock Exchange’ of regional power supply (SADC 2006). The SAPP 
Coordination Centre is the facilitator (ibid). At the time of writing, nine countries were 
participating; the exceptions being Angola, Malawi and Tanzania.  
 
Electricity contract sales have been rising every year since April 2001, when STEM started. 
It rose from 766-GWh in 2001 to 4,222-GWh in 2004 (SADC 2006). The highest sale was 
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recorded in 2004 when total sales amounted to US$4.4 million (SAPP 2005). The year 
2005 saw a decline in sales due to reduced energy trade. This decline was mainly due to 
members reducing participation in STEM. HCB and ZESCO did not participate in STEM as 
the two utilities embarked on major power rehabilitation and maintenance works in their 
respective countries (Mozambique and Zambia). At the beginning of 2006, the two 
utilities resumed participation and STEM sales increased again. In addition to trade, the 
SAPP coordinates planning and operation of the interconnected regional power system 
and ensures system security and reliability. The economic background of each country 
varies enormously. GDP and access to electricity in each country in 2006 are shown in 
Table 1.12. 
 
Table 1.12: SAPP’s Economic, Electricity and Demographic Indicators for 2006 
 
Country 
GDP, 2006 
(US$ 
billions) 
Real GDP 
Growth Rate, 
2006 (%) 
Population Access 
to Electricity, 2006 
(%) 
Per Capita 
GDP, 2006 
US$ 
Population 
2006 
(millions) 
Angola $26.0 27.3 12 $1,734 15.2 
Botswana $9.0 5.0 30 $4,944 1.7 
D.R. Congo $5.5 6.5 15 $97 56.4 
Lesotho $1.4 3.2 13 $664 2.2 
Malawi $2.5 5.5 11 $215 11.4 
Mozambique $6.0 7.7 10 $304 19.5 
Namibia $5.0 3.8 17 $2,505 1.9 
South Africa $239.4 4.9 45 $5,093 47.0 
Swaziland $2.0 2.0 20 $1,763 1.2 
Tanzania $12.0 5.7 14 $284 43.3 
Zambia $7.0 6.0 11 $661 10.9 
Zimbabwe $2.9 -10.3 41 $218 13.3 
SAPP 
Total/Weighted 
Average 
290.1 6.3 17.6 $4,171 243.7 
 
Source: Global Insights (2007) 
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Table 1.13: Status of Power Supply Capacity in the SAPP region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNDP (2009) 
 
Table 1.13 shows the SAPP installed capacity, the capacity required and shortfalls in MW. 
In 2009, the countries belonging to SAPP collectively consumed a peak of 43 267MW 
(1.3% of total world consumption) and available capacity was 48 649MW (2.0 percent of 
total world production) (UNDP 2009). The region's dominant economy, South Africa, 
accounted for 83 percent (35 959MW) of the energy consumption and 69.8 percent 
(40 483MW) of its energy production (ibid). Table 1.13 does not calculate the shortfall but 
gives 968MW total SAPP shortfall. The 968MW shortfall is obtained after including 10.2 
percent reserve above required capacity on the basis of total no for each country. 
 
The regional comparison also reveals that, while Zimbabwe has relatively high nameplate 
installed capacity compared to other SADC countries (2 045MW), the available capacity is 
almost 50 percent lower, creating a large deficit in relation to the peak demand (UNDP 
No. Country Utility
Installed 
Capacity 
[MW] As at 
April 2009
Available 
Capacity 
[MW]               
As at April 
2009
Installed 
minus 
Available 
[MW]
2009 Peak 
Demand 
[MW]
Capacity 
Required 
[MW]             
10.2% 
Reserve
Shortfall   
( MW)
1 Angola ENE 1,187             930            257 668
2 Botswana BPC 132               90              42 503
3 DRC SNEL 2,442          1,170         1,272 1,028
4 Lesotho LEC 72               70                2 108
5 Malawi ESCOM 287             267              20 260
6 Mozambique EDM 233             174              59 416
HCB 2,075          2,075               -   
7 Namibia NamPower 393             360              33 430
8 South Africa Eskom 44,170        40,483         3,687 35,959
9 Swaziland SEC 70.6               70                1 200
10 Tanzania TANESCO 1008             680            328 694
11 Zambia ZESCO 1,812          1,200            612 1,604
12 Zimbabwe ZESA 2,045          1,080            965 1,397
       55,927        48,649         7,278         43,267         47,680 968      
53,445      46,772       6,673        41,645               45,893 879      Total Interconnected SAPP
TOTAL SAPP
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2009). The generation mix and contributions for SAPP for the year 2009 are shown in 
Figure 1.7. Electricity in SAPP is generated mainly through thermal or hydroelectric 
resources (Figure 1.7a). Throughout the region, there are significant reserves of coal, 
petroleum and natural gas. Natural gas is becoming more significant to the region's 
energy sector as Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania accelerated the 
development of natural gas fields in their respective countries. 
 
Figure 1.7: Generation Mix and contributions – Year 2009 
 
 
Source: SAPP (2009) 
 
The largest utility (Eskom) in South Africa predominantly generates electricity using 
thermal power, while the medium-sized utilities are predominately using hydropower. 
The majority (95%) of South Africa's current generating capacity of over 38,000 MW is 
provided by coal fired stations. South Africa's thermal stations at Duvha, Kendal, Lesotho 
and Matimba each have generating capacities of about 3500 MW. Swaziland mainly uses 
hydropower and Botswana mainly thermal power (SAPP 2009).  
 
The three largest existing hydropower sites within SAPP are at Inga, DRC (1 775 MW), 
Hydro Cahora Bassa, Mozambique (2 075 MW) and Kariba, Zambia–Zimbabwe (1 266 
MW) (SAPP 2009). The hydro plants are owned by their respective national utilities and 
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20% 
4% 2% 
1.7a Generation Mix  of the SAPP 
Coal 
Hydro 
Nuclear 
Gas/Diesel 
80% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
4% 
1.7b Contributions made to SAPP 
Electricity needs 
South Africa Mozambique Zimbabwe 
Zambia DRC Rest 
30 
 
are parastatal institutions. Despite vast hydro water potential, the DRC only contributes 
2.6 percent of the region’s electricity.  Efficiency has been discussed among the different 
SAPP utilities but plans are often compromised due to technical, political, social and 
financial constraints. In terms of contributions of electricity supply in the region, South 
Africa has the largest share, followed by Mozambique and Zimbabwe (see Figure 1.7b).  
 
Figure 1.8: Bilateral Contracts among member utilities in 2009 
 
 
Source: SAPP (2009)  
 
Electricity trade among these nations takes place through bilateral contracts.  Figure 1.8 
shows some of the bilateral contracts among power utilities in 2009. With the high-
predicted electricity growth rates in the SADC region, the gains from importing cheaper 
hydropower will become more significant with time. The immediate gains would be 
minimising power outages in the SADC region. Due to the region's relatively small urban 
population (approximately 25.4 percent), access to commercial energy sources is limited. 
The majority of SADC's population relies on the use of bio-fuel as its primary source of 
energy. 
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1.5.2 The SAPP Electricity Supply Challenge 
 
As a power pool, SAPP faces significant electricity supply challenges (UNDP 2009). The 
power pool’s peak demand, demand growth and load shedding statistics are shown in 
Table 1.14.  
Table 1.14: Peak Demand and load shedding for SAPP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNDP (2009) 
The table shows that in 2008 the SAPP non-coincidental peak for the interconnected 
utilities was 43 755MW against an availability capacity of 42 404MW.  A total of 1 351MW 
was load shed by ZESA, Eskom and ZESCO, causing power outages in the respective 
countries. In addition, there was diminishing generation surplus available in the power 
pool region in 2009. The peak demand for the interconnected utilities in 2009 was 43 
267MW, against an availability interconnected capacity of 41 645MW.  A total of 758MW 
was load shed by ZESA, Eskom, ZESCO and LEC. ZESA load shed the most, namely 317MW. 
 
The impact of power outage crises reached new heights in 2008 in the power pool when 
the mining companies of Anglo Gold Ashanti Ltd., Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd. and Gold 
Fields Ltd. suspended all but emergency operations on some of the world's largest gold 
No. Country Utility
2008 Peak 
Demand 
[MW]
2009 Peak 
Demand 
[MW]
Demand 
Growth [%]
Load 
Shed 
[MW]
1 Angola ENE 476 668 40%
2 Botswana BPC 493 503 2% 0
3 DRC SNEL 1,075 1,028 -4%
4 Lesotho LEC 109 108 -1% 18
5 Malawi ESCOM 240 260 8%
6 Mozambique EDM 343 416 21%
7 Namibia NamPower 449 430 -4% 0
8 South Africa Eskom 36,513 35,959 -2% 273
9 Swaziland SEC 196 200 2% 0
10 Tanzania TANESCO 635 694 9%
11 Zambia ZESCO 1,468 1,604 9% 150
12 Zimbabwe ZESA 1,758 1,397 -21% 317
            43,755             43,267 -1%
42,404           41,645           -1%Total Interconnected SAPP
TOTAL SAPP
32 
 
mines out of fear that power outages could trap workers underground. The stoppage 
caused hundreds of millions of Rands in losses for one of South Africa's most important 
industries and fractured investor confidence (Schussler 2008). Not only mines were 
affected. Parts of south-western South Africa as well as its largest city, Johannesburg, 
were hit by power failures in 2008, disrupting households and bringing trains to a halt 
(Zulu 2008). The same also happened in Zimbabwe. 
 
Power outages also shut down basic services across Zambia. Households, farmers and 
industries were forced to resort to other energy sources. A nation-wide power blackout 
hit copper and cobalt output in Zambia and briefly trapped workers underground. The 
same power outage also caused partial flooding at Chililabombwe copper mine, as water 
could not be pumped out. The company lost a day's production (75 tonnes of copper and 
89 tonnes of cobalt). The net loss was estimated at US$2 million because the switch and 
associated electrical equipment were damaged at the mine (The Times 2008).  
 
1.5.3 Reforms in SAPP 
 
Table 1.15: Types of Reforms by SAPP Countries 
 
Country 
Competition 
in generation 
Private role in 
Distribution 
Sector 
Regulator 
Vertical 
Integration 
Main Electricity 
Source 
Angola 
 Yes No No 
No 
D- EDEL 
G, T-ENE 
T 
Botswana No No No Yes T+I 
DRC No No No Yes H 
Lesotho Yes Yes Yes Yes H+I 
Malawi No Yes Yes Yes H 
Mozambique 
Yes 
Yes 
MC&SC 
Yes 
A-2003 
Yes 
2firms in G 
H+I 
Namibia Yes Yes Yes No H+I 
South Africa 
Yes Yes Yes-1992 
Yes 
Many SF in  
Ds 
T 
Swaziland Yes No Yes-2002 Yes H+I 
Tanzania Yes Yes MC 2002 No Yes H 
Zambia Yes Yes Yes Yes-2 BF H 
Zimbabwe Yes No No Yes-BF H+T+I 
Key: A- Advisor, T- Thermal, H- Hydro, G- Generation, D- Distribution, I - Import, MC-Management Contacts , SC Small 
Contracts , BF Big Fi rms, SF- Small Fi rms , EDEL- Empresa Dis tribuicao Electricidade, ENE- Empresa  Nacional de 
Electricidade 
Source: Estache et al. (2007) 
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Table 1.15 is a summary of restructuring activities undertaken by power utilities in the 
SAPP region. The ongoing restructuring of utilities within the SAPP are aimed at replacing 
traditional monopolies with advanced market structures that favour competition, 
enhance efficiency and facilitate access to competitive tariffs. The restructuring of power 
utilities will affect many elements of the electricity sector. 
 
1.5.4 Implications for Zimbabwe   
 
This section has shown that the whole SAPP region has experienced problems of power 
outages with SAPP load shedding totalling 758MW in 2009. Some countries experiencing 
growth in demand have resorted to cancellation of exports in order to first meet local 
demand. Various countries in the region have implemented different types of reforms in a 
bid to improve electricity supply. Arguably, Zimbabwe is the worst affected.  
 
It is clear that a solution to Zimbabwe’s power shortage problem does not lie in imports 
from its neighbours, because they too are also experiencing shortages. 
 
1.6 LITERATURE ON POWER OUTAGES 
 
There are a number of ways of estimating the cost of power outages. Initially, a 
production function approach (direct assessment method) was popular. Later, several 
other approaches emerged, such as self assessment (Iyanda 1982), adaptive cost (World 
Bank 1993) and marginal costing (Adenikinju 2003:9).  A summary of studies carried out 
by other researchers is shown in Table 1.16. 
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Table 1.16: A Typology of Selected Previous Studies  
Study Country Sector Methodology 
1.Ontario Hydro (1980)  Canada Industrial Survey 
2.Bental and Ravid (1982) USA Industrial Proxy method 
3.Billinton, Wacker and Wojczynski (1982)  Canada Industrial Survey 
4.Billinton, Wacker and Wojczynski (1982)  Canada Residential Survey 
5.Iyanda (1982) Nigeria Residential Survey 
6.Bernstein and Heganazy (1988) Egypt Industrial Proxy method  
7.Doane, Hartman and Woo (1988)  Canada Residential Survey 
8.Lee and Anas (1992) Nigeria Industrial Survey 
9.Caves, Herriges and Windle (1992) USA Industrial Proxy method 
10.Uchendu (1993)  Nigeria Industrial Survey 
11.Matsukawa and Fujii (1994) Japan Services Proxy method  
12.Tierney (1997) USA Industrial Survey  
13.Beenstock, Goldin and Haitovsky (1997) Israel Business & public Proxy method  
14.Primen (2001) USA Firms Survey 
15.Rose and Lim (2002) USA Industry Input-Output Model 
16.Adenikinju (2003 ) Nigeria Manufacturing Marginal costing  
17.ICF Consulting (2003) USA Manufacturing Survey 
18.Rose and Guha (2004) Spain Industrial CGE Analysis 
19. Adenikinju (2005) Nigeria Manufacturing Survey 
20. de Nooij et al (2006) Netherlands Agriculture & Industry Survey 
21. Jyoti, Ozbafli and Jenkins (2006) Nepal Manufacturing Contribution Method 
22. Bose,  Srivastava and Yaron (2006) India Agriculture& industry Survey 
 
Table 1.17 shows some of the cost estimates per kWh of lost electricity calculated by 
others. 
 
Table 1.17: Estimated Outage Costs in Selected Other Studies (US$ per kWh) 
 
Country 
Cost (US$) per 
kWh 
Source 
Israel 0.21 Bental and Ravid(1982) 
United States of America 1.16 Bental and Ravid(1982) 
United States of America 11-20 Caves, Herriges and Windle (1992) 
Japan 118-149 Matsukawa and Fujii (1994) 
Israel 7.20 Beenstock, Goldin and Haitovsky (1997)  
USA 4-9.60 Eto, Koomey, Lehman, Martin, Mills, Webber and  
Worrell (2001) 
Netherlands 12-20 de Nooij, Koopmans and Bijivoet (2006) 
 
A review of the NEXUS and Dissertation Abstracts International databases did not indicate 
other doctoral studies that have been undertaken on the topic in question, other than 
those cited above.  
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1.7 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
 
a. A power/electricity outage is the loss of the electricity supply to an area. The 
Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support Digital Economy (CEIDS 2001:1) 
referred to power outages as a complete loss of power at the plug, that is, zero 
voltage. Jyoti, Ozbafli and Jenkins (2006:1) define power outages as all electricity 
supply interruptions and include all power cuts, both planned load shedding as 
well as unplanned power failures with or without advance notice. 
A power outage may take one of the following forms: 
 A Blackout is where power is lost completely due to unplanned power 
failures (CEIDS2001:1);  
 Load shedding or rolling blackouts are a controlled way of rotating 
available generation capacity between various customers. Load shedding 
denotes physical rationing of the electricity by the utility company, 
whereby it forcibly, reduces the demand for electricity on the system, 
usually during periods of peak demand (Jyoti, Ozbafli & Jenkins 2006:1); 
 A Power failure is an unscheduled outage that occurs without notice 
(CEIDS, 2001:1);  
 A Brownout is where the voltage level drops below the normal minimum 
level specified for the system (CEIDS 2001:1). Systems supplied with three-
phase electric power suffer brownouts if one or more phases are absent, 
or at reduced voltage, or incorrectly phased. Some brownouts, called 
voltage reductions, are made intentionally to prevent a full power outage 
(ZESA 2008); and  
 A Dropout is where the loss of power is only momentary (seconds) (CEIDS 
2001:1).  
b. Power quality refers to the measure of how well a source of electricity power 
meets the energy-supply needs of connected loads (CEIDS 2001:2). If the load 
experiences no operational problems, then, by this measure, power quality is 
adequate. 
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1.8 SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY IN ZIMBABWE 
 
Unreliable supply of electricity has been a feature of the supply of electricity in Zimbabwe 
during the last 15 years (World Bank 2008; UNDP 2009; CCZ 2009; CZI 2009). In 2009 
about US$8 billion (including maintaining current generation capacity, grid and new 
suggested generation units) was required to generate, transmit and distribute electricity 
in the country (ZESA 2009). The high operational cost, capital intensity and essentialness 
of electricity made it necessary for the government to supply electricity. The indivisibility 
of supply infrastructure, coupled with a long gestation period, discourages the private 
sector from investing in the generation of power supply (Ajayi 1995; Adenikinju 2005:1).  
The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) is facing the problem of how to 
generate an adequate and reliable level of power supply. Theoretically, such a problem 
can be solved by comparing the cost of supply and distribution with customers’ benefits 
at different reliability levels. The optimum reliability level will be at the point where the 
marginal cost of supply equals the marginal benefits derived by the customers.  
 
Notwithstanding the supply of electricity being a natural monopoly, t he exclusive 
concentration of electricity provision in the hands of the public sector has led to failures 
in supply in Zimbabwe. ZESA is currently facing funding problems and ageing equipment. 
The company is finding it difficult to keep pace with adequate provision and maintenance 
of infrastructure; a situation that is compounded by government regulation of electricity 
tariffs (Mangwengwende 2005:1). The annual generation and supply from the utility for 
the seven-year period from 2003 to 2009 is shown in Table 1.18. 
 
Table 1.18: Electrical Energy Produced and Distributed in Millions of Kilowatt hours 
 
 GENERATION SENT OUT (million kilowatt hours) 
Period 
Hwange Power 
Station 
Kariba Power 
Station 
Other Power 
Station 
Total From 
Zimbabwe 
2003 4808.9 2997.7 119.2 7925.8 
2004 4580.7 3824.0 182.2 8587.9 
2005 3388.2 5359.2 51.1 8798.7 
2006 3907.6 5521.1 290.2 9718.9 
2007 3594.1 5383.3 120 9097.4 
2008 3348.2 4742.5 0 8090.7 
2009 3274.4 3876.3 0 7150.7 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSO (2008); ZESA (2009) 
37 
 
The total annual generation of electricity in Zimbabwe declined from 9718.9 million kWh 
in 2006 to 7150.7 million kWh in 2009, a 26.43 percent decline. The decline in electricity 
supply limited economic growth. 
 
In 2009 the total average energy demand at peak by consumers in Zimbabwe was about 
1397 MW (ZPC 2009). The potential domestic generation capacity in 2009 was 2 045MW, 
but the actual generation was 1 080MW. Of the 1 080MW generated, about 200MW was 
consumed by generating equipment and ZESA properties , and about 10 percent (about 
110MW) was lost due to transmission losses, leaving 770MW available to be consumed 
(ZETDC 2009). This also leaves a shortfall of 965MW to be imported from other countries.  
Zimbabwe has two peak periods of demand: 1 220MW in the morning (0400-1030hrs) 
and 1 574MW in the evening (1700-2100hrs), 1 574MW. Since the country was only able 
to import 100MW from Mozambique, ZESA was forced to load shed about 250MW in the 
morning and about 384MW in the evening, an average daily deficit of 317MW in supply. 
The deficit translates into power outages, as the utility has no option but to balance 
supply through load shedding.  An analysis of electricity demand by consumer sectors is 
shown in Figure 1.9. 
 
Figure 1.9: Electricity Consumption by Sectors 
 
Source: ZESA (2009) 
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The industrial sector demands the highest proportion of electricity from the grid, followed 
by households, mining and agriculture. For urban households, electricity is a major 
resource. About 80% of urban households are connected to the grid. Consumption in 
rural low income households is small. Despite the little they consume it still is very 
important (ZESA 2009). Only 40% of total households in Zimbabwe are connected to the 
grid, but even where electricity is available, the costs for cooking  are relatively high (ZESA 
2009). The use of electricity for lighting depends on the availability, the installation costs 
and access to the grid (ZESA 2009).  
 
Excessive demand due to high urbanisation and increased extension of the power 
network caused pressure on the delivery of electricity to consumers (World Bank 2008; 
UNDP 2009; ZESA 2009). Figure 1.10 shows the annual demand and supply of electricity  
between 2003 and 2009. 
 
Figure 1.10: Annual Electricity Supply and Demand in GWH 
 
 
Source: CSO (2007) and ZESA (2009) 
Difficulties in importing electricity were experienced in 2008 and 2009 when Zimbabwe 
was disconnected from the regional grid due to inability to pay debts and having 
insufficient foreign currency to pay for electricity (ZESA 2009). The unreliable utility 
supply led to demand being suppressed. The suppressed electricity demand took the 
following forms - demand for consumers to supplement the public supply with private 
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power, and demand for consumers who had the option of ZESA power but preferred to 
use privately generated power for reasons of quality and security.  Due to generation and 
importation problems, the economy was forecast in 2008 to experience more and longer 
periods of supply disruptions and higher electricity prices during the next few years (ZESA 
2009). 
 
1.9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OUTAGE CRISIS 
 
Regular power outages in Zimbabwe began in 1997 (Kayo 2001:7). Plant generation 
capacity had declined. Total systems losses averaged 11 percent of the power generated 
in 1997 (ZESA 1998). The Zimbabwean dollar depreciated significantly against major 
currencies - by more than 150 percent from US$1: Z$9 to US$1: Z$24 and since more than 
70 percent of ZESA costs were in the form of imports, the provision of proper plant, 
transmission and distribution equipment maintenance proved to be unaffordable (ZESA 
1999). Simultaneously, the real value of the electricity tariffs were eroded by regulatory 
constraints and ZESA was forced to rely increasingly on government for financial support 
(Kayo 2001:8). 
 
By the year 2000, the extent and regularity of power outages in Zimbabwe had become 
severe. At the same time an agrarian land reform programme was initiated in Zimbabwe, 
further reducing the supply of foreign currency (Ministry of Energy and Power 
Development 2003).  Foreign suppliers demanded advance payment before electricity 
was supplied.  The foreign currency crisis prevented the importation of spare parts for 
plant maintenance.  Finally, the high cost of transporting coal from Hwange (coal mine) to 
Bulawayo, Munyati and Harare Thermal Power Stations (TPSs) and high maintenance 
costs to these TPSs, resulted in the decommissioning of the three TPSs (ZPC 2005). The 
decommissioning of theTPSs took 405MW capacity out of the generating infrastructure 
(Bulawayo 120MW, Harare 135MW and Munyati 150MW) (ZESA 2006). 
 
The decommissioning of the TPSs reduced the supply of electricity in 2005, causing total 
generation capacity to fall to 50 percent of potential generation capacity (ZESA 2006). A 
drought in 2005/2006 aggravated the supply constraints due to low generation at the 
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hydro-electric power station (Ministry of Energy and Power Development 2006). The 
supply was constrained where as demand was growing (ZESA 2006). In 2006, Zimbabwe  
was further constrained by economic sanctions, hyper-inflation, and continuing coal 
supply problems at the Hwange thermal plant. In addition, ZESA lost 20 engineers in 2006 
to neighbouring power utility companies (ZESA 2006) and eighty (80) in 2007 (ZESA 2007). 
 
 
Simultaneously, foreign suppliers found themselves under increasing pressures to meet 
domestic demand, especially South Africa. Zimbabwe was disconnected from ESKOM 
supplies in 2007 (ZESA 2007). Imports from Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Mozambique were also cut due to ZESA’s inability to pay for power. ESKOM 
converted the debt of electricity to a loan in order to cover its expenses (ZESA 2007).  As a 
result Zimbabwe was left to depend solely from its own domestic generation and a 
guaranteed 100MW from Mozambique.  
 
 
Vandalism also contributed to the power outage problem. The Electricity Amendment Bill 
(Number17) of 2007 identified vandalism as a problem and recommended that stiffer 
penalties be imposed on those caught vandalising. ZESA technicians and engineers also 
blamed the power problem on poor quality transformers and related equipment being 
acquired from China (ZESA 2008). The poor performance of this equipment resulted in 17 
percent of network electricity losses in 2008 (ZESA 2009). 
 
ZESA’s response to the problem was to propose the expansion of both Hwange Thermal 
Power Station (TPS) and Kariba Hydro Power Station (HPS). However, high expansion 
costs inhibited progress at these generation plants. ZESA also proposed several other 
supply augmentation projects - a new coal fired plant at Gokwe, a methane gas fired plant 
at Lupane and hydro-plants at Batoka, Condo Gairez, Manyuchi, Mutirikwi, Osborne, Siya 
and Tsanga. 
 
1.10 THE DAMAGE POWER OUTAGE CAUSED AND METHODS USED 
TO ESTIMATE COST THEREOF 
 
Power outage costs can be classified as direct or indirect costs (Munasinghe 1979). Direct 
costs are those which occur during or following an outage, while indirect costs are those 
which result because an outage is expected and people take mitigating actions ( ibid). This 
41 
 
identification of costs by Munasinghe (1979) forms the basis of the approach taken in this 
research. There are two cost estimates – direct or welfare cost and indirect cost 
(mitigating or captive generation cost).  
 
The direct or welfare cost was estimated using the direct assessment method. Survey 
questionnaires were administered to ascertain the cost of power outages or a reduction 
in its quality as perceived by consumers (Munasinghe & Gellerson 1979). The method 
uses the value of production loss or utility loss for each unit of power outage. The lost 
production or time in each sector during an outage can be es timated directly from this 
feedback and aggregated to a total. The approach provides a first estimate of the cost of 
power outages. 
 
The indirect cost (backup cost or mitigating/generation cost) is estimated from the 
actions taken by consumers to mitigate outages by acquiring generators or captive power 
units and diesel pumps (Klytchnikova & Lockshin 2006:1).  This method of estimation is 
based on observed market behaviour, e.g. of consumer expenditures on generators and 
use of interruptible contracts (Caves, Harriges & Windle 1992). The backup cost was 
estimated using the captive generation method; a method that estimates  the cost that 
customers incur to ensure a reliable power supply. The captive generation method is 
widely acknowledged to be a reliable second way of estimating the cost of power outages 
(Adenikinju, 2005). 
 
ZESA divides consumers into two broad categories - commercial (productive sector) and 
residential (households).  
(i) Productive sector costs include:  
 Cost of lost output;  
 Equipment damage and maintenance cost;  
 Cost of lost deliveries and business; 
 Mitigation cost or cost of acquiring substitutes ;  
 Loss of labour productive time; and 
 Loss of study time in education institutions.   
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(ii) Householdsector cost includes: 
 Households’ inconveniences; 
 Loss of entertainment programmes;  
 Lost food stuffs; 
 Cost of purchasing alternative fuels and health problems; and 
 Cost of additional work to women. 
 
Power outage cost can also be incurred beyond outage time, as operations cannot be 
restarted instantaneously (Rose et al. 2004:2). Household outage costs are often 
intangible (Carlsson & Martinsson 2004:1). Households described their costs in terms of 
the hassle or inconvenience of outage, rather than in terms of specific labour or material 
costs (Rose et al. 2004:2). In addition, costs are incurred in trying to reduce potential 
losses, through the purchase of backup generators, permanent changes in production 
schedule and capacity utilisation (Munasinghe & Gellerson 1979). 
 
To evaluate an outage cost requires a good understanding of the customer’s damages 
when an outage has occurred. The losses incurred due to disruptions can be regarded as 
an invisible tariff that the customers of the utility have to pay (Carlsson & Martinsson 
2004:2). Even in the best of systems, it is difficult to estimate the cost of unserved (COU) 
electricity to different categories of consumers, due to the challenge of dealing with 
common cost allocations (Lawton et al. 2003:4). In Zimbabwe, an additional challenge is 
of dealing with subsidies and tariff regulations (Mangwengwende 2001:3). Subsidies or 
price regulations are imposed with little consideration to service delivery.  
 
1.10.1 Characterising Supply Interruptions Cost 
 
Power outages can be characterised along a number of dimensions, including duration, 
frequency, timing, warning time and interruption depth (Adenikinju 2003:22). Each of 
these characteristics may alter the outage costs incurred by a customer (Adenikinju 
2005:10). There are many reasons why the consequences of one supply interruption 
differ from the consequences of another (de Nooij, Koopmans & Bijvoet 2006: 5): 
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1. There are different types of electricity users. Interruptions in hospitals, in industrial 
plants and in private households have very different costs.  
2. The effects of electricity interruptions are smaller when the interruptions are structural 
(daily) than when they are incidental. If the supply is interrupted regularly, people 
prepare for it even if they are not warned before hand. Although the costs per 
interruption are lower, the total damage will be greater because of the larger total 
number of interruptions and because additional costs (like deterred investments) 
might occur. 
3. The length of the interruption also determines the costs. Some forms of damage (the 
loss of computer files) occur instantaneously. Some effects (the loss of working hours) 
are proportional to the length of the interruption, while other effects will start only 
after some time has passed (the spoilage of food in refrigerators). 
4. A notification before an interruption lowers the cost of that interruption. For instance, 
if people know that the electricity is about to be interrupted, they will not use the lift 
and get stuck halfway up or down the shaft. 
5. The perceived reliability level. The higher the perceived reliability, the less firms and 
households are inclined to take precautionary measures (backup facilities), and the 
greater the damage caused by an interruption. This is also known as the ‘vulnerability 
conflict’ (Rathenau 1994: 101). 
6. The moment when the interruption occurs, the season, the day of the week and the 
time of day determine which activities are interrupted. For many households, an 
interruption at 8 p.m. interferes with recreation (television and Internet); while at 2 
a.m. an interruption has much smaller effects because most people are asleep. 
7. Finally – and generally not included in this list – the source of the outage. If the outage 
is caused by a failure in the network, the price effects will mostly be small, whereas if 
the outage is caused by the fact that the production capacity is less than the demand, 
prices tend to rise strongly. 
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Total outage costs are not proportional to outage frequency, but decl ine per interruption 
as frequency increases (Adenikinju 2005:6). This pattern suggests that customers are able 
to adapt to more frequent outages but customers report preferring infrequent outages to 
frequent outages. Studies among industrial and commercial sectors reveal that electricity 
consumers prefer infrequent long duration interruptions (one 4-hour interruption) to 
frequent short duration interruptions (four 1 hour interruptions) (Billinton, Wacker & 
Wojczynski 1982; Ontario Hydro 1980). However, the reverse has been found to be true 
for residential consumers. Similarly, outage costs have been found to vary with the timing 
of the power interruptions (Beenstock, Goldin & Haitovski 1997). Large industrial firms 
exhibit little variability in estimated outage costs, while small firms exhibit a seasonal 
pattern (Caves, Herriges & Windle 1990). 
 
1.10.2 A Summary of the Impact of Power Outages 
 
 
Power outages have an impact on the Zimbabwean economy (Figure 1.11).  
 
Figure 1.11: Summary Impact of Power Outages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own diagram 
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 Reduced Income earned by households:  Power outages reduce income through 
non-payment for idle time and lost output or sales for business (Masih & Masih 
1996). 
 
 Reduced Employment: Continuous power outages cause loss of jobs. About 10 000 
jobs were estimated to have been lost in Zimbabwe by end of 2007 due to power 
outages (CSO 2008). In South Africa power outages were estimated to have caused 
55 000 job losses in 2008 (Schussler 2008). 
 
 Loss of Output: The failure to adequately manage the load leads to extensive load 
shedding, which disrupts economic activities (Du Plessis 2007). Electricity outages 
reduce working hours of firms, causing loss of output (Adenikinju 2003). 
 
 Reduced GDP: The loss of industrial output translates into reduced GDP growth 
(Templet 1999). A causality study between energy consumption and GDP for the G-7 
countries and for the top 10 emerging economies, excluding China, found bi-
directional causality for Argentina, unidirectional causality from GDP to energy 
consumption in Italy and Korea, and unidirectional causality from energy 
consumption to GDP in Turkey, France, Germany and Japan (Soytas & Sari 2003).  
 
 Reduced Exports and a weakening Exchange rate: Lower exports lead to lower 
inflows of foreign earnings. Power cuts affect the mining industry especially 
(Schussler 2008).  
 
 Increased Inflation: Shortages enable suppliers to increase prices. 
 
 Reduced quality of Life: Power outages affect the lives of consumers. Households are 
affected by long and unpredictable power cuts. They may suffer from fatigue, 
irritability, sleepiness in the daytime, laziness and even a propensity to fall asleep at 
work or while driving (Saghir 2005). Households incur huge costs in purchasing 
generators and installing them, as an alternative source of electricity (Adenikinju 
2003:2).  
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 Reduced Investment: Investment is negatively affected by power outages. About 
25% of businesses closures in Zimbabwe were due to power problems (CSO 2007). 
Very often foreign investors, once lost, do not return (CZI 2008). 
 
 Poor Delivery of Services and Transport: Power losses lead to traffic jams, accidents 
and transport disruption in areas where traffic signals are non-functional (Mayo 
2006:5).  
 
The power outages affect all sectors of the economy although not necessarily equal ly. The 
sectoral populations/users are classified as follows:  
 
 The household energy-consuming sector consists of living quarters for private 
households, whether leased or privatly owned, urban or rural; 
 The industrial energy-consuming sector consists of all facilities and equipment 
used for producing or assembling goods. This sector encompasses digital, essential 
services, manufacturing, construction and commercial services ; 
 The agriculture energy-consuming sector consists of forestry, field cropping, 
horticulture, citrus, etc.; and 
 The mining, energy-consuming sector consists of quarrying and ore extraction.  
 
1.11 CONCLUSION 
 
Electricity power is an input into virtually all industries, from heavy industrial 
manufacturing to simple irrigation systems in agriculture (CEIDS 2001:1), and also directly 
affects the daily lives of private citizens (Balducci, Roop, Shienbein, Desteese & Welmar 
2002).  
 
People frequently associate the electricity power crisis with the political dispensation 
prevailing in Zimbabwe but it is more than a symptom of a political problem as there are 
long term issues. Power outages started in 1997 with small disruptions to supply. The 
main issue appeared to be mismanagement. Prior to 2000, supply equated demand (D = 
S), but due to tariff controls, the power utility was obliged to charge a price lower than 
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the equilibrium price. This created a situation where demand exceeded supply (D > S) 
resulting in increasing outages. The inadequate supply problem manifested in non-
replacement and maintenance of equipment and failure to initiate new power-generating 
schemes by government and the power utility. It is not a problem unique to Zimbabwe. 
All of the members of the SAPP face challenges in meeting demand for electricity, but the 
challenge is more acute in Zimbabwe.   
 
The responsibility for supply lies with ZESA (Mangwengwende 2005:5). Unreliability in 
power supply resulted in consumers coining a term from the organisation’s acronym ZESA 
as “Zimbabwe Electricity Sometimes Available”. ZESA’s inefficiencies have imposed a huge 
cost on business, but no one has yet tried to estimate the cost. 
 
Firms and households experience power failures about five times a week, each lasting on 
average four hours (CZI and CCZ 2009). The productive sector electricity power outage 
cost comes in the form of idle workers, spoiled material, lost output, damaged 
equipment, restart costs and mitigation cost (Rose et al. 2004). These costs have the 
effect of increasing business uncertainty (Adenikinju 2003:2). For the aggregate economy, 
the power outages have seriously undermined growth potential (Kerekezi 2003). In 
addition, power outages have lowered the attractiveness of Zimbabwe to external 
investors (Adenikinju 2005:1). 
 
The theoretical basis for estimating electricity outages cost is that there is a producer and 
consumer welfare loss when firms and consumers experienced them. In developed 
countries, a number of studies have examined the cost of outages, but in Africa only a 
few studies have tried to measure the cost of electricity outages for example: Iyanda 
1982; Lee and Anas 1992; Uchendu 1993; Ajayi 1995 and Adenikinju 2003 and 2005.  
 
This thesis will estimate the cost of electricity outage in Zimbabwe and from the cost 
estimated, make recommendations to the power utility on how to minimise cost and 
appropriately allocate available electricity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GLOBAL AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INADEQUACY 
 
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
The electricity outages have attracted interest from various scholars over the last three 
decades (Ukpong 1973; Ontario Hydro 1980; Bernstein & Heganazy 1988; Lee & Anas 
1992; Tierney 1997; Beenstock et al. 1998; Primen 2001; Rose & Lim 2002; Eto, Divan & 
Brumsickle 2004; Eto et al. 2005; Rose et al. 2004; Adenikinju 2005; Bose, Shukla, 
Srivastava & Yaron 2006). The general conclusion has been that power outages cause 
significant direct and indirect costs. Empirical evidence links the scale of these costs to 
variables such as electricity consumption per capita and the number of hours 
with/without electricity per day.  
 
Improved energy supply reliability after the 1950s coincided with rising global economic 
growth (WB 2004:72). This chapter surveys the  global and African literature relevant to 
electricity outages. 
 
2.1 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF POWER OUTAGES 
 
Energy is a prerequisite for economic growth and development (Ebohon 1996; Rosenberg, 
1998; Templet 1999; Boston Institute for Development Economics 2006; Foster & 
Steinbuks 2008; Calderon 2008). Energy has been shown to be equally as important in 
production as other factors such as labour, land and capital (European Commission, 
1993). The relationship between economic growth and electrical power demand has been 
found to be close (European Commission 1993; Rosenbergy 1998; Andrews-Speed and 
Do, 2000; Ferguson, Wilkinson & Hill 2000). Energy consumption is positively correlated 
to economic growth (Akinlo 2008). 
 
A study by Ferguson et al. (2000) that compared correlations between electricity 
consumption/capita with those between total primary energy supply/capita and GDP per 
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capita showed that there is a stronger correlation between electricity use and wealth 
creation than there is between total energy use and wealth. The study also shows that in 
wealthy countries an increase in wealth over time correlates with an increasing 
proportion of energy used in the form of electricity.  
 
In eleven Sub-Saharan, African countries energy consumption is positively correlated to 
economic growth (Akinlo 2008).  A study on the impact of energy consumption on 
economic growth in Taiwan, using data for the period 1955-2003, found evidence of a 
level-dependent effect between the two variables, energy consumption and economic 
growth (Lee & Chang 2006). A study on the challenges of emerging Asia attributed the 
accommodation of increased energy consumption as a key contributor to ‘miracle 
growth’ (Asian Development Bank (ADB) 1997). Increased energy consumption is 
correlated with increased life expectancy, improved health, decreased mortality rates and 
improved productivity since the 1940s. 
 
A World Bank study (1998) found that improved energy supply contributed approximately 
0.8 to 1.9 percent of the accelerated annual growth of the Asian Tigers. Increasing 
electricity use has also been a foundation for all productivity improvements in developed 
countries and it now fuels the new digital economy (Pineau 2002). Electricity facilitates an 
array of end-use equipment, including those for cooking, cooling, lighting, safe storage of 
food, clean water and sanitation (Ikeme & Ebohon 2005). 
 
2.2 THE WORLD ELECTRICITY SUPPLY CRISIS 
 
Deterioration in public electricity supply imposes a heavy burden on firms and households 
(World Bank 2006:3). About 68 percent of the world survey respondents identified 
electricity outage as a major obstacle to development in 2005 (ibid). If allowed to 
continue, electricity supply interruptions will precipitate a development crisis  (Adenikinju 
2003:7; Adenikinju 2005:5; Rose et al, 2004; Bose et al. 2006; Limi 2008:4).  
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The world population tripled in the Twentieth Century and the use of electricity as an 
energy source increased three fold (World Energy Council and FAO 1999:21). Since 1970, 
the world population grew by two billion and per capita electricity usage rose by one sixth 
(World Bank 2006:9). It is estimated that the global consumption of electricity doubles 
every 20 years (World Bank 2006:10). Currently, there are 1.6 billion people without 
electricity and 2.4 billion people rely on traditional biomass fuels for cooking and heating 
(UNDP 2009). 
 
One way of measuring the scale of an electricity supply crisis is through assessing the 
quality of supply. If the quality of electricity supply is  poor as measured by transmission 
and distribution losses, economic development is undermined. Significantly, losses in East 
Asia are twice as high as that of in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: Electricity Distribution Losses by Region 
 
 
 
Source: Limi (2008:4) Adapted from World Development Indicators (2004)  
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of electricity losses for the two years 1998 and 2003. 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean as well as South Asia managed to 
reduce electric power losses between 1998 and 2003 by 1.3 percent. Between these 
years, Sub-Saharan Africa increased electricity losses by about 3.4 percent. 
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Figure 2.2: Number of Days without Electricity by Region 
 
 
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (BEEPS2006)  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of days without electricity supply per region in 2003 and 
2006. For the world as a whole, it is 10 days per year on average and the average duration 
of electricity interruptions is 2.5 hours (BEEPS 2006). The frequency of electricity outages 
is high in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, but low in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). 
The benefits from improving electricity services are proportional to the reduction in 
interrupted service hours.  
 
There are adverse implications of electricity outages for every sector of the economy 
(Kirby 2005). About 40 percent of the world’s food is grown on irrigable land – mostly 
electricity powered irrigation (Postel 2002:22: FAO 2005:25). Electricity outages reduce 
the yield of any crop, as well as the number of crops that can be grown per year (Bose et 
al. 2006:11). Electricity outages also heighten political tensions within a country (Postel 
2002:22; Rose et al. 2004; Limi, 2008:11). 
 
There are clearly demand side interventions (World Bank 2006) and supply side 
interventions (Limi 2008:20) needed in order to address the problem of electricity 
outages. 
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2.3 AFRICA’S ELECTRICITY POWER PROBLEMS 
 
Africa faces major infrastructural challenges; the most severe of which are arguably those 
in the power sector. Not only is the continent’s energy infrastructure meagre compared 
to other continents, but the electricity supply is unreliable. In recent years more than 30 
of the 52 African countries have suffered acute energy crises (World Bank 2008:74). The 
entire generation capacity of the 48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa is 63 gigawatts (GW) 
(World Bank 2008:75). If South Africa is excluded, the installed capacity of Africa is only 
one-third of South Asia’s and about a tenth of that of other developing regions ( ibid). 
 
Figure 2.3: African Countries affected by acute Power Sector Crisis in 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
The continent’s generating capacity has been stagnant for many years and although there 
has been an increase in economic growth, this has not matched those rates achieved in 
other developing continents (Yepes, Pierce & Foster 2008:12). To make matters worse, as 
much as one-fourth of Sub-Saharan Africa’s plant is currently not in an operating 
condition (World Bank 2008:76). Figure 2.3 shows countries affected by power sector 
crises and the causes of the crises.  In most of the countries (32 out of 48) of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the source of power outages is high growth in demand coupled with low 
investment in electricity infrastructure. Due to this problem, many African countries were 
left with no option but to load shed.  
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Figure 2.4: Frequency distribution for load shedding, as percentage of demand in Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: World Bank 2008:76; Eberhard et al. 2008. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the frequency distribution for load shedding as a percentage of demand 
in Africa. With economic growth raising demand for electricity, the lacklustre expansion 
of generation and transmission facilities has stripped away any cushion from excess 
capacity that previously existed (World Bank 2008:77; Clement & Shanaka 2008). 
Countries whose power infrastructure has been damaged by conflict have also suffered 
severe shortages. High petroleum prices have created enormous cost pressure in West 
African countries that depend on imported oil products for generation (WB 2008:77). 
Figure 2.5 depicts the number of days without electricity experienced by a selection of 
African countries. 
Figure 2.5: Number of days with outages per year in Africa 
 
 
 
Source: BEEPS (2008) and Limi (2008:12) 
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The frequency of power outages reaches as many as 80 days per year in several African 
countries and averages 48 days (Limi 2008:12).  
 
A common response to the crises has been short-term leases for emergency power 
generation by a handful of global operators (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Emergency power Generation in Africa 
Country Date 
Contract 
Duration 
Emergency 
Capacity 
Total Installed 
Capacity (%) 
Estimated Annual 
Cost as % of GDP 
Angola 2006 2 years 150 18.1 1.04 
Gabon 2006 2 years 14 3.4 0.45 
Ghana 2007 1 year 80 5.4 1.90 
Kenya 2006 1 year 100 8.3 1.45 
Madagascar 2004 Several years 50 35.7 2.79 
Rwanda 2005 2 years 15 48.4 1.84 
Senegal 2005 2 years 40 16.5 1.37 
Sierra Leone 2007 1 year 20 133.3 4.25 
Tanzania 2006 2 years 180 20.4 0.96 
Uganda 2006 2 years 100 41.7 3.29 
Source: Eberhard et al. (2008) and World Bank (2008:78)  
 
Though this capacity can be put in place within a few weeks, it is expensive. The cost of 
small-scale diesel units, for example, is typically about US$0.35/kWh (World Bank 
2008:77). The equipment is typically leased for up to two years, after which it reverts to 
the private provider. An estimated 700 megawatts (MW) of emergency generation are 
currently operating in Sub-Saharan Africa, representing more than 20 percent of installed 
capacity (ibid). The total estimated cost of this emergency power ranges from a minimum 
of 0.5 percent of GDP in Gabon to a maximum of 4.3 percent in Sierra Leone ( ibid). 
 
2.4 POWER SECTOR REFORMS IN AFRICA 
 
Although they are somewhat behind the reform programs in other regions of the world, 
African countries have also embarked upon the path of power sector reform in the past 
decade, including new legislation, utility restructuring and increased scope for private 
sector participation in the electricity service supply chain (WB 2008:82). 
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Figure 2.6: Evaluation of Power Sector Reform in Africa 
  
 
Notes: IPPs –Independent Power Producers ;SOE – State Owned Electricity;  PSP – Private Sector Partnership 
Source: Eberhard et al. 2008 
 
By the year 2006 more than 80 percent of African countries had enacted a power sector 
reform law, 75 percent had experienced private participation in power, about 66 percent 
had corporatised their state-owned utilities, more than half had established a regulator, 
and more than one third had independent power producers (Figure 2.6a). A few countries 
have adopted the full range of reform measures (Figure 2.6b). One reform that has not 
been widely adopted in Africa is unbundling generation, transmission and distribution 
functions in order to create competition in generation and supply. The restructuring of 
the power sector to advance competition only makes sense in countries where the 
market is large enough to support several generators above minimum efficient s cale 
(Besant-Jones 2006). Power demand in most African countries is so small that this option 
does not exist. 
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Table 2.2: Private Participation Power Sector Transactions in Africa  
 
Type of private 
participation 
Countries Affected 
Number of 
Transactions 
Prematurely 
cancelled 
Transactions 
Total Value of 
Transactions 
(US$ m) 
Management of 
lease contract 
Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya,  Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Tanzania, Togo  
17 4 5 
Concession 
Contract 
Cameroon, Comoros, Cote Ivory 
Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Togo, Uganda 
12 5 1.598 
Independent Power  
Project 
Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, 
Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana,, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania 
24 2 2.293 
Divestiture Cape Verde, South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
4 --- 938 
Overall  57 11 4.834 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database (2007).  
There have been nearly 60 medium to long term power sector transactions with the 
private sector in Africa (World Bank 2008:83). Almost half of these have been 
independent projects, with the utility signing Power Purchase Agreements with the 
private sector to build green field generation plants (Table 2.2). These plants have 
provided nearly 3 000 MW of new supply and entailed more than US$2 billion of private 
investment (World Bank 2008:80). An independent assessment concluded that these 
projects are relatively costly, owing to technology choices, procurement problems and 
currency devaluation, and are often renegotiated (Gratwick & Eberhard 2007). 
 
The other transactions have been concessions, leases or management contracts, typically 
for the operation of the entire national power system (World Bank 2008:83). These have 
had a relatively high failure rate. About one-third of these contracts are currently in 
distress or already cancelled (ibid). The usual reasons for failure are the lack of financial 
viability or creditworthiness of the utilities . Governments have been unwilling or unable 
to adjust tariffs to enable cost recovery or pay subsidies to make up the difference 
between the revenue collected and costs incurred (ibid).  
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Poor governance is reflected in deficient performance. In utilities in developed 
economies, system losses are often as low as 10 percent. By comparison, two-thirds of 
African utilities report losses of more than 20 percent (Eberhard et al. 2008). Similarly, 
utilities in many developed economies collect close to 100 percent of what is owed to 
them, while 40 percent of African utilities collect less than 90 percent (W orld Bank 
2008:84). 
 
Given the large scale, long lead times, and extensive preparation required to build power 
infrastructure, careful planning in holding this infrastructure is crucial. However, many 
African countries lack ministerial capability for long-term power sector planning (World 
Bank 2008:85). The current power shortages were, to a large extent, foreseeable, but 
action was not taken far enough ahead to avert them (ibid). 
 
2.5 ELECTRICITY OUTAGES AND THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
PRIVATISATION DEBATE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
A common response to failures in government electricity supply is privatisation, but the  
privatisation of electricity supply is a contentious issue, partly because allocations under 
the privatisation model allow for exclusion and partly because there is no evidence of the 
model actually being the panacea in developing countries. Proponents of the privatisation 
model argue that the electricity related goals committed to by heads of state in the 1999 
World Energy Council need to be addressed with utmost urgency; something the public 
sector is incapable of (Eberhard et al. 2008). Counter-arguments are that privatisation is 
driven by the profit motive and is therefore bound to exclude the very poor (Gratwick & 
Eberhard 2007). 
 
The private/public electricity management debate is not a new one. In the Nineteenth 
Century, electricity utilities were largely managed by private institutions in the world’s 
cities. During the middle of the Twentieth Century, urbanisation, industrialisation and 
high population growth were experienced, increasing electricity demand (World Bank 
2000). In the wake of the increasing acceptance of the importance of electricity and the 
realisation of the positive externalities and high capital cost associated with reliable 
electricity supply, the public sector increasingly took over management (ibid). The 
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situation under the public sector management has improved, but is not ideal. In 
developing countries 1 in 5 people have no electricity connection and there are 10 to 80 
days of electricity outage per year (World Bank 2007). Thus, the contribution of the state 
is not without problems. 
 
Since 1980, the privatisation model has gained so much popularity that today, reference 
is made of the ‘British model’ and the ‘French Model’  of privatisation. The former model 
consists of privatising both assets and operation of the public electricity company, while 
the latter model allows for the assets to remain publicly owned (Eberhard et al. 2008). 
During the 1990s these models grew in popularity elsewhere in the world under the 
leadership of the UN Department of Energy (DoE). At the Paris conference on energy in 
1993, electricity sector reform through privatisation was emphasised (DoE 1993).  As a 
result, many international institutions and governments aligned their policies in line with 
the reforms in promoting Private Sector Participation (PSP) (Eberhard et al. 2008). 
 
Privatisation entails a shift of management and operational tasks from the public sector 
to the private sector (Gratwick & Eberhard 2007). The nature of it is defined by various 
contracts (Eberhard et al. 2008), such as lease, affermage, concessional and BOOT. 
Typically, the public sector role is one of being the overseer of all operations. The ‘British 
Model’ entails the government selling part, or all, of its stake in the electricity business to 
the private sector (Eberhard et al. 2008). This model has been adopted by England and 
Wales. 
 
Critics of privatisation argue that, while the privatisation proponents present efficiency as 
the case for PSP and IPP, such an argument is not true for necessities like electricity 
(Eberhard et al. 2008). Efficiency requires effective regulation and the correct incentives 
(Gratwick & Eberhard 2007). Further more, the lowering of cost of services is dependent 
on the cost of capital. Common to all anti-privatisation arguments is the assertion that 
electricity is a human right and that private companies will neglect the poor (deny them 
access) (Barlow 2001; Gratwick & Eberhard 2007). During the decade following the 
privatisation of electricity in the 1990s, in Britain, France, Finland, Ireland and Nordic 
States, electricity tariffs have increased by 130, 120, 115, 112, and 110 percent 
respectively (Barlow 2001).  
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The operation of a full cost recovery or Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) business model 
requires private firms to be selective in the siting of their operations. The selectiveness, 
commonly referred to as “cherry picking”, guarantees the minimisation of their risks. For 
this reason, Sub-Saharan Africa has not attracted many private firms. Where PSP has 
taken off, it has been short term in duration, and where IPP have been commissioned, it 
has been for small scale operations.  
 
There have been allegations that private electricity companies are prone to corruption 
and lack of transparency. The then UN secretary General, Kofi Annan (2004) remarked 
that the problem of collusive bidding for franchises, lack of transparency, inflexible 
contractual guarantees, monopolisation of essential infrastructure and lack of proper 
regulation by governments have led to the questioning of the merits forwarded by 
privatisation proponents in the electricity sector (Eberhard et al. 2008; Gratiwick & 
Eberhard 2007).   
 
2.6 POWER OUTAGES AND PRIVATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
 
The privatisation of the public electricity supply has not been the only form of 
privatisation in the sector. There are also many private individuals and firms generating 
power for themselves all over the world. Companies producing generators such as 
Cummins and Generator King have benefited worldwide due to high demand for their 
products. The companies produce small generators for domestic use and industrial 
generators for large firms (Cummins 2008).  
 
Emergency power systems were used as early as World War II on naval ships (Wikipedia, 
2008). Diesel generators serve as emergency backup power for hospitals, businesses and 
individuals (ibid). About 30 percent of businesses in California installed backup generators 
as a result of the 2001 blackout (Electric Power Research Institute 2002).  Backup 
generators saved 60 percent of cost to business likely to be incurred due to power 
outages (National Power Laboratories (NPL) 2003). 
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The annual value of private power generation is estimated to be US$2.5 trillion for the 
world (World Bank 2007:78). The total investment needed for private firms and 
households to own generators is estimated to be US$3.2 trillion (ibid). Much of the 
private power generating capacity is located in developing countries. In these countries, 
consumers are opting for this more expensive generation system because of load 
shedding. Private generation is expensive in terms of maintenance cost, fuel cost and 
other related costs. Backup generators are generally driven by internal combustion 
engines, fuelled by gasoline or diesel and emit gases, thereby polluting the air 
(Department of Environment, California 2003). This cost is frequently ignored in financial 
analyses because it is external. 
 
Both the private and public power generating sectors are prone to failure. In the LDCs, 
where there exist the biggest challenges of electricity supply and relatively low demand, it 
is important that the public sector plays a leading role in the supply of electricity and 
regulation of generation and distribution in order to capture the benefits of economies of 
scale.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Power supply inadequacy is a global problem, but it is particularly acute in Africa. Power 
supply inadequacy retards economic growth as it negatively affects production.  
 
African countries have experienced high electricity distribution losses and outages even 
though the continent is richly endowed with natural resources for electricity generation. 
Lack of investment in the sector is the main contributor to the electricity crisis on the 
continent. A number of power sector reforms have been implemented in Africa, but to no 
avail. Electricity privatisation has been debated as a measure to the crisis, but low access 
for the poor and tariff increases are considered as undesirable consequences. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MODELLING THE COST OF ELECTRICITY OUTAGES IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
3 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
There are many costs associated with outages and these costs are borne by a wide 
spectrum of users. An outage is a symptom of disequilibrium – excess demand for 
electricity. Chapter three presents a three model approach for analysing electricity 
demand and supply and combines these into a three segment-model of demand for 
electricity in Zimbabwe. The model was formulated against a background (sketch in 
Chapters one and two) of: 
 Some consumers being prioritised to receive electricity; 
 Some consumers investing in backup to mitigate the impact of outages ; 
 Some consumers just putting up with the power outages; and  
 A power utility (ZESA) unable to cover its cost and attempting to provide the poor 
with access to electricity. 
 
3.1 THE IMPACT ON DEMAND OF AN OUTAGE 
 
The demand for electricity is both direct and derived (Choynowski 2002:1). Direct demand 
is the use of electricity by consumers. Derived demand is the use of electricity as an input 
into production of goods and services by firms (Choynowski 2002:2). Electricity outages 
result in both types of demand not being met.  
 
3.1.1 Direct Demand Impact (Households) 
 
Households demand electricity for lighting, heating, cooking, and driving of mechanical 
equipment (Filippini & Pachauri 2002:3). In all cases the household combines electricity 
and capital equipment to produce a composite energy commodity (Becker 1965). The 
household utility function (U0) from electricity use can be written as:  
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U0 = U0(S(E0,CS))                3.1 
where S is the composite energy commodity, E is electricity supply and CS is the capital 
stock (electrical appliances). Households may change both their rate of utilisation and 
stock of electrical appliances due to power outages (Filippini & Pachauri 2002:3). In the 
short run, a household may lower the rate at which it utilises its current stock of 
appliances. In the long run, since interruptions in electricity supply can result in changes 
in the use of other inputs, it may alter the mix of inputs. Alternatively, households may 
invest in alternative backup systems to avoid consequences of power outages . This 
investment causes an adjustment of the household’s capital stock. One of the 
adjustments may be the substituting of highly electricity-sensitive appliances for less 
sensitive (and less efficient) appliances. This way, power outages negatively affect 
household utility. The major immediate cost of an outage is inconvenience. For more 
protracted outages, there are also the costs of lost food-stuffs, time, damage to 
household appliances and emergency cost of alternative power.  The cost of 
inconvenience is difficult to measure. 
 
3.1.2 Indirect Demand Impact (Firm) 
 
The impact of power outages on a firm is influenced by:  
 the sensitivity of its equipment to outages; and 
 the elasticity of its demand for electrical power (Choynowski 2002:1). 
Figure 3.1: Electricity Production Function 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coelli, Rao and Batesse  (2005:22) 
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A production function for electricity-consuming equipment (using electricity as an 
intermediate input) is shown in Figure 3.1. As the stock increases, there is an increase in 
output, ceteris paribus. Initially access to power yields a high return in output (Q0 for X0). 
If there are outages, there is zero access and output declines to zero. Also, demand for 
complementary factors of production declines (Rose et al. 2004; Coelli et al. 2005:25).  
 
An alternative response to shutting production as a result of a power outage is to use a 
substitute, for example, one’s own generator. However, this usage may result in technical 
inefficiency, with the firm producing Q1 at TC1 instead of Q2 at TC1. The optimising input 
choice when only P0 power is available from the grid is to use P0 own power, namely point 
B (see Figure 3.2). The efficient choice (A) is not available where grid access is denied. 
 
Figure 3.2: Effect of using alternative own power generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to lost output and inducing technically-inefficient choices, power outages can 
damage equipment, destroy materials in stock, require restarts of production, reduce 
goodwill, and lost sales orders (market share). 
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3.1.3 Impact on the nation 
 
Power outages undermine the contribution (productivity) of the stock of electricity-
consuming equipment (capital) and other factors of production (Choynowski 2002:1). 
They reduce production potential. This impact is shown in a ‘two-good’ model in Figure 
3.3. The two goods are consumer goods and capital goods. Power outages cause the 
production possibilities frontier (PPF) to shift inwards, thereby retarding economic 
growth. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Effect of Retarded Economic Growth Due to Power Outages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lipsey (1989:7) 
 
Before outages, points a and b on the PPF are feasible, but with outages only points such 
as c and d are attainable. 
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3.2 MODELLING ELECTRICITY DEMAND AND SUPPLY WITHOUTAGES 
 
3.2.1 A Three Model Approach for Analysing Demand and Supply of Electricity 
 
The cost of electricity outages can be expressed in unattained profit or utility 
(Klytchnikova & Lockshin 2007:12). A primary attribute of electricity service supply is its 
service reliability (interruptions) and intrinsic service quality (frequency and timing of 
outages) (ibid).  Figure 3.4 depicts three characterisations of this (combined) attribute.  
The quantity of electricity delivered (X) is shown on the horizontal (x-axis), and the price 
(P) is shown on the vertical (y-axis). 
 
Figure 3.4: A Three model framework for demand and supply adjustment for outages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Klytchnikova and Lokshin (2007:17) and own drawing 
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model C reducing quality of supply reduces demand (D1 to D2) until equilibrium is 
achieved at P0 and Xg. 
 
All three models yield relevant predictions about the impact on the market by power 
outages – the market is under-supplied, the electricity under priced, the quality of service 
poor and there is a significant market for private (higher cost) power generation.  The 
three models are combined into a single one in Figure 3.5 by means of introducing 
segmentation of demand into the analysis. The three segments of the model are 
identified as A, B and C, and link to the models described in Figure 3.4. This model 
assumes that segmentation is feasible or an inevitable consequence of the state of the 
electricity sector in Zimbabwe. Within this framework, a firm may find itself operating in 
more than one segment, for example, being able to cover part of the outage through 
backup generation, but not all, and thus falling into both segments B and C. 
 
Figure 3.5: Electricity demand – the three segment demand curve model 
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In Figure 3.5, segment A consists of customers prioritised by the government to receive 
electricity. The tariff (price) is set or administered by government. It is set below the 
optimal price level but the demand (D1) for electricity is met.  If electricity supply is 
allocated by government, electricity tariffs or prices frequently do not reflect the marginal 
utility of consumption and this arrangement will be supported by the favoured customers  
(Deaton 1981). The observed consumption expenditure on allocated electricity demand 
cannot be used in welfare measures of electricity interruptions because none are 
experienced by those customers (Hentschel & Lanjouw 2000). 
 
Segment B in Figure 3.5 consists of customers whose demand is not met (they face 
outage) and they have a willingness to pay (WTP) to purchase private power. Consumers 
meet their excess demand of Q1Q2 during outages from private generation (Q0Q1 of their 
demand being met from the grid). These consumers have a reliable energy source as 
electricity is generated in-house when an outage occurs. Supply takes a stepped curve 
shape from S1 to S2 reflecting the higher cost of private generation. The additional backup 
cost due to outages (under supply) is shown by the shaded area BIQ1Q2. Some of the cost 
would have had to have been incurred by the public utility, had it supplied the power, 
namely Q1Q2CH. 
 
In Figure 3.5, segment C consists of customers without the means or WTP to meet their 
excesss demand Q2Q4 over what is supplied by the grid, namely 0Q2 (so they only have 
the option of adjusting demand according to quality). Demand among these customers 
shifts from D1 to D2. The result is that the consumers incur a welfare cost due to inferior 
quality of ABFE. They are only willing to pay for up to 0Q4. 
 
The total welfare cost of the outage is the sum of excess cost paid for own (backup) 
power generation plus inferior quality power, namely welfare surplus areas HIBC + ABFE. 
 
 
3.2.3 Production Cost and Supply 
 
The supply options shown in Figure 3.5 were defined by government choices, but costs 
are determined by other factors, like long run economies of scale and the high cost of 
shortrun supply. The associated cost structure is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: Cost structure options for electricity generation and distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 highlights the different cost options in the short and long run. The first cost 
structure is the downward sloping short-run average cost (SAC) where public utility 
supplies electricity up to Q1 from the current generation capacity.  Up until this point 
there is sufficient capacity to avoid outages, but unless there is an increase in plant 
capacity, outages may occur beyond this point, possibly requiring private generation 
backup. Foster and Steinbucks (2009) estimate that own generated electricity is on 
average 313 percent more expensive than that from the grid.  On the other hand, if there 
is investment in increased plant capacity, the costs defined by the long-run average cost 
(LAC) will be incurred. This curve is typically L-shaped (indicating a natural monopoly). 
Capacity expansion enables the utility to enjoy economies of scale in generation.  
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The welfare costs shown in Figure 3.5 assume that the administered tariff P0 to be a cost 
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shows a situation where average cost (AC) pricing exceeds administrated pricing by the 
public utility. 
 
Figure 3.7: Electricity outage cost determination 
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the welfare cost of poor quality supply may be estimated from the cost incurred by those 
under-supplied who do not have backup alternative power generated, viz ABGE (see 
Figure, 3.7); less than the equivalent cost identified in the demand model (Figure 3.5).  
 
 
 
J 
P0 
B 
k 
Market price with load 
shedding and backup 
generators 
P1 
Q0 Q2 
D2 
D1 
Quantity of electricity in 
MW per annum 
 
ZESA 
resale 
price 
D1 
S1 
S2= SAC 
Price set or 
regulated by 
government 
Q4 Q3 Q1 
A 
E 
F 
Breakeven Price 
with invest in new 
capacity and no 
load shedding P2 
I 
SAC 
LA
C 
G 
H C 
0 
M 
L 
Q5 
70 
 
To sum up this modelling analysis, Figures 3.5 and 3.7 identify two types of outage costs: 
 
a. Lost producer and consumer surplus due to poor quality of supply causing 
(dissatisfied consumers, damage to equipment, idle time, restart cost and lost 
production) losses by those who can not avert those impacts (ABGE). The 
approach taken to estimate this cost (termed the welfare cost) is the direct 
assessment method (see Chapter 4). 
b. Supplementary power generating cost, or the cost of backup power – losses by 
those who can avert the impact of an extra private cost of BIQ1Q2. The approach 
taken to estimate this cost is the indirect method also called captive generation 
method (see Chapter 5). An alternative to private generation is for the public 
utility to install a bigger plant size (the alternative case – see Chapter 1). In this 
case it could generate 0Q4 power at an average cost of 0P2 and produce the extra 
Q1Q2 power at a total cost of JI Q1Q2. For this reason the extra (or excess) cost 
incurred due to the outages caused by the Q1Q2 under-supply is BI Q1Q2 - JI Q1Q2 = 
IBJ. 
Within this model, a policy imposing outage costs will always be more costly (and less 
efficient) than a policy that seeks to satisfy demand through distorted pricing. But if the 
loss through inefficiency is small relative to other benefits achieved, for instance, 
providing electricity access to the poor, then the distorted pricing policy still may be the 
better policy. Clearly, the empirical question of how big or small the extra cost is, is a very 
important one to which we now turn our attention.  
 
A distinct, but very relevant and related efficiency matter, is the additional tax burden 
imposed to cover the loss on generating the electricity (P0P2IH + JKLC). This thesis does 
not estimate this entire burden as it is not an outage cost. But merely notes that 
economic efficiency could be undermined through the redistribution from tax payers to 
electricity consumers. 
 
3.2.5 Outage Cost Functions and the Outage Cost Estimation Framework Employed 
3.2.5.1 The welfare cost function 
 
The welfare cost is a function of the outage characteristics (3.2): 
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Outage characteristics include outage duration, outage frequency, season and capacity 
utilisation (Bental & Ravid 1982; Beenstock & Goldin 1997; Billinton &Wangdee 2005) 
(see Chapter 4). 
 
3.2.5.2 The Indirect Method (captive/backup cost) function 
 
Similarly, backup costs are a function of backup characteristics (3.3): 
 
                                                                   
 
Backup characteristics include hours of backup use, frequency of backup use, backup 
capacity, annual units of electricity generated by backup and years of backup use (see 
Chapter 5). The backup costis estimated using the captive generation method. Only a 
portion of these costs (IBJ) can be attributed to outages because the public utility would 
otherwise have incurred JIQ1Q2 to produce this electricity (Figure 3.7). 
 
3.2.5.3 The Economic Loss-not an outage cost 
 
The economic loss in power production is the excess of total cost over revenue collected. 
There may be two elements to this loss – financial under-recovery and excluded 
economic cost (external ones). Neither of these costs can be attributed to outages. 
 
3.2.5.4 Framework linking alternative methods of estimating the cost of outage 
 
This thesis estimates the costs of power outages imposed on four main sectors of the 
economy. The approach on how the costs are estimated is shown in Figure 3.8. A number 
of studies have identified different costs of outages. The direct cost/savings which occurs 
during, or following an outage, as identified by Munasinghe (1979), are the labour cost or 
savings, cost of lost production or utility and damage, spoilage and start-up cost. These 
form the components of the direct assessment cost method (welfare cost). Even though 
power outages cause cost beyond the duration of the outage (Jyoti, Ozbafli  & Jenkins 
2006:1) such costs are difficult to measure and are not included in this estimate.  
 
Electricity outages, as highlighted by Munasinghe (1979), result in mitigating costs as 
consumers and producers take actions to minimise or avoid outage cost. These costs 
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come in the form of investment in backup sources (Adenikinju 2005). As shown above,  
the excess (not total only excess) expenditure on backup power provision is part of the 
cost of power outages (Adenikinju 2003; Adenikinju 2005; Bose et al. 2006;   de Nooij et 
al. 2006).  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Framework for electricity outages cost estimation 
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birth rate increases demand for resources by the households , so reducing the income 
available to satisfy other needs (Saghir 2005:4). Outages also have negative health and 
living condition effects (Terreblanche, Nel & Opperman 1992:26; Fiil-Flynn 2002). Ill-
health and poor standards of living also increase the cost of trade and commerce, by 
making it harder to reap the full gains from the activities that would otherwise have 
improved societal income and/or welfare (Hamouid & Sachs 1999). A poor standard of 
living reduces productivity and performance of labourers, thereby inhibiting ability to 
earn (Saghir 2005:4).  
 
The prevalence of poverty compels many households to subsist on the natural resources 
(like firewood), causing over exploitation of these resources and resulting in social ‘bads’ 
like deforestation, smoke and contaminated drinking water sources (Saghir 2005:5). 
Around most urban areas in Zimbabwe the signs of deforestation, soil erosion and 
polluted water sources are already evident.1 
 
For an agrarian economy like that of Zimbabwe, power supply is critical to both economic 
and social development.2 Electricity outages thwart growth and food security; typically, 
hurting the poor the most (Pouliquen 1999). When there are adequate communications 
networks, roads, storage and electricity, farmers can obtain the information they need to 
grow the most profitable crops, store them, move them to market and receive the best 
prices for them (World Bank 1997:41). Up to 15 percent of production is lost between the 
farm gate and the consumers because of electricity outages, thus reducing incomes for 
farmers and raising the cost of food for urban consumers (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1Deforestation occurs as many households rely on firewood for consumption and contaminated water bodies such 
as rivers and dams as the sewage reticulation plants are channelling raw sewage into the rivers due to outages of 
electricity and other factors.  
2 Zimbabwe relies much on irrigated winter wheat production as a source of its food; therefore electricity outages 
are causing output loss which is threatening food security. 
74 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Power outages affect the production function, factor productivity and efficiency in the 
use of factors. A sectoral analysis of demand for electricity shows that, the costs of 
outages are not borne evenly but more by certain segments  of the user population. 
Particularly hard hit are those with no backup generating option and not prioritised by the 
public utility. 
 
An analysis of cost shows that there  are two main types of cost – direct welfare loss and 
indirect cost of backup arrangements. Two approaches are proposed by which to 
estimate these costs – the direct assessment method and the indirect method or captive 
generation method. Following the segmented approach, the welfare (direct) cost is a 
different outage cost from the indirect cost (backup cost). Therefore, the two costs must 
be added together to derive total outage cost. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE DIRECTASSESSMENT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING 
DIRECT (WELFARE) OUTAGE COST– (C1) 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
 
The methodology of the direct assessment approach uses direct loss by which it estimates 
the cost of power outages through lost production, lost materials and lost time or leisure. 
The direct assessment method is an economic appraisal tool that estimates the cost of 
power outages by allowing electricity consumers to express their losses in monetary 
terms (Bose et al. 2006:1439). The approach is based on the principle that the lost 
production, materials and time in each productive sector, or lost goods during an outage, 
can be estimated directly, and this can be aggregated to a total (de Nooijet al. 2006:284). 
The approach relies on the individual respondent’s self assessment method of valuing the 
cost of electricity outage. Direct cost estimations, such as the direct financial evaluation 
approach, the gross economic indices approach (GNP divided by total electricity 
consumption), and the case study approach have been frequently employed in the past 
(Pollitt, Jamasb & Yu 2006).  
 
The use of the direct assessment approach dates back to the Industrial Revolution when, 
firms experienced an energy (coal) crisis in production (Alfred Marshall 1907), but it was 
not until the 1930s that direct assessment became widely applied. The methodology was 
employed in the formulation of the Federal Electricity Regulation Commission (FERC) 
responsible for initiating reliable electricity supply in the United States in the 1940s. It 
was a period during which most privately owned electricity suppliers converted to public 
utilities (FERC, 1973). Under the Commission, US electricity utilities were required to 
supply reliable electricity in order to minimise the loss of production. The Commission’s 
survey in the 1940s on the cost of unsupplied electricity to firms showed shocking results 
of lost production, revenue and profits. It was in making these calculations , that the direct 
assessment methodology was popularised (Ukpong 1973; Beenstock et al. 1997). Since 
then, the method has been extended to estimating cost of poor telephone networks and 
the cost of unsupplied water, inter alia. 
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The direct assessment approach was adopted by Ukpong (1973) in Nigeria. He referred to 
it as production function approach.  Tishler (1993) and Grosfeld-Nir and Tishler (1993) 
further refined the methodology by assuming that damage to materials was 
proportionate to the output loss during the outage and that factor demands for electricity 
and labour were adversely affected by the uncertainty of electricity supply. The latter 
raises the effective user cost of electricity. Outages cause sub-optimal technologies to be 
adopted, and thereby impose additional costs beyond the direct costs incurred at the 
time of the outage itself (Grosfeld-Nir & Tishler 1993).  
 
The direct assessment method was the dominant methodology for estimating the cost of 
power outages in the early studies of this problem (Beenstock et al. 1997).  
 
4.1 VARIATIONS OF THE DIRECT ASSESSMENT COST ESTIMATIONS 
 
4.1.1 Production Loss Approach 
 
One application of the direct assessment cost is to calculate the value of the production 
loss that can be attributed to the interruption of power supply, that is, to estimate the 
‘cost of unserved energy’ (CUE) (Ontario Hydro 1977; Caves et al. 1990; Matsukawa & Fuji 
1994; Beenstock et al. 1997). In the agricultural sector, the production loss method 
derives the CUE from the incremental crop output not realised (opportunity cost) due to 
the non-availability of power for irrigation. The production loss method calculates the 
maximum amount that a firm or household will pay to avoid electricity outages. 
 
The major problem with this approach is that, adjustment processes are not accounted 
for in the responses, with the result that the CUE is often overstated (Ross, Boyd & 
Kokkkelenberg 2000). For example, industrial enterprises that suffer from power cuts will 
seek to minimise the outage effects by rescheduling production to other periods , e.g. 
through the use of pump sets (Tiwari 2000). These rescheduling possibilities are not 
incorporated into the estimates respondents make of their lost production (Oosterhaven 
1996). A further disadvantage of the method is its reliance on the recall ability of 
respondents – the firms (Yung 2005). The value of losses is overstated when the entire 
loss of production is attributed to the power cut (Bose et al. 2006:1437). Frequently, firms 
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can estimate the loss in revenue, but not the loss in value added (Ross et al.2000). For 
these reasons, the production loss method provides an upper limit estimate cost of 
electricity outages from the perspective of the firm (Stern 2000). 
 
4.1.2 Systems Customer Outage Cost (SCOC) Approach 
 
The Systems Customer Outage Cost (SCOC) approach has also been used to estimate the 
financial impact of an electricity supply interruption (OFGEM 1999). This method 
estimates the costs of outages from Sector Customer Damage Functions (SCDFs). These 
reflect the number of interruptions, interruption durations and the system custome r mix. 
SCDFs are evaluated from the weighted Customer Interruption Costs (CICs) (Allan & 
Kariuki 1999). This method determines the costs customers would be likely to incur if 
their electricity supply were interrupted for a given duration of time from SCDFs. On the 
basis of hypothetical scenarios, customers are asked to choose from a given list the 
actions they would take in order to minimise the impacts of such interruption (OFGEM 
1999). The hourly cost of each scenario is noted alongside the list of actions.  
 
A shortcoming of this type of estimation is that it equates the direct cost of an action 
incurred from a power interruption to the value of the interruption to customers (Pollit, 
Jamasb & Yu 2006:14). Without considering the value of utility losses to consumers, 
Ofgem’s approach (SOSC) is likely to significantly under-estimate the actual outage cost. 
 
To avoid the underestimation problem, a combination of the methods may be required. 
 
4.2 APPLICATION OF THE DIRECT ASSESSMENT METHOD 
 
The direct assessment method may be employed to ascertain the cost of interruptions of 
electricity supply or a reduction in its quality to productive sectors and households. 
Households and firms differ substantially in their valuations (de Nooij et al. 2006:280). 
The main valuation of firms is output traded on the markets, whereas the main valuation 
of households is well-spent leisure time. 
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The cost of power outages vary from case to case and from sector to sector, depending 
on any or all of the following factors (Bose et al. 2006:1437): 
 the extent the consumer is forewarned about such interruptions ; 
 the time of the day and the season during which the supply fails; and 
 the coping strategies that the customer has in place. 
 
4.2.1 Steps in Direct Assessment Application 
A typical direct assessment method follows the steps detailed below. 
4.2.1.1 Defining the scope of power outages estimation 
The first stage of direct assessment is defining the proposed estimation of power outages 
cost (Hanley & Spash 1993), analysing how the proposed estimation is going to be 
achieved, who the affected are and the means with which the targets are to be reached. 
The anticipated challenges in achieving the targets have to be identified. At this stage, the 
researcher must decide, how important the targets are to the whole analysis and so 
determine the implications thereof. The reference against which the implications are 
determined is the base case, a scenario where there are no power outages. 
4.2.1.2 Setting power outage scenarios 
 
The second stage of the direct assessment is to list a set of power outage scenarios. The 
scenarios may vary considerably among sectors or targets or situations (Eto et al. 2001). 
For example, one scenario might ask for the cost of a one-hour outage, while another 
might ask two or twelve hours. In some cases, advance notice of outages might be 
presented as an explicit scenario, e.g. one hour outage with advance notice. In others, 
consumers might be asked if their costs would be reduced if they had advance notice of 
the outage. 
The person administering the questionnaires should get the respondents to understand 
their involvement and the nature of the transaction proposed (Hanley & Splash 1993). 
Pre-testing of the questionnaire should be done before the actual survey takes place in 
order to determine the most appropriate way of asking questions and whether the 
respondents will provide sensible responses to the questions. 
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4.2.1.3 Defining the type of direct cost associated with power outages.  
The third stage of the direct assessment is the identification of direct costs associated 
with power outages. Power outages can impose direct costs on consumers in a number of 
ways, depending on the class of consumers. These costs have to be identified separately 
for each class of consumer. The identification is normally conducted by making reference 
to the direct costs associated with each sector. 
4.2.1.4 Determining cost 
 
a.   Determining cost for firms 
Firms suffer three kinds of damages in the case of an outage (Borestein 2001).  First, they 
produce less. Without electricity, many production processes stop, some production is 
lost, e.g. unsaved computer files, and it takes time to start up production again. Second, 
extra costs may be incurred, e.g. paying overtime bonuses to workers. Third, some goods 
and inputs may be damaged, e.g. hot steel in a steel plant may cool down (making it 
difficult to process) and have to be reheated (the earlier input of heat is then lost).  The 
damage caused by an electricity interruption in a firm is equal  to the value it would 
normally have added during that period.  
b. Valuing cost for households 
Households face two kinds of cost: the lost possibility to use their leisure time as they 
want and the loss of goods, e.g. the contents of the freezer if an interruption lasts too 
long (Nooij et al. 2006:287). In winter, households could experience cold discomfort 
because heating systems depend on electricity. Households enjoy leisure by using time 
and money as inputs. The marginal utility of money decreases with the increasing amount 
of money one has, while the marginal utility of free time increases as the numbers of 
hours worked increases. There is an optimal amount of time for a person to work. At this 
optimum, the income generated with one hour of work equals the value of an additional 
hour of leisure time. Put differently, the value of a marginal hour of leisure time equals 
the income earned per hour.  
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4.2.1.5 Data Collection 
 
The fifth stage is data collection. Data collection can be done by one of two methods. The 
first is the survey method. Surveys are the principal source of information on customer 
outage costs (Caves et al. 1992). Survey approaches require customers to identify their 
possible response to different power outage scenarios. The consumers are required to 
estimate how much it would cost them to adjust to a power outage. The second is the 
case study. This method involves asking the electricity consumers the cost they have 
incurred after an outage had occurred and the amount of value they place on the 
interruption of their activities.  
 
The maginitude of consumers outage cost can only be estimated by making reference to 
similar past outages (Eto et al. 2001). Consumers face problems in trying to determine the 
different costs for different times, e.g. how different the costs of power outages  are for 1 
hour, 2 hours, or 4 hours. The cost of any power outage has both direct and indirect costs. 
In most studies, the indirect costs are ignored. However, the indirect costs may be higher 
than the direct costs and have long-term consequences, e.g. deforestation. Other 
measures, such as the contingent valuation method (CVM) can also be used to estimate 
such costs.  
 
4.2.1.6 Screening, Consistency Checking and Capturing 
  
The researcher also needs to check on the consistency of the consumers’ responses to 
questions, e.g. one hour outage cost should not be higher than a 12 hour outage. An 
important part of screening the data is the identification of valid and invalid responses. 
Refusal to state the cost, or incomplete questionnaires, are normally identified and 
omitted from the calculations. A decision has to be made about how to identi fy the 
outliers, as well as what to do with them. As an alternative to omitting outliers, the 
problem they cause is often addressed by weighting responses differently (Hanley & 
Splash 1993). It is also important that the researcher minimises double counting of costs, 
e.g. the cost of lost production or cost of damage to equipment should not be added if 
there is replacement cost also included.  
81 
 
4.2.2 Rationale 
 
The direct assessment method provides the richest source of information for tracking 
trends in interruption cost because it identifies specific components of economic losses, 
distinguishes among classes and types of customers bearing those costs and considers the 
costs associated with a range of electricity interruptions (Concept Economics 2008:8). 
 
4.2.3 Critique 
 
The direct assessment approach is not, however, without its shortcomings. The following 
are weaknesses. 
4.2.3.1 Ignores indirect cost 
 
The direct assessment method measures only direct cost of production (such as lost 
output) and not indirect cost (such as inconvenience) (Concept Economics 2008:8). 
Indirect cost may be more than direct cost.  
4.2.3.2 No consideration for make-up cost 
 
The direct assessment method makes no allowance for the fact that foregone production 
might be partially made up for after the outage and for this reason, overestimate the cost 
of electricity outages.  Proponents of the method argue that this overestimation of direct 
cost compensates for the omission of indirect costs (Boseet al. 2006; Concept Economics, 
2008:8). 
 
4.2.3.3 Self assessment problem 
 
Self assessments based on business surveys may be prone to strategic misrepresentation 
(Pasha et al. 1990). The reported outage cost may be exaggerated to impress upon the 
power company the need for more reliable electricity. Alternatively, the interviewees 
may be unaware of the cost or unable to devote the necessary time to complete the 
questionnaire.  
 
Typically, outage cost estimates are based on what customers say they will experience 
under different outage circumstances (Lawton, Sullivan, Van Liere & Katz 2003). The key 
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source of uncertainty in these estimates is the degree to which the cost customers report, 
for hypothetical circumstances, correspond with the actual cost experienced (Woo & 
Pupp 1992). No studies have attempted to validate the results obtained from these 
surveys, yet this is a significant source of uncertainty in the cost estimates to date 
(LaCommare & Eto 2005). Another important source of uncertainty typically encountered 
in customer surveys is small sample size. This problem undermines the scope for 
generalising information derived from the sample (ibid).  
4.2.3.4 Limited information 
 
The estimates are based on limited surveys of consumer groups (LaCommare & Eto, 
2004). LaCommare and Eto (2005) found that the cost experienced by a non-surveyed 
customer group were 25-50 percent of the cost experienced by the surveyed population.  
 
Business losses are not always directly proportional to the duration of an outage (Eto et 
al. 2004). In such cases, the key factor is the length of business or production downtime 
caused by an outage of any length. In some cases, partial loss of voltage or voltage sag 
can cause the same amount of downtime as a complete loss of power if machines need to 
be rebooted or production processes need to be restarted (LaCommare & Eto 2005). This 
issue poses a major challenge in estimating the economic cost of power interru ptions. 
 
4.2.3.5 Nature of respondents 
 
Assessing actual cost is complicated by differing impacts of events on different classes of 
customers, e.g. households, industrial, mining and farmers (LaCommare & Eto 2005). The 
costs experienced by non-households customers or firms are (in principle) simpler to 
estimate than the difficult-to-quantify “hardship” cost experienced by households. Basic 
accounting categories for firms, such as labour and materials costs and revenue los ses, 
are straight forward (though not necessarily easy) to estimate. However,  household-
sector costs, include elements such as the cost of consumable goods (flashlights and 
candles) and inconvenience costs (resetting clocks, changing plans, and coping with  
inconvenience, fear, anxiety, etc). 
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4.2.3.6 Presence of backup 
 
The economic cost and perceived risk of unreliable power supply has led many electricity 
consumers to invest in a wide variety of technologies and measures to reduce their 
vulnerability to outages. Back-up or stand-by generators are probably the most well 
known of suchinvestments (LaCommare & Eto 2005). These investments mean the direct 
cost of power outages will differ between those with the generators and those without. 
The presence of backup sources will also influence the perceptions and estimates of 
respondents (Eto et al. 2004).  
 
4.3 ADDING THE COST COMPONENTS 
 
In order to estimate the cost of outage by the direct assessment, it is important that total 
value lost by consumers due to power outages is ascertained by summing all direct cost 
experienced during outages. The direct costs incurred by firms go beyond production l oss 
or output loss. In addition to output loss cost, other direct costs such as materials 
destruction cost (in stock), labour cost (payment of idle labourers and cost of overtime 
and bonuses to meet production and orders), damage to equipment cost, restart cost, 
time or opportunity cost per outage are part of the outage cost. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 
Where:      is the total direct cost for the ith consumer;     is cost of lost output (lost 
leisure for households);     is the material destruction cost;     is labour cost;      is 
the equipment damage and maintenance cost as a result of outages; and R   is restart 
cost. 
 
From equation 4.1 costs per unit of electricity (kWh) lost can be estimated as: 
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Where:     is the cost per kWh lost and kWhlos j are the total units of electricity (kWh) 
lost or unsupplied due to outages. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The direct assessment method estimates the cost borne by the end consumers and 
producers of electricity as a result of outages, excluding backup costs . The costs include 
production loss and all direct losses such as material loss, idle labour cost, direct 
maintenance cost and lost leisure. The cost also includes the additional cost of covering 
lost production or sales as a result of outages.  
 
The flexibility of the direct assessment method and its link to observable market 
behaviour recommends its use in outage cost research (Caves et al. 1992; Beenstock et al. 
1997). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE INDIRECT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING OUTAGE 
COST (BACKUP COST)–(C2) 
 
5 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purchase of, or investment in, backup systems, such as generators, solar panels, 
diesel pumps or UPS’s may be regarded as the payment of a premium on an insurance 
policy against outage risks (Eto et al. 2001). The unmitigated loss due to an outage, in the 
event of incomplete insurance, may be regarded as deductible on the policy (Beenstock et 
al. 1997). The unmitigated loss varies inversely, ceteris paribus, with the investment in 
back-up generators (ibid). 
 
The indirect method (backup or captive generation method) dates as far back as the 
World War One (WWI) when it was used by the US Navigation Army (1917). This method 
was adopted by British and other European countries in the 1930s as a way of 
consolidating their industry production and estimating the negative effects of power 
outages (Wikipedia 2008).  The implementers of the backup concept did not consider the 
cost of the backup devices as the cost of outages (Matsukawa & Fujii 1994). 
 
The first researcher to point out that data on back-up generators may be used to infer 
outage costs was Munasinghe (1979) and was further refined by Bental and Ravid (1982). 
Their ideas were further refined by Beenstock (1991). These researchers needed a way of 
quantifying the cost of the outages (Munasinghe 1979; Bental & Ravid 1982; Beenstock 
1991). Since then, the method has been extended to analyse the cost of electricity quality 
and cost of unserved electricity. Many researchers favour this method of estimating cost 
of power outages (Pasha, Ghaus & Malik 1990; Matsukawa & Fujii 1994). Based on data 
for Japanese companies using large computer systems, the latter estimated discrete 
choice models in which they found that the demand for backup (backup generators, UPS) 
varied inversely with electricity reliability and the user cost of backup investment.  
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The indirect method (backup cost method) rapidly gained popularity among researchers 
because the cost of backup generation can be estimated with certainty (market values of 
the backup device and its variable cost can be easily inferred) (Bose et al. 2006).  
 
5.1 NATURE OF INDIRECT (BACKUP) COST 
 
If the expected gain from a self-generated kWh equates to the expected loss from the 
marginal kWh that is not supplied by the utility, the marginal cost of self-generated power 
serves as an estimate for the marginal outage cost (Adenikinju 2005:9). 
 
The cost to a firm generating its own power consists of two ele ments (Adenikinju 
2005:10). The first is the yearly capacity cost of the generator and other capital outlays. 
This cost will be denoted by c(Kg), where Kg is the generator’s capacity measured in kVa 
and c is the proportionate constant determined for capital outlay. Second is the variable 
cost per kWh for fuel, maintenance and wage costs. If the generator is used to capacity 
during power cuts, as assumed, the variable cost per year is given by v.H.Kg, where H is 
the expected total duration of outages, measured in hours per year and v is the constant 
of capacity or load powered by the backup equipment. 
 
The World Bank (1993b) estimated that the adaptive costs of electricity failure on the 
Nigerian economy to be US$390 million. This cost was for consumer backup capacity 
(US$250 million), operating and maintenance of diesel auto-generators (US$90 million), 
and fuel and lubrication (US$50 million). Ross et al. (1995) criticised the use of the 
marginal cost of generators as the power outage cost on the grounds that power outage 
costs go beyond the cost of acquiring and running backup devices. For this reason, the 
use of marginal variable replacement cost underestimates the total power outage cost. 
Tiwari (2000) found that the costs of power outages are significantly higher than those of 
marginal cost as there are other social costs to consider such as shortage of food, 
outbreak of diseases and malnutrition.  
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An alternative proxy approach is to use secondary data (in the form of past expenditures 
on backup devices) to estimate the cost of power outages (Wang & Min 2000). The 
method assumes consumers would act in similar ways when faced with similar situations. 
The proxy approach may overestimate the cost that consumers are willing to pay 
(Mazundar 1995) because it only estimates the CUE at the margin. Some of the costs 
cannot be monetized, for example, the additional investment required, the inconvenience 
of the hot air and noise from the generator, and the additional responsibility for the 
generator (World Bank 1993). Given that consumers may keep the backups on site even if 
there is supply from the grid, the capital cost is a sunken cost – perhaps not really part of 
the outage cost.  
 
5.2 RATIONALE FOR AND CRITIQUE OF THE INDIRECT METHOD 
 
5.2.1 Rationale 
 
The indirect assessment method employed in assessing the cost of power outages is 
premised on the behaviour of a typical firm or rational consumer. Firms are assumed to 
be operating to maximise profits, while households are assumed to maximise utility 
(Wang & Min 2000; Bose et al. 2006). A firm or household, faced with frequent power 
outages, will act to insure itself against the damage caused, by acquiring backup 
generating units (Adenikinju 2005; Bose et al. 2006). 
 
The gain from insurance against outages consists of the continued production or the 
continued leisure that the self-generated electricity makes possible, and the avoided 
damage to equipment that otherwise would have been caused by power outage (ibid). 
The expected gain from the marginal self generation kWh is also the expected loss from 
the marginal kWh that come as a result of an outage.  
 
Using 1987 data, Clemmensen, Bates and Kraft (1999) estimated that 1.5 to 3 US cents of 
every US$1 manufacturing sales are spent correcting for power reliability problems - a 
total of US$25.6 billion per year (based on 1987 sales of US$853.6 billion and the three-
cent per US$1 of sales expenditure estimate). 
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Data on the size of device generating units, the cost of the backup systems and the 
output of the system, in the form of power (kWh) generated, can be easily traced to the 
suppliers of the devices (Beenstock et al. 1997). The same information about the output 
can be traced to the load that is powered by the device. The units required for these 
devices are known internationally, e.g. the cooker consumes 60 AMPs on average and 
lights 10 AMPs. This makes the method easy to apply. 
 
5.2.2 Critique 
 
Critics argue that this method can misrepresent cost. For example, reported initial device 
cost may be exaggerated to impress upon the researcher that they spend a lot on 
minimising the cost of power outages (Eto et al. 1997). Respondents may be unaware of 
the costs or unable to devote the necessary time to complete the questionnaire, which is 
often necessarily complex and long (ibid). 
 
Critics question the plausibility of respondents’ ability to keep a record of the hours and 
days of power outages, as these are linked to the hours the generator has been in use 
(Eto et al. 1997). Generators are owned by a minority and they are the ones who provide 
information. It is difficult to verify if the sample is representative (Caves et al. 1992). 
 
The use of the backup generation method to estimate cost depends on whether the 
backup power supplies are for emergency or optional standby (Caves et al. 1992). Where 
captive generation is used as (normal) emergency backup power, the method may 
overestimate cost.  On the other hand, Tiwari (2000) argues that power outage costs are 
far greater than the backup generation costs, as there are indirect costs other than direct 
costs that must still be added.  
 
The method assumes a perfectly competitive market for generators, risk neutrality, and a 
production technology in which electricity enters smoothly. The existence of risk aversion, 
externalities (which bring about environmental regulation), and technologies in which 
relatively small generators, are of no use, would yield misleading estimates of the 
marginal outage cost (Eto et al. 2001). 
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Often backup generation may only be used for lighter loads, such as lighting, maintenance 
of security system and running computer savers (Wang & Min 2000). These loads covered 
by backup are lower than what is required for normal operations, resulting in an 
underestimation of outage cost (ibid). For it to be an accurate estimate, the backup 
should be the estimate used to maintain normal load activities.  
 
Despite the weaknesses of the captive generation method, the ease of applying the 
method makes it an appealing one by which to estimate part of the cost of power outages 
(Eto et al. 2001; Adenikinju 2005; Bose et al. 2006).  
 
5.3 STEPS IN APPLYINGTHE INDIRECT (BACKUP/CAPTIVE) METHOD 
 
 
The indirect (captive generation) method uses questionnaires, interviews and secondary 
data to estimate the cost of power supply interruption. The investment by consumers 
depend on whether the backup system is for business or personal use, the scale of 
operation (large scale, medium scale and small scale) and size of family (extended or 
single family). When electricity is disrupted, customers usually resort to captive 
generation – a technology that automatically triggers to supply power when the grid 
electricity cuts out. The application of the method takes place in stages (Beenstock et al. 
1998; Adenikinju 2005). 
 
5.3.1 Defining the Objectives and the Target 
 
The first stage of indirect assessment is defining the objectives to be achieved (Beenstock 
et al. 1998) – in this case power outage cost estimation. The anticipated challenges in 
achieving objectives have to be laid down. It is important to have a basis of reference of 
the cost. The cost is based on the market behaviour and actual market values of backup 
systems and estimated consumption of inputs (operational cost).  It is important to 
distinguish the backup case - a scenario where the device is used intensively for one hour, 
two hours, etc. from the base scenario where there are no power outages (the status 
quo). 
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5.3.2 Determining the Backup Sources 
 
The second stage is to list the set of backup systems that can be used to estimate the 
cost. The sources can vary considerably among sectors and classes of consumers (Wang & 
Min 2000). For example, one firm might be using UPS, generator and energy saver lights 
at the same time. Some companies might have their own mini-thermal or hydro-plants to 
generate electricity to supplement grid electricity supply. Potential and actual output 
capacity from each device must be known. Consideration should also be given to the 
sharing of devices such as diesel pumps and generators so as to avoid double counting.  
 
5.3.3 Classifying the Cost of the Indirect (Backup) Sources 
 
The third stage of indirect assessment is classifying the cost associated with backup 
generation. The cost of generating backup power comprises two items: the capacity cost 
of acquiring and constructing the backup facility and the operating cost (Wang & Min 
2000). The actual capacity cost (capital cost of backup source) can be obtained by 
referring to market values and opinions of expert engineers. The running cost is the 
summed cost of all consumables for the period under review.  
 
5.3.4 Data collection 
 
The data can be collected by surveying respondents who own backup devices. The 
questionnaire can be administered through the mail (email or postal) or by personal 
interview. Mail survey questionnaires are reputed to have low response rates. Personally 
administered questionnaires are preferred as they increase response rate and allow the 
respondent to ask questions where there is need for clarity. Interviews may be 
administered either by telephone or face-to-face. Interviews via the telephone can be 
problematic where visual information is part of the interview and where contact 
information is important. The person administering the questionnaires, or conducting the 
interview, needs to be well informed in respect of the subject matter and must be able to 
communicate this information.  
 
The cost of the backup system/s can be obtained by using open-ended questions or 
closed-ended questions (Beenstock et al. 1993). The most appropriate way is to use open-
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ended questions in the questionnaire as they allow the individual freedom to specify the 
actual amount incurred in acquiring the device and running cost for the device.  
 
5.3.5 Data Capturing, Screening and Describing the Survey 
 
An important part of screening the data is the determination of valid and invalid 
responses. A decision has to be made about how to identify the outliers, non-responses 
on the captive generation questions as well as what to do with them (Wang & Min 2000). 
 
5.3.6 Summing the Cost 
 
The cost is estimated by adding the capital cost and variable cost of acquiring and running 
the captive generation backup system. The capital cost has to take into account the issue 
of depreciation and the discounting factor for investment in the capital equipment. A 
captive unit will typically have a life span of more than one year and the capital cost must 
be divided over the life span of the asset. The capital cost discount factor can be obtained 
from the financial sector, or the firm’s or industry’s average rate of return on assets. The 
general accounting depreciation of such assets should be obtained from the accounting 
firms or from individual firms. The average economic cost per unit of power generated for 
the ith consumer, using the jth backup unit, can be calculated by dividing the total 
indirect cost by the total kWhs generated as: 
 
    
             
   
                                                                                                                
   
 
        
                                                                                                                          
 
where      is the gross backup cost of the ith consumer with j backup units;       is the 
annualised cost of back-up power expressed in US$ (    is the capital cost of the backup 
device at current prices expressed in US$ and    is the capital recovery factor);     is the 
electrical units generated by the backup units expressed in kWh;    is the annual 
maintenance and wage cost expressed in US$;      the annual fuel cost of running backup 
generation expressed in US$; r the annual rate of interest; n the total life of the backup 
device expressed in years; j the number of backup units. 
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5.4 ADJUSTING THE TOTAL COST FOR NORMAL (UTILITY) COST 
AVERTED 
 
In order to calculate the net indirect (backup) cost of an outage it is necessary to deduct 
the normal public utility cost of generation averted from the gross backup cost, i.e. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
where     is the gross backup cost of the ith consumer with j backup units;     is the per 
kWh cost recovery tariff a public utility company would need to charge. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The indirect assessment method has been used extensively in empirical studies to 
estimate outage costs (Beenstock et al. 1997; Wang & Min 2000; Adenikinju 2005; Bose et 
al. 2006) despite its weaknesses. Its popularity stems from the flexibility and ability of the 
method to relate to market values (Adenikinju 2005; Bose et al. 2006).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
ESTIMATING THE COST OF POWER OUTAGES IN THE 
ZIMBABWEAN MINING SECTOR 
 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
Zimbabwe is richly endowed with mineral wealth (CZI 2008). Over 40 different minerals 
are known to exist and most of these have been exploited at one time or another ( ibid). 
Most of the country’s minerals are in high demand on the international markets. The 
range of minerals includes gold, coal, nickel, platinum, diamond, chrome and cobalt. Gold, 
diamonds and platinum are Zimbabwe’s main mineral exports. The exploitation of these 
minerals has been hampered by persistent power cuts.  
 
Mining comes the third in terms of contribution to the GDP, at about 12.7 percent and is 
the second highest foreign currency earning sector (CSO 2008); the highest being 
agriculture. The key legislation governing this sector, are the Mines and Minerals Act 
(Chapter 21:05) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 
21:04). The said legislation provides for the licensing, exploration and marketing of 
minerals in Zimbabwe. 
 
The Zimbabwean government acknowledges the importance of the mining sector to the 
socio-economic development of the country. Currently, the sector employs about 55 000 
people formally (CSO 2008; CZI 2008). The figure was higher before the 2008 downturn of 
global market prices, world recession and other domestic problems (CZI 2008). Mining is 
particularly susceptible to power quality issues (Bert et al. 2006). Many mine sites are 
remotely located (Ministry of Mines 2007).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate outage costs in the mining sector for the year 
2009. A survey framework is used to elicit cost of outages. The chapter is organised as 
follows: the survey administration and analysis of data are described and costs are 
estimated usingregression analysis for the two methods applied, namely the direct 
method and indirect assessment methods. Survey administration takes into account, the 
questionnaire design, population, sampling design, data collection and data analysis. 
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6.1 ADMINISTRATION OF THE MINING SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire used in the mining sector outage cost survey was designed in 
consultation with several focus groups: the Ministry of Mines, Minerals Marketing 
Corporations of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), ZESA, Ministry of Energy and Power Development 
and Mining captains. It was deemed to be important to understand the electricity outage 
impact on mines: how they experienced the outages; the frequency of the outages; the 
time of the outages; the length of outages; losses they incur as a result of outages; 
alternative sources available; and whether captive generation is common to mines.  
 
The final questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part contained questions about 
the mine considerations vis-a-vis mineral extracted, location, hours of operation, hours of 
outages and the frequency of outages, uninterrupted power supply, advance warning 
arrangement, ranking of electricity infrastructure and other publicly provided 
infrastructures. The second part comprised questions about the direct cost estimation of 
power outages. This part extracted actual outage cost: level of operation affected by 
power outages; monthly production losses; damage to equipment; labour cost of idle 
staff; labourers employed; and those laid off and deterred investment as a result of 
power outages. The third part of the questionnaire asked questions about the captive 
generation cost for the mine: the cost of acquiring backup equipment and the 
accessories; running cost; and maintenance cost at mine unit level. The backup 
equipment such as generators, solar panels and UPS used to power mine equipment were 
identified. Before the questionnaire was finalised, it was tested with smaller group.  
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6.1.2 Sampling Design 
 
6.1.2.1Sample Frame 
 
Table 6.1: ZESA mining electricity supply capacity classification 
 
Electricity Supply Capacity Tariff Class Number of Customers 
 Low Capacity (LC) Mining 723 
 High Capacity (HC) Mining 256 
Total 984 
Source: ZESA (ZEDTCO) (2009)  
 
The survey population includes all mines connected to the utility grid. The total numberof 
mine consumers is 984 (see Table 6.1). 
 
6.1.2.2 Sample size 
 
The sample should be representative of the target population (sample frame) and of 
sufficient size (Cochran 1977). Failure to meet these requirements undermines the 
inference that can be drawn about the target population from the sample. Three criteria 
need to be specified to determine the appropriate sample size: the level of precision; the 
level of confidence; and the degree of variability in the attributes being measured 
(Miaoulis & Michener 1976). The level of precision, sometimes called sampling error, is 
the range within which the true value of the population is estimated. This range is often 
expressed in percentage points, e.g., ±5 percent. The confidence or risk level is based on 
ideas encompassed under the Central Limit Theorem. The key idea encompassed in the 
theorem is that when a population is repeatedly sampled, the average value of the 
attribute obtained by those samples is equal to the true population value (Israel 2003:1) . 
The values obtained by these samples are required to be distributed normally about the 
true value, with some samples having higher value and some obtaining a lower score than 
the true population value.  
 
In a normal distribution, approximately 95% of the sample values are within two standard 
deviations of the true population value. The more heterogeneous a population the higher 
is the degree of variability in sample values and the larger the sample size required to 
obtain a given level of precision. A variability proportion of 50% (p = 0.5) indicates the 
maximum variability in a population. It is often used in setting the sample size in the 
absence of knowledge of the true variability of the population.  
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The sample size was reached by applying the Yamane (1967:886) approach to sample size 
determination. This approach makes an assumption that there is normal distribution of 
the sample error. If population sizes (N) are known, the minimum required sample size 
can be computed as follows: 
 
  
  
   
    
 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
   
 
       
                                                                                                                           
 
Where: n0= first approximation of n 
 n= is the minimum required sample size 
 N = population size (sample frame) 
 e = level of precision 
In order to populate these formulas, the relevant precision, confidence or risk level and 
degree of variability in the attributes need to be specified. The researcher assumed a 10% 
level of precision. The minimum required sample size for Low Capacity mines was 
calculated as follows: 
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The required sample size estimates for the selected mine electricity consumers are shown 
in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Required sample sizes based on electricity tariff classification  
 
Electricity Supply 
Capacity Tariff Class 
Number of 
Customers 
Sample size of 
respondents 
Sample size as 
percentage  of  
population 
 Low Capacity  Mining 723 79 11% 
 High Capacity  Mining 256 69 27% 
TOTAL 984 148 15% 
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6.1.2.3 Sample selection 
 
A stratified sampling design was adopted for the mining electricity outage cost estimation 
survey. Firstly, mines were stratified into low capacity (LC) and high capacity (HC) mines, 
as per utility electricity supply capacity classification shown in Table 6.1. The second 
stratification was in terms of the mineral exploited and 14 minerals highly mined in 
Zimbabwe were randomly selected. The minerals they mined included gold, platinum, 
limestone, iron, vermiculite, phosphate, chrome, nickel, diamond, coal, lithium, graphite, 
black granite and asbestos. The selection of the type and units for the survey was based 
on secondary data on electricity purchased, sanctioned load, electricity generated by 
captive units and utility recommendations.  
 
6.1.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The survey was administered by the researcher and research assistants, who were trained 
in administering the questionnaires. Personally administered questionnaires were used to 
collect the data in order to reduce mis-information biases. The respondents were 
informed of the purpose of the research in advance by telephone or email. The data 
collection exercise was spread over 3 months from May 2009 to July 2009. The data from 
the questionnaires was cleaned, coded, collated on Excel spreadsheets and analysed 
using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS: 13) and Eviews (6). 
 
6.2 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
6.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
A total of 74 out of the 148 questionnaires (50%) were successfully collected and analysed 
for the direct method (C1), while out of the 74 questionnaires collected, 63 out of 148 
(43%) questionnaires were analysed for the indirect method (C2). A total of 11 
questionnaires were discarded for the indirect method because the respondents did not 
have backup systems. 
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Table 6.3: Respondents distribution by power capacity, mineral, scale and location  
 
Item of Analysis Consideration 
Direct Method (C1) Indirect Method (C2) 
Frequency 
Percentage 
of total 
Frequency 
Percentage 
of total 
Power Supply Capacity HC mines 31 41.9 28 44.4 
 LC mines 43 58.1 35 55.4 
      
Scale of Operation Small Scale (SS) 30 40.5 25 39.7 
 Medium Scale (MS) 20 27.1 15 27 
 Large Scale (LS) 24 32.4 21 33.3 
      
Location Harare 7 9.5 7 11.1 
 Bulawayo 1 1.4 1 1.6 
 Mutare 2 2.7 2 3.2 
 Kwekwe 10 13.5 7 11.1 
 Kadoma 7 9.5 5 7.9 
 Chegutu 3 4.1 2 3.2 
 Chinhoyi 3 4.1 3 4.8 
 Other areas  41 55.4 36 57.1 
      
Mineral Mined Gold 32 43.2 24 38.1 
 Platinum 5 6.8 5 7.9 
 Limestone 5 6.8 4 6.3 
 Iron 5 6.8 4 6.3 
 Vermiculite 1 1.4 1 1.4 
 Phosphate 3 4.1 3 4.8 
 Chrome 9 12.2 8 12.6 
 Nickel 1 1.4 1 1.4 
 Diamond 3 4.1 3 4.8 
 Coal 2 2.7 2 3.2 
 Lithium 2 2.7 2 3.2 
 Graphite 1 1.4 1 1.4 
 Black Granite 3 4.1 3 4.1 
 Asbestos 2 2.7 2 3.2 
 
The distribution of the mines sampled is shown in Table 6.3. For the purpose of this 
survey, mines connected to voltage supply of below 300kVa were regarded as Low 
Capacity (LC) and those above 300kVa as High Capacity (HC). Mines employing less than 
150 were classified as small scale, between 150 and 450 medium scale and above 450 
large scale. The table shows mining respondents for the two methods applied. It shows 
that 41.9 percent were HC mines and 58.1 percent were LC mines. About 40.5 percent 
were small scale mines, 27.1 percent medium scale and 32.4 percent large scale.The 
survey shows that most mines were located in remote areas (55.4%) and some around 
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cities or towns. The mines selected were spread across mineral type extracted, with gold 
being the most highly mined mineral (43.2%), followed by chrome, platinum and 
limestone while vermiculite and graphite (1.4%) the least. 
 
The impact of the crisis of electricity supply on the mining sector and economy is shown 
in Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7.  
Table 6.4: Frequency of weekly outages experienced by mines 
Number of outages per week Frequency Percentage of total 
 0 1 1.35 
 1-2 7 9.46 
 3-4 20 27.03 
 5-6 40 54.05 
 7+ 6 8.1 
 
The outages ranged from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 7 or more incidences per 
week (see Table 6.4). About 54 percent of mines surveyed experienced 5 to 6 outages per 
week, 8.1 percent reported they experienced outages 7 or more outages per week, 9.46 
percent reported they experienced 1 to 2 outages per week and 1.35 percent (1 mine) 
reported zero outages per week. Although the frequencies of the outages differed, all but 
one mine in the sample experienced a power outage problem. The findings revealed a 
higher average frequency of outages than reported by CZI (2009), namely 3 outages per 
week for mines. 
 
Table 6.5: Average duration of outages in hours reported by mines 
Average outage duration (hours) Frequency Percentage 
 0 hour 1 1.35 
 0-1 hour 5 6.76 
 2-3 hours 24 32.43 
 4-5 hours 19 25.68 
 6-7 hours 13 17.57 
 8-9 hours 7 9.64 
 10-11 hours 2 2.70 
 12
+ hours 3 4.05 
 
The average number of hours of outages by mines ranged from a minimum of zero hour 
per outage for one of the mines to 12 or more hours for other mines. About 32.43 
percent of surveyed mines experienced outages averaging 2 to 3 hours in length per 
outage, 25.68 percent reported they had experienced outages averaging 4 to 5 hours per 
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outage incident, 4.05 percent reported experiencing the longest duration of 12 hours or 
more and 1.35 percent (1 mine) reported zero hour duration of outage. The frequency 
and duration of outages differed depending on whether there was an arrangement with 
the power utility by the mine for an uninterrupted power supply. The findings show that 
the average duration of outages far exceeded that of 1 hour reported by CZI (2009).   
 
Table 6.6: Uninterrupted supply and warning arrangement by mines with ZESA 
 
 
Frequency Percentage 
Average  
weekly 
outages 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
Mines without  arrangement  54 73.0 6 8 
 Mines with arrangement 20 27.0 2 2 
 
Table 6.6 shows that 27 percent of surveyed mines reported they had an arrangement 
with the power utility for an uninterrupted power supply, while 73 percent reported that 
they did not. Those having a warning arrangement have fewer outages per week than 
those without and they have shorter outages than those without.  The uninterrupted 
power supply contracts also provide for advance warning of an outage, should it be one 
that is unavoidable. In return for these supply assurances the mines must pay for their 
electricity in advance. All the mines affected stated that the arrangement for an 
uninterrupted supply and advance warning could not be fully achieved given the 
electricity supply problems in the country.  
 
Table 6.7: Proportion of total mining output loss caused by power outages 
 
 Proportion of mining output lost Frequency Percentage 
0% loss 1 1.4 
Less than 10% 2 2.7 
Between 10-25% 7 9.5 
Between 26-50% 22 29.7 
Between 51-75% 26 35.1 
Between 76-99% 12 16.2 
100% loss  4 5.4 
 
 
Table 6.7 shows that, of the surveyed mines, 5.4 percent reported having to shut down 
production at one time or the other in the year due to power outages, 35.1 percent 
reported between 51 and 75 percent loss of output, 29.7 percent reported between 26 
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and 50 percent loss of output, 16.2 percent reported between 76 and 99 percent loss of 
output while a small proportion (1.4%) reported zero loss.  
6.2.1.1 Ranking of service problems by mines in Zimbabwe 
 
The mines surveyed were asked to rank the severity of service disruption on a scale of 1 
to 3:  major obstacle; moderate obstacle; and no obstacle respectively (see Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: Ranking of severity of service problems by mines (percentage) 
 
Services Major Obstacle Moderate Obstacle No Obstacle 
Electricity 87.8 8.1 4.1 
Water 31.1 33.8 35.1 
Transport 25.7 60.8 13.5 
Telecommunication 47.3 47.3 5.4 
Market 74.4 17.2 8.4 
 
Table 6.8 shows that the majority (87.8%) of mines surveyed regarded power outages as 
the major obstacle of their operations with only 4.1 percent showing no obstacle. The 
result confirms expectations of the study that the interruptions in electricity supply are 
the major obstacle to production. This is also consistent with the findings of Adenikinju 
(2003) and Adenikinju (2005:21).  
 
Minerals market pricing follows closely as the majority (74.4%) of mines surveyed 
reported the market as a major obstacle, 17.2 percent reported moderate obstacles while 
8.4 percent reported no obstacle. This was also expected as mines were hampered during 
the time the survey was administered by the steep decline in world prices of minerals. 
Some mines reported shutting down operations due to unviable world prices (Bindura 
Nickel 2010).  
 
Others reported that they had to scale down operations, especially gold, chrome and 
platinum mines (Mazowe mine 2010; Zimasco mine 2010; Zimplats mine 2010). The 
telecommunication services followed electricity and market in a distant third, with 47.3 
percent revealing communication network problems to be a major obstacle. This low 
ranking is mainly due to the location of many mines. Some mines are far away from the 
main telephone lines and some are far away from the cellphone network base stations 
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and they require their own boosters to remain connected (Unki mine 2010, Shamva mine 
2010). The transport service was the least problematic type of service. Only 25.7 percent 
reported it as being a major obstacle. The transport problems cited were poor road 
network and non-availability of fuel. Some mines reported having to maintain their own 
road network. 
6.2.1.2 Overview of general questions section for mines  
 
A brief overview of the data collected is presented in Table 6.9.  
Table 6.9: Summary of descriptive statistics of mines 
 
Items  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Weekly outages 0 7 4.5 1.6 
Average outage duration in hours 0 12 7 2.7 
Total Number of outages (Year) 0 364 232 81 
Total Outage hours (Year) 0 1424 1080 442 
Capacity level of operation (percentage) 5 80 35 14 
Electricity expenditure (US$) 1900 3 152400 104558 403964 
kWh consumed from the grid (Year) 2500 2251714 174682 288544 
Hours electricity available from the grid 1768 8710 6599 2303 
Average kWhs consumed per hour 4 25852 915 3335 
Total kWh lost  (Year) 1582 2578397 69761 1717845 
Revenue from the mine per year (US$) 135000 51500000 2812686 8 150110 
 
The table shows that there was considerable variation in the data across the mines.Most 
of the mines reported they were operating below expected capacity. One mine was 
operating at five (5) percent of its capacity, while another was operating at 80 percent of 
its capacity.  Electricity consumption from the grid varied from 2 500 kWh per year (as low 
as 6.8kWh per day) for a small mine to 2 251 714kWh per year (6 169kWh per day) for 
one of the largest mines. 
 
The total outage hours per year ranged from a minimum of zero hours to a maximum of 
1424 hours. The mean was 1 080 hours. Using an eight-hour working shift, a normal 
working shift for the mines, this translates to a maximum of 128 shifts and an average of 
75 shifts without electricity per year. In terms of days, this yields a maximum of 60 days 
and an average of 45 days – lower than the findings of BEEPS (2008) and Limi (2008:12). 
They estimated that the mines averaged 78 days without electricity in Zimbabwe. For 
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mines, what matters most is the number of shifts affected. Table 6.9 also shows that 
payments to ZESA for the electricity supply in 2008 ranged from US$1 900 per year for 
one small mine to US$3 152 400 for another large mine. Revenues from sales ranged from 
US$135 000 for one mine to US$51 500 000 for another.  The high standard deviation for 
most of the variables is an indication of the variation in the scale of production across the 
mines. 
 
6.2.2 Direct (Welfare) Cost Estimation 
 
Computing of cost of power outages for the mining sector using the direct cost 
assessment method required estimation of: (1) value of lost output; (2) labour cost; (3) 
material cost; and (4) other additional cost (restart cost, damage to equipment and repair 
and maintenance cost). From these, may be calculated total value lost, total direct losses 
and production loss per kWh of unsupplied electricity. This section will di scuss the 
distribution of direct (and hence welfare) cost, decomposition of direct cost and 
estimation of the cost using total cost summation and value of energy lost per kWh 
electricity unsupplied. 
 
6.2.2.1 Direct cost by type of cost for mines 
 
Table 6.10: The Average Direct outage cost for mining by type of cost 
 
Table 6.10 decomposes the cost by type, using the average values reported by the 
surveyed mines. The table also confirms the survey expectations that lost output is the 
major type of direct cost incurred by mines. The average outage cost totalled US$255 089 
in 2009 for the surveyed mines. No single mine reported labour cost savings as a result of 
outages. Using the total average of the direct cost components, the total outage costs of 
 Cost Type Amount (US$) As % of Total 
Average Lost output 219 059 85.87 
Average Labour cost  22 745 8.93 
Average Destruction of material (raw materials and stocks) 1 816 0.71 
Average Restart costs  5 313 2.08 
Average Damage to equipment 6 156 2.41 
Subtotal Cost 255 089 100 
Average Labour cost saving 0 0 
TOTAL AVERAGE COST 255 089 100 
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the surveyed mines was US$18 876 586. The total cost for the sector was US$251 007 
576.  
6.2.2.2 Direct cost per mineral  
 
In order to calculate total direct cost, these costs need to be determined for mineral type 
and location. Table 6.11 decomposes losses by type of mineral extracted. The table shows 
output loss cost, labour cost, material cost, other cost (restart and damage to equipment 
cost) and total direct cost. Asbestos mines reported the highest output loss cost (US$3 
118 320) while vermiculite mines reported the lowest cost (US$24 000). It was different 
for labour cost, where platinum reported the highest cost (US$151 200) and vermiculite 
the least (US$6 000). For material destruction cost, diamond mines reported the highest 
(US$1 260 000) and nickel reported the lowest. Diamond mines reported the highest for 
other costs and limestone the least. Overall, asbestos mines reported the highest total 
direct cost (US$3 232 320) and vermiculite mines the lowest cost (US$34 000). Some 
surveyed mines pointed out that output loss is more significant per outage if the outage 
affects the whole shift in operation (Mimosa mine 2010; Mutorashanga mine 2010; 
Mashava mine 2010). They all confirmed that labourers have to be paid regardless of 
outages.  Low material destruction cost shows that mineral ores do not lose value due to 
power outages. 
 
Table 6.11: Decomposition of Direct cost by mineral type 
 
Mineral Type 
Output Loss 
Cost (US$) 
Idle Labour 
Cost (US$) 
Material 
Cost (US$) 
Restart & Damage 
Cost(US$) 
Total Direct 
Cost (US$) 
Asbestos 3 118 320 54 000 30 000 30 000 3 232 320 
Black Granite 2075000 26000 8000 16000 2125000 
Chrome 540000 49333 37667 24000 641000 
Coal 2212000 75000 9000 105000 2401000 
Diamond 1 517 734 104000 1260000 13400 2 498 000 
Gold 2378563 82725 24531 44700 2530519 
Graphite 180000 90000 6000 18000 294000 
Iron 150168 24800 13200 24800 212968 
Limestone 180000 28800 5000 15600 229400 
Lithium 2150000 66000 96000 12000 2324000 
Nickel 2200000 90000 0 18000 2308000 
Phosphate 322000 34000 38000 22000 416000 
Platinum 1242800 151200 33280 53280 1480560 
Vermiculite 24000 6000 2000 2000 34000 
TOTAL 15 172 671 881 858 2 302 678 519 380 18876587 
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The total direct cost for the surveyed mines was US$18 876 587 for 2009.  
 
6.2.2.3 Distribution of direct (welfare) cost per kWh lost for the mining sector  
 
 
 
 
The direct cost per kWh lost was obtained by adding up all the direct outage costs and 
dividng this by the annual kWhs of unsupplied electricity due to outages from the power 
utility grid (Table 6.12).  
 
Table 6.12: Distribution of per kWh cost by power capacity, scale, location and mineral 
Factor 
Production Loss cost per 
kWh (US$) 
Power Supply Capacity High Capacity (HC) mines 7 
 Low Capacity (LC) mines 12 
   
Scale of Operation Small Scale 6 
 Medium Scale 9 
 Large Scale 12 
   
City of Location Harare 11 
 Bulawayo 7 
 Mutare 5 
 Kwekwe 9 
 Kadoma 6 
 Chegutu 7 
 Chinhoyi 8 
 Other areas 10 
   
Mineral Type Asbestos 13 
 Black Granite 5 
 Chrome 8 
 Coal 5 
 Diamond 11 
 Gold 12 
 Graphite 1.8 
 Iron 3.4 
 Limestone 2 
 Lithium 9 
 Nickel 9 
 Phosphate 3 
 Platinum 8 
 Vermiculite 1.2 
 
 
Table 6.12 shows outage cost per kWh for mines by power supply capacity, scale of 
operation, location and type of mineral extracted. In terms of electricity supply capacity, 
Low Capacity (LC) mines reported the higher direct cost per unsupplied kWh (US$12) than 
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High Capacity (HC) mines (US$7). The reason for this was an arrangement between the 
power utility and HC mines (Zimplats mine 2010; Zimasco mine 2010). 
The cost variation across location is also presented in Table 6.12. Of the locations, mines 
around Harare reported the highest direct cost per kWh (US$11), followed by mines in 
other (remote) areas (US$10 per kWh), while Bulawayo reported the lowest direct cost 
(US$7 per kWh). Among the minerals, asbestos, diamonds, gold and nickel mines 
recorded the highest direct cost per kWh ranging between US$10 to US$13, followed by 
lithium, black granite, platinum, chrome and coal mines (US$5 to US$90 and phosphate, 
limestone, iron, and graphite mines (US$1.8 to US$4). A Vermiculite mine reported the 
lowest cost of US$1.2 per kWh. The mean kWh cost was found to be US$8.06 per kWh. 
 
Using the average kWh cost of US$8.06, the total direct cost incurred by surveyed mines 
due to unsupplied kWhs was US$18 685 387 in 2009 with an average cost per mine of 
US$252 505. For all the mines connected to the grid, this adds up to US$248 464 920. The 
two ways by which estimates of the direct cost were estimated yielded similar figures; the 
average of which was US$249 736 248. 
 
6.2.2.4 Characterising outage cost for mines for the direct (welfare) cost 
 
The survey also investigated the characteristics of the direct costs to find out whether the 
costs vary across type of mineral extracted, electricity supply capacity, scale of operation 
and location. The results are presented in Table 6.13. Among the minerals, diamond 
mines reported the highest outage cost, platinum, asbestos and chrome mines take the 
middle position, while graphite, phosphate and vermiculite mines reported the lowest 
cost values.  
 
Table 6.13 also shows that direct cost also varies with electricity supply capacity and scale 
of production. As expected, direct costs vary proportionately with the utility electricity 
supply capacity and scale of production. The survey found that mines around Harare 
suffered the highest direct cost of power outages, while mines around Chinhoyi and 
Bulawayo suffered the least direct cost from outages.  
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Table 6.13: Direct cost decomposition by power capacity, scale, location and mineral (US$) 
Factor  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Deviation 
N 
Power Supply capacity  HC Mines 314057 316800 1516000 223656 31 
 LC Mines  130695 26000 981600 271804 43 
       
Scale of Operation Small Scale 125006 26000 921600 275299 30 
 Medium Scale 343545 222000 981600 358925 20 
 Large Scale 972750 192000 1516000 1533948 24 
       
City of Location Harare 603685 486000 1516000 356811 7 
 Bulawayo 54000 54000 54000 0 1 
 Mutare 277000 163200 322000 47904 2 
 Kwekwe 288384 26000 981600 375761 10 
 Kadoma 137485 34000 281400 109185 7 
 Chegutu 221200 186000 863400 391719 3 
 Chinhoyi 41400 27200 618000 198273 3 
 Other areas 474741 114000 607200 162013 41 
       
Mineral Mined Asbestos 431400 269400 593400 221026 2 
 Black Granite 213000 162600 244200 44581 3 
 Chrome 691000 192000 1200000 661153 9 
 Coal 380100 153000 607200 311679 2 
 Diamond 1264000 642000 1830000 664521 3 
 Gold 286519 123000 1516000 398321 32 
 Graphite 49400 49400 49400 0 1 
 Iron 126480 54840 295800 94153 5 
 Limestone 153040 26000 306000 181785 5 
 Lithium 3144000 1368000 4920000 2511643 2 
 Nickel 1008000 1008000 1008000 0 1 
 Phosphate 46600 32200 774000 281510 3 
 Platinum 600560 316800 1634000 319187 5 
 Vermiculite 34000 34000 34000 0 1 
 
 
6.2.2.5 Mining direct cost as a function of duration for specific aspects 
The relationship between direct cost and duration of outages by mineral type, electricity 
supply capacity, location and scale of operation mines is shown in Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1a 
compares the mean direct cost for: 1 hour; 2 hours; 6 hours; and 12 hours outage 
durations by individual mineral type.  The longer the outage duration the higher the 
direct costs for mines. All minerals showed small differences at one hour durations, but as 
durations increase, the gap widens between the minerals. Diamond mines reported the 
highest outage cost for all four durations and vermiculite mines the lowest.  
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Figure 6.1: Average direct outage cost by duration per mineral, location, capacity and 
scale  
  
 
 
 
Using the same durations, Figure 6.1b compares the mean direct cost to mines in terms of 
electricity supply capacity. For the surveyed mines , HC mines reported higher direct costs 
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while LC mines reported lower direct costs. These costs increase sharply as duration 
increases for both HC and LC mines. Figure 6.1c also compares the mean direct cost for 
different mine locations. For the surveyed mines, those located in other areas reported 
the highest direct cost, while mines in Chinhoyi reported the lowest cost. The direct cost 
for all locations increases as the duration of the outage increases. Lastly, Figure 6.1d 
compares mean direct cost for different scales of operations. Large mines reported the 
highest cost while small mines reported the lowest cost per outage. 
 
In all diagrams (Figure 6.1) a positive and increasing relationship between mean direct 
cost and duration was observed. 
 
6.2.2.6 Unemployment Related to Outages by mineral type 
 
Table 6.14: Unemployment caused by outages 
 
 Mineral Total number laid off by surveyed mines 
Asbestos 273 
Black Granite 0 
Chrome 133 
Coal 0 
Diamond 15 
Gold 49 
Graphite 0 
Iron 75 
Limestone 10 
Lithium 0 
Nickel 200 
Phosphate 56 
Platinum 170 
Vermiculite 13 
 
Power outages also resulted in other hidden costs, such as unemployment. Table 6.14 
shows the number of labourers laid off by different mines exclusively due to power 
outages. Asbestos mines reported the highest number of mine labourers laid-off, 
followed by nickel, platinum, chrome and iron mines.  Some of the mines surveyed 
indicated that workers who were laid off were mostly contract and unskilled (Zimplast 
Makwiro mine 2010; Murowa Diamonds 2010).  
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6.2.3 The Indirect (Backup) Cost Estimation for Mines 
 
The cost of investing in own power generation was considered as the indirect cost of 
power outages (see Chapter 3). This cost relates to the use of backup generators, solar 
panels, Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) system or battery backup, diesel pumps or a 
combination of two or three types of backup equipment to supply power during outages. 
 
6.2.3.1 Availability, type of backup equipment and use of backup by mines 
The surveyed mines were asked about the type of backup equipment they used during 
power outages (see Table 6.15). 
 
Table 6.15: Backup equipment used by mines 
 
 Type of Backup Equipment Frequency Percentage 
 Generator only 45 71.4 
 UPS only 1 1.5 
 Generator and UPS 12 19.1 
 Generator and Diesel pump 4 6.3 
 Generator, Diesel Pump and UPS 1 1.5 
 
The number of backup sets varied across mines. The majority of the mines (71.4%) had 
generators only as backup power supply, 19.1 percent had generators and UPS, 6.3 
percent had generators and diesel pumps and only 1.5 percent of the mines had 
generator, diesel pump and UPS. Of the surveyed mines, 10 mines reported having three 
generators on site and 14 mines reported having two generators. While one is in use, the 
other is usually reserved as backup to the main generator (Mimosa mine 2010; Unki mine 
2010) or they are used at the same time to meet high power demand by mine equipment 
(Zimplats mine 2010; Shamva mine 2010).  
 
Some mine captains and workers reported that the backup equipment was for safety 
purposes mainly (most of the power is provided by the public utility) as workers travel 
long distances underground (Mireal mine 2010; Shabani mine 2010). Others reported 
using the backup for computer systems and data base maintenance, and yet others use 
backup for communication networks (Arcturus mine 2010; Hwange Colliery 2010). Many 
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reported that the backup generation was needed for their normal day to day mining 
operations as utility supply was unreliable (Earlyworm mine 2010; Mazoe mine 2010).  
 
The relevance of the backup equipment is shown by the proportion of mining operations 
powered by backup equipment during outages (see Table 6.16). 
 
Table 6.16: Proportion of mining operations powered by backup equipment 
 Proportion of operations powered by own generation Frequency Percentage 
1-10% 2 3.2 
11-20%  4 6.4 
21-50%  17 26.9 
51-75%  21 33.3 
76-99%  16 25.4 
100%  3 4.8 
 
The majority of mines reported that they supplied the electricity of their mining 
operations by use of backup equipment during outages. About 4.8 percent reported to 
have all operations (100%) powered by backup equipment, 25.4 percent reported 
between 76 to 99 percent covered, 33.2 percent reported between 51 to 75 percent 
covered and 3.2 percent reported a very low proportion between 1 - 10 percent covered. 
 
Some mines revealed that they have to suspend all non-core operations during outages in 
order to run their equipment safely (Rio Tinto mine 2010; Zimplats Makwiro mine 2010). 
The power outage problem was also shown by the number of hours of backup use and 
frequency of use per week (see Table 6.17 and 6.18) reported by the mines. 
 
Table 6.17: Average hours of backup use by mines per outage per week 
 
Average backup time  use per outage (hours) Frequency Percentage 
 0 1 1.6 
 1-2  5 7.9 
 3-5 17 27 
 6-8 29 46 
 9-11 11 17.5 
 
 
Of the mines surveyed, 46 percent reported that they used backup equipment between 6 
and 8 hours per week, 17.5 percent reported the maximum average hours of backup 
equipment use between 9 and 11 hours per week and only 1.6 percent reported no 
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backup equipment use per week. The average hours of backup equipment use per week 
for the surveyed mines were 4 hours. 
 
Table 6.18: Frequency of backup equipment use per week by mines  
 
 Frequency(times) per week  Frequency(outcome) Percentage 
 0 1 1.6 
 1-2 8 11.1 
 3-4 13 20.6 
 5-6 37 58.7 
 7+ 5 7.9 
 
Table 6.18 shows the frequency of backup equipment use by mines per week. Of the 
mines surveyed 58.7 percent reported between 5 to 6 times of backup use per week, 7.9 
percent reported 7 plus times, 12.7 percent reported between 1 and 2 times and 1.6 
percent of mines reported zero times. The frequency of use reflected that there were 
serious power outage problems during 2009 as the majority (87.2%) of mines reported 
above three times of backup use per week. 
 
6.2.3.2 Investment in backup equipment by mines 
 
The additional investment in backup equipment was incurred to mitigate the unreliability 
of ZESA supplies (see Table 6.19). 
 
Table 6.19: Descriptive Information for backup equipment owned by mines  
 
 
Item Backup equipment Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cost in US$ Generator  2000 500000 120727 148289 
 UPS  1000 1500 1200 317 
 Diesel Pump  300 5000 3526 1155 
Capacity Generator(s) (kVA) 5 500 140 115 
 Diesel Pump (HP) 3 24 9 12 
 UPS (VA) 300 10000 5400 4865 
Years in Use Generator 1 12 5 6 
 UPS  1 4 2 2 
 Diesel pump  1 15 5 8 
 
Generator costs in 2009 ranged from US$2 000 to about US$500 000 with a mean value 
of US$124 727, UPS costs ranged from US$1 000 to US$1 500 with a mean value of US$1 
200 and diesel pump costs ranged from US$3 000 to US$5 000, with a mean of US$3 526. 
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The generator capacity ranged from 5kVa to 500kVa, with an average capacity of 135kVa. 
The years in use of the generators varies from 1 to 12 years, with a mean of 5 years. The 
majority of the surveyed mines reported owning generators for an average period of 4 
years. All mines reported having imported the generators.  
 
6.2.3.3 Cost structure of own generators for mines 
 
The cost of owning and running own backup generators by the mines in terms of capital 
cost and operating cost items is shown in Table 6.20. 
 
Table 6.20: Mean annual cost structure of own generation by mines in terms of cost items 
 
Item Cost (US$) As % of Total cost 
Capital Item   
Generator Cost 120727 99.04 
Installation cost (transport, house, oil and fuel tank) 1170 0.96 
Total Capital cost  121897 100.00   
Running Cost Item   
Fuel, oil and grease cost  28807 91.75 
Labour cost (wages and salaries) 1165 3.71 
Maintenance cost  1424 4.50 
Total Running Cost 31396 100.00 
 
 
The mean annual capital and operating costs of the backup equipment were US$121 897 
and US$31 396 respectively.  The high fuel, oil and grease cost was connected to the high 
price of fuel in 2009. A breakdown of the average capital and operating cost by type of 
mineral extracted from the mines surveyed is shown in Table 6.21. 
 
Table 6.21: Capital and running cost by type of mineral mined (US$) 
 
Mineral 
Extracted 
Average 
Capital Cost 
(US$) 
Average Fuel, oil, 
grease cost (US$) 
Average Labour 
cost (wages) (US$) 
Average Maintenance 
cost (US$) 
Gold 52211 30893 6506 8831 
Platinum 293800 43920 15480 15360 
Limestone 33960 30720 2640 3720 
Iron 102630 44832 3696 4608 
Vermiculite 8500 108000 4200 4200 
Phosphate 23667 27200 2800 1600 
Chrome 138772 41000 4800 3200 
Nickel 56500 60000 4200 9000 
Diamond 404167 116800 33400 61400 
Coal 312250 73800 4200 7500 
Lithium 301500 100800 6600 6000 
Graphite 140500 37200 2400 4200 
Black Granite 334500 68800 5800 6400 
Asbestos 315100 84000 5700 7500 
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Diamond mines reported the highest average capital cost and vermiculite mines reported 
the lowest capital cost per year. In terms of fuel cost, diamond mines reported the 
highest expenditure and phosphate mines reported the lowest. Diamond mines also 
reported the highest labour cost of running the backup equipment and graphite mines 
reported the lowest.  
 
6.2.3.4 Measuring the Indirect Cost 
 
 
To compute the indirect (backup) cost of unsupplied power for the mining sector in 
Zimbabwe using the indirect cost estimation method, it is necessary to compute the 
annualised capital cost of investing in backup equipment including accessories like oil 
tanks, stabilisers, fuel tanks, cables and synchronisers. Price schedules for generators 
were obtained from one of the most popular generator dealers in Zimbabwe, Tendo 
Power. Prices increase linearly with the capacity. The annualised capital cost depends on 
the price schedule of generator, depreciation rules and on the interest rates. The 
annualised generator cost was obtained by dividing the generator cost by the expected 
life-span of the generator, or number of years, taking off depreciation for each year using 
the reducing balance method applied by most mines, at 10% per annum. The values were 
then discounted using the prevailing interest rate i.e. 10%. The generator annualised kVa 
cost was converted to kW cost using the power factor (0.8kVa = kW). Other capital costs 
such as generator housing, stabilisers, fuel and oil tanks and others (included in the 
installation cost) were also annualised and converted to cost per kW. The annualised 
generator cost plus annualised other capital cost yields the total annualised capital cost 
per kW of electricity. This was then converted to kWh (energy terms). The running costs 
were mainly for fuel, oil, grease, labour and maintenance. Transformations were applied 
to convert these costs into cost per kWh. Summed together, the annualised capital cost 
per kWh and running cost per kWh gave the total outage cost per kWh generated. Since 
the cost per kWh generated by generators is the cost of insuring the mine against power 
outage, it then becomes cost per kWh unsupplied. The transformations yielded cost per 
kWh and for each type of mineral extracted, electricity supply capacity, scale of operation 
and location. The findings are shown in Table 6.22. 
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Table 6.22: Indirect (Backup) cost per kWh by capacity, scale, location and mineral 
 
Item                        Consideration Cost (US$)/kWh 
Electricity supply capacity High Capacity (HC) 5.5 
 Low Capacity (LC) 12 
   
Scale of operation Small Scale 6 
 Medium Scale 5.4 
 Large Scale 12 
   
Location Harare 10 
 Mutare 6 
 Kwekwe 9 
 Kadoma 8 
 Chegutu 7 
 Chinhoyi 5 
 Other areas 8 
   
Mineral Mined Asbestos 8 
 Black Granite 6 
 Chrome 5 
 Coal 8 
 Diamond 12 
 Gold 10 
 Graphite 2 
 Iron 5 
 Limestone 7 
 Lithium 7 
 Nickel 6 
 Phosphate 2 
 Platinum 8 
 Vermiculite 0.8 
 
The LC mines experienceda higher cost than the HC mines reflecting economies of scale in 
backup power generation. The large scale mines reported the highest cost (indirect cost) 
and medium scale mines reported the lowest cost per kWh unsupplied. Mines located 
around Harare reported the highest cost per kWh lost to outages and mines located 
around Chinhoyi reported the lowest cost. Among the minerals, diamond and gold mines 
reported the highest outage cost per kWhand vermiculite mines reported the lowest cost 
per kWh electricity unsupplied.  
 
Using the mean kWh cost of private generation of US$6.20, and applying formulas 
presented in the methodology section (see Chapter 5) the total indirect (backup) cost was 
calculated to beUS$10 751 650 and the mean indirect (backup) cost US$167 994 per 
116 
 
mine. For the total number of mines connected to the grid, this mean translates to a total 
indirect (backup) cost of US$165 306 619 for the sector. 
 
6.2.3.5 Adjusting the Indirect (backup) cost 
 
Netting off the per kWh cost recovery tariff, a public utility company would need to 
charge US$0.12 (ZESA 2009), mean kWh cost of private generation was calculated to be 
US$6.08. The total net indirect (backup) cost was calculated to be US$10 543 554 and the 
mean net indirect (backup) cost US$164 743 per mine. The total net indirect (backup) cost 
for the sector was calculated to be US$162 107 136. 
 
6.2.4 Computation of Total Outage Cost for the Mining Sector 
 
 
The total cost of outages in the Zimbabwean mining sector was obtained by summing the 
direct and indirect costs. In this case, the total cost was calculated to be US$411 843 384 
(US$162 107 136 + US$249 736 248). 
 
6.2.5 Mining Outage Cost Impact Assessment 
 
The impact of outages was assessed using total sector outage as a proportion of GDP. The 
outage cost scale was assessed as a proportion of the GDP of US$5.4 billion for 2008 (RBZ 
2010). The impact of outages for the mining sector was 4.6 percent of GDP for the direct 
cost and 3.1 percent of GDP for backup cost; 7.6 percent in total. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter calculated the cost of power outages in the mining sector in Zimbabwe as 
the direct cost and the backup cost. 
It is concluded that the under-supply of electricity in Zimbabwe has imposed significant 
cost within the mining sector. Of the direct cost, the bulk (85.87%) comes in the form of 
lost output or lost production. Of the backup costs, the bulk (99%) comes in the form of 
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the acquisition of expensive backup power generating equipment. Some of the 
equipment is purchased for safety reasons rather than first and foremost to provide 
power for regular outages. 
 
Outage costs (both direct and indirect costs) vary proportionately with power supply 
capacity and scale of operations. Small scale mines which form the greater proportion of 
Low Capacity (LC) mines are more heavily affected by electricity outages than High 
Capacity (HC) mines. The latter form the greater proportion of large scale mines and have 
frequently been able to negotiate uninterrupted power supply and advance warnings.  
 
A positive and increasing relationship between mean outage cost and outage duration 
was observed, showing that the longer the outage duration the higher the outage cost. 
The outage cost per kWh lost was way above the price charged by ZESA of US$0.07 per 
kWh. The direct cost ranged from US$1.20 to US$13 and indirect cost ranged from 
US$0.80 to US$12 per kWh. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
ESTIMATING THE COST OF POWER OUTAGES IN THE 
ZIMBABWEAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
 
7 INTRODUCTION 
 
Zimbabwe is rich in fertile soils and a favourable climate for agriculture. A wide range of 
crops, birds and animals are grown and reared. Agricultural production is by either 
natural processes or by means of technologies , many of which are powered by electricity. 
Electricity plays a critical and positive role in agricultural development and poverty 
alleviation through its use in irrigation (FAO 2005), as well as greenhouse crop 
production, post harvest activities and the operation of dip-tanks. Electricity represents 
an intermediate input to agriculture production, and consequently, the levels of income, 
output and employment. Electricity raises the productivity of other factors of production 
in agriculture (Kessides 1993).  
 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy. Over 80 percent of the 
population derives its livelihood from agriculture and related fields (CSO 2007). 
Agriculture contributes about 40 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, 15-
20 percent of GDP, 25 percent of employment and 60 percent of industrial raw materials 
(CZI 2009; Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 2009). The performance of the entire 
economy is heavily influenced by how the agriculture sector is faring  because of strong 
forward and backward linkages that exist between agriculture and other productive 
activities and commercial services (CZI 2009).  
 
A lack of electricity causes water stress and reduced crop production. In India, Mittal, 
Paneser, Singh and Manna (1987) pointed out that farmers who irrigate land with 
electric- powered pump-sets incur a variety of indirect costs attributable to the sharp 
fluctuations in voltage, namely, frequent burnout of the pump motors and loss of 
production. 
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When the available power supply is severely limited, water deficits will be unavoidable 
during some period of crop growth (Chandra et al. 2001). Scheduling of irrigation timings 
becomes more complex, because irrigation decisions have to be based, not only on the 
relationships between grain yield, crop growing phase and crop water use, but also on 
electricity availability. The impact of limited irrigation and soil water deficit on crops 
depend on the particular growth stage of the crop (Singh et al. 2002). 
 
The economic effect of power outages is on the lost output and other related costs. Bose 
et al. (2006) has estimated the cost of unserved energy (CUE) in agriculture using the 
direct cost and indirect cost methods. The CUE was derived from the net production loss 
method and the cost of alternative generation method. The value of production loss in 
agriculture is the net value loss based on the farmer’s perception of reduction in profits 
due to non-availability of electricity. The study shows that use of diesel pumps was more 
expensive.  
 
Due to erratic power supplies, agricultural electricity consumers incur high costs in the 
purchase of low-powered electric pumps and back-ups or alternate diesel pumps 
(Kessides 1993).  
 
This Chapter (Chapter 7) estimates the outage costs of agricultural customers in 
Zimbabwe. Electricity plays a significant role in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. A survey 
was used to elicit the cost to farmers associated with specific power outages.  
 
7.1 ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL SURVEY 
 
7.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire used in the agriculture sector electricity outage cost survey was 
designed in consultation with several focus groups consisting of eng ineers, statisticians 
(at ZESA) farmers’ representative organisations, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the 
Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (TIMB), and the Zimbabwe Wheat Farmers Association 
(ZWFA). 
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The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part contained questions about the 
farmer’s activities: the nature of farming activities; to what extent they rely on electricity; 
and their general views on power outages in 2009. The second part was made up of 
questions about direct cost estimation of power outages. This part extracted actual 
outage cost, namely, lost output and hectrage under crop production, damage to 
equipment, idle labour hours and spoiled materials. The third part tackled the captive  
generation cost for the farmer, namely, the cost of acquiring the captive systems and the 
accessories, running costs of the devices and maintenance costs of backup systems. 
Before the questionnaire was finalized, it was tested on a smaller group of 15 farmers for 
errors, layout, questions ordering and structure improvement. 
 
7.1.2 Population 
 
The survey includes all farming electricity consumers connected to the grid, but it is 
accepted that there are some farmers not connected whose costs might even be higher 
than those who are connected. The total population for the sector is  shown in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: ZESA Agricultural Tariff Classification 
 
Electricity Supply Capacity Tariff Class Number of Customers 
 Low Capacity Agricultural 7781 
 High Capacity Agricultural 498 
Total 8279 
 
Source: ZESA (ZEDTCO) (2009) 
7.1.3 Sample Size and Sampling design 
7.1.3.1 Sample Size   
 
The sample size was reached by applying the Yamane (1967) approach to sample size 
determination. The sample size estimates for the selected farming electricity consumers 
are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Sample sizes based on electricity tariff classification 
Tariff Class 
Number of 
Customers 
Sample size 
Sample size as percentage  
of  population 
 Low Capacity  Farms 7781 268 3.4% 
 High Capacity  Farms 498 84 17% 
TOTAL 8279 352 4.25% 
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7.1.3.2 Sample selection 
 
A two-stage stratified random method was used for collecting field data from agricultural 
consumers. In this method, the sampling is carried out in two stages. At the first stage 
agricultural consumers were stratified according to ZESA classification, namely as either 
Low capacity (LC) or High capacity (HC) consumer (Table 7.1).  The following information 
was collected: farmers land holding size; major cropping; type of farming; proportion of 
irrigated area to the total farm use; major cropping season and the number of electric 
and diesel pump-sets owned. 
 
In the second stage, farmers were sorted into appropriate farming sectors, and farms 
were selected from each farming sector at random with the aim of capturing a soundly 
representative sample. 
 
7.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
  
The survey was administered by the researcher and research assistants, trained on 
administering the questionnaires. Questionnaires were personally administered in order 
to increase response rate and reduce mis-information biases. The potential for 
embedding and ordering effects were taken into consideration when setting up the 
questionnaire and conducting the survey. The farmers were informed of the purpose of 
the research before the questionnaires were administered. The data from the 
questionnaires were then collated on Excel spreadsheets. The Statistical Package for 
Social Scientists (SPSS-13) and Eviews (6) were used for the analysis. 
 
 
7.2 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
7.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
A total of 172 out of 352 questionnaires (49%) were successfully administered for the 
direct method and out of 172 questionnaires collected, a total of 130 (37%) were 
successfully administered for the indirect method.  
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Table 7.3 shows the distribution of the farms sampled by scale of operation, location 
(province), electricity supply capacity and agriculture sector. For this survey, the farms 
connected to voltage supply of below 300kVa were regarded as Low Capacity (LC) and 
those above 300kVa as High Capacity (HC). Farms occupying less than 100 hectares were 
classified as small scale commercial and those above as large scale commercial. 
 
Table 7.3: Respondents distribution by power supply, location, size and activity 
 
Item of Analysis Consideration 
Direct Cost (C1) Backupcost (M2) 
Frequency  Percent 
of total 
Frequency  Percent of 
total 
Power Supply Capacity HC Farms 78 45.3 71 54.6 
 LC Farms 94 54.7 59 45.4 
      
Scale of Operation Small Scale Commercial 80 46.51 65 50 
 Large Scale Commercial 92 53.49 65 50 
      
Location (Province)  Mashonaland Central 42 24.4 31 23.8 
 Mashonaland East 41 23.8 32 24.6 
 Mashonaland West 30 17.4 14 10.8 
 Manicaland 22 12.8 20 15.4 
 Masvingo 8 4.7 5 3.8 
 Matebeleland North 4 2.3 4 3.1 
 Matebeleland South 4 2.3 4 3.1 
 Midlands 7 4.1 7 5.4 
 Bulawayo 4 2.3 4 3.1 
 Harare 10 5.8 9 6.9 
      
Agriculture Sub-Sectors Agronomy 7 4.1 6 4.6 
 Horticulture 9 5.2 7 5.4 
 Citrus 6 3.5 6 4.6 
 Dairy 6 3.5 6 4.6 
 Floriculture 11 6.4 11 8.5 
 Ranching 5 2.9 4 3.1 
 Piggery 1 .6 1 0.8 
 Poultry 11 6.4 10 7.7 
 Forestry/Plantations 14 8.1 12 9.2 
 Mixed Farming 102 59.3 67 51.5 
 
The nature of the electricity supply crisis to the farming sector is reflected in Table 7.4 
(frequency of outages), Table 7.5 (average duration of outages reported), Table 7.6 
(uninterrupted power supply and advance warning arrangements) and Table 7.7 
(proportion of agricultural activities affected). 
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Table 7.4: Frequency of weekly outages experienced by farmers 
 
 Number of outages per week Frequency Percentage of total 
 1-2 2 1.2 
 3-4 54 31.4 
 5-6 82 47.6 
 7+ 44 19.8 
 
About 19.8 percent of surveyed farms reported experiencing 7 or more outages 
incidences per week, 47.6 percent reported they had experienced 5 to 6 outage 
incidences per week, 31.4 reported they had experienced 3 to 4 outage incidences per 
week and 1.2 percent (2 farms) had experienced only 1 to 2 outage incidences per week.  
Further analysis shows that 67.4 percent of farms surveyed experienced over 4 outage 
incidences per week. All farms surveyed reported having been exposed to power outages. 
 
Table 7.5: Average duration of outages for farms (hours) 
Average outage duration (hours) Frequency Percentage of total 
 0-1hour 3 0.58 
 2-3hours 19 2.33 
 4-5hours 43 34.88 
 6-7hours 25 30.80 
 8-9hours 28 15.12 
 10-12hours 18 10.47 
 12+hours 8 5.81 
 
Table 7.5 shows the average outage duration for farms.  About 34.88 percent of surveyed 
farms reported experiencing outage duration of 4 to 5 hours per incident, 5.81 percent 
reported having experienced the highest outage duration of 12 or more hours and 0.58 
percent (1 farm) reported having experienced the least outage duration of 0 to 1 hour per 
outage. The majority (97.09%) had experienced outage durations of more than 4 hours 
per incident. The frequencies and durations reported in Table 7.4 and 7.5 depended on 
whether farmers had an arrangement with ZESA of uninterrupted power supply or 
advance warning. 
 
Table 7.6: Uninterrupted power supply arrangement with the power utility 
 
  
Frequency Percent 
Average weekly 
outages 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
Farms without  arrangement 135 78.5 6 7 
Farms with arrangement 37 21.5 4 4 
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Table 7.6 shows that a minority (21.5%) had an uninterrupted power supply arrangement 
with the power utility but most did not (78.5%). The minority experienced a lower 
average number of outage incidences (4 per week) and those without 6 times per week 
and experienced shorter average outage duration (4 hours per incident) and those 
without power supply arrangement, 7 hours per incident. The survey also revealed that 
wheat and tobacco farms were the ones afforded preferential treatment by ZESA in terms 
of uninterrupted power supply and advance warning. 
 
Table 7.7: Proportion of total farm output/service loss caused by power outages 
 
Proportion of firming output lost Frequency Percentage of total 
 0% Loss 3 1.70 
 Less than 10% 15 8.72 
 Between 10-25% 36 20.93 
 Between 26-50% 88 51.20 
 Between 51-75% 21 12.21 
 Between 76-99% 7 4.07 
 100% loss  2 1.16 
 
Table 7.7 shows that, of the surveyed farms 51.2 percent reported having lost 26 and 50 
percent of output, 1.16 percent (2 farms) reported  total loss and only 1.7 percent (3 
farms) reported no loss. The total loss was for wheat farmers who had to write off their 
wheat production due to continuous electricity power interruptions , e.g. Rungudzi farm 
(2010). 
 
7.2.1.1 Ranking of service problems by farmers 
 
The surveyed farms were asked to rank the problem of services on a scale of 1 to 3: major 
obstacle; moderate obstacle; and no obstacle respectively. 
Table 7.8: Ranking of services problems by farms (percentage)  
 
Services Major Obstacle Moderate Obstacle No Obstacle 
Electricity 74.9 23.4 1.7 
Water 22.1 44.8 33.1 
Transport 36.0 45.3 18.6 
Telecommunication 30.2 50.6 19.2 
Market 69.9 21.7 8.4 
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The majority (74.9%) of farms surveyed reported power outages as the major obstacle, 
23.4 percent reported it to be a moderate obstacle and a few (1.7%) reported it to be no 
obstacle. Market services follow electricity very closely with 69.9 percent reported it to 
be a major obstacle. Farmers consider price controls on most agriculture outputs to be a 
major obstacle. Some farmers considered not sending their maize output to the market 
due to the low price set (Greenden Estate 2010; Magombedze 2010).  
7.2.1.2 Summary of descriptive statistics 
 
An overview of the data for the general questions is reported in Table 7.9. The table 
shows that there are also considerable variations across survey farms. 
Table 7.9: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Items  Minimum  Maximum  Mean Std. Deviation 
Weekly outages 2 8 5 1.3 
Average  outage duration (hours) 3 12 7 2.3 
Total number of outages 104 416 265 70 
Total outage hours 1156 3224 2152 418 
Hectares 15 6500 415 743 
Electricity expense 500 1250000 27655 108322 
kWh consumed from the grid 3571 8928571 19753 773730 
Hours electricity available from grid 1456 8528 3849 1989 
Average kWh consumed per hour 1.3 2230 41 176 
Total kWh lost due to outages 325 81688 4858 65368 
Total revenue earned 12500 135000000 2815269 11747292 
 
Table 7.9 shows that farm sizes range from as small as 15 hectares for one farm to as 
large as 6 500 hectares for another farm. Electricity consumed from the grid varies from a 
minimum of 3 571 kWh per year (as low as 10kWh per day) for one farm to a maximum of 
8 928 571kWh per year (as high as 24 461kWh per day) for another farm. For the 
surveyed farms, the total outage hours per year ranged from 1 156 hours to a maximum 
of 3 224 hours, with a mean of 2 152 hours. Converted to days, this translates to a 
minimum of 48 days, a maximum of 124 days and an average of 89 days without 
electricity per year. By comparison, the studies of BEEPS (2008) and Limi (2008:12) 
reported an average of 78 days of electricity disruption in Zimbabwe.  
 
The table also shows that payment to ZESA for electricity supply in 2009 ranged from 
US$500 to US$1 250 000 per year. Similarly, revenues earned from farm sales ranged 
from US$12 500 to US$135 000 000. The high standard deviation for the reported 
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variables indicates the high variation across the type of farming activity, farm size and 
intensity of activities.  
 
7.2.2 Direct Cost Estimation 
 
The direct (welfare) cost estimation requires the assessment of value of lost output, wage 
cost or savings, material destruction cost and other additional costs (emergency cost, 
equipment damage cost and start up cost). From these costs the total direct cost and 
direct cost per kWh lost may be calculated.  
7.2.2.1 Direct cost by type of cost 
 
Table 7.10 decomposes direct outage cost by type of cost using the mean values and also 
shows the percentage of each type of cost of total mean cost. 
Table 7.10: Direct outage cost for farming by type (US$) 
 
Cost Type Mean As % of total 
Lost output 5258.02 78.7 
Wage cost 431.40 6.5 
Material destruction cost 637.44 9.5 
Restart cost 110.39 1.7 
Damage to equipment cost 240.70 3.6 
 Direct Cost 6677.95 100 
Wage savings 0 0 
Total Cost 6677.95 100 
  
 
The mean direct cost summed to US$6 677.95 in 2009. The table confirms expectations 
that lost output is the major component (78.7%) of direct cost. This concurs with the 
findings by Kessides (1993) that lost output is the major direct cost incurred by farmers. 
Using the mean, the total outage cost was calculated to be US$1 148 607 for the 172 
successfully surveyed farms. The total direct cost for the sector (8279 farms) then 
translates to US$55 286 748. 
 
 
7.2.2.2 Direct cost per agricultural activity 
 
Table 7.11 shows the decomposition of cost by type of agricultural activity involved. The 
table shows output loss cost, wage cost, material destruction cost and other costs (start 
up cost and equipment damage cost) and total direct cost. High material destruction costs 
were reported (cost of shrinkage of output, material loss and cost of poor taste and 
deteriorated quality). 
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Table 7.11: Decomposition of cost by type of agriculture activity 
 
Agriculture Sector 
Output Loss 
Cost (US$) 
Wage Cost 
(US$) 
Material 
Cost (US$) 
Other 
Cost (US$) 
Total Direct 
Cost (US$) 
Agronomy 39460 1 977 75626 25971 142829 
Horticulture 97667 2600 79333 22000 201 600 
Citrus 26100 2600 36000 27500 92 200 
Dairy 36000 1600 30000 6000 73 600 
Floriculture 84182 3000 45000 13909 123091 
Ranching 7200 5400 4560 4440 21600 
Piggery 6000 1 600 1 600 0 9 200 
Poultry 103818 3327 140982 24611 272 738 
Forestry/Plantations 144857 5700 7 500 26357 184 414 
Mixed Farming 51 515 2 182 27 730 15 358 96 785 
TOTAL 596 799 29 986 448 331 166 146 1241 262 
 
Forestry and plantation (coffee, tea and bananas) farms reported the highest output loss 
and piggery reported the lowest. The same applied to wage cost. However, it was 
different for material destruction and other costs; poultry farms reported the highest 
material destruction cost while ranching farms reported the least. Citrus farms reported 
the highest other cost, while piggery reported the least (zero cost). In total, poultry farms 
reported the highest total direct cost while piggery farms reported the lowest direct cost. 
 
7.2.2.3 Distribution of direct cost per kWh lost by agricultural sector 
 
The direct cost per kWh for the farms surveyed was obtained by dividing the total direct 
outage cost by total kWh unsupplied by the power utility. Table 7.12 shows that Low 
Capacity (LC) farms reported higher direct cost per kWh lost (US$2.20) while High 
Capacity (HC) farms reported lower direct cost (US$1.64). This difference is explained by 
the presence of uninterrupted power supply and advance warning arrangement with the 
power utility by HC farms. In terms of scale of agricultural production, large scale 
commercial farms reported higher cost per kWh lost of US$3.86, while the small scale 
commercial farms reported lower cost per kWh lost of US$1.53.  Among the ten 
provinces, farms in Harare province reported the highest cost per kWh lost of US$4.27, 
followed by farms in Mashonaland (US$3.20 per kWh), while farms in Matebeleland 
North province reported the least cost (US$1.12).  
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Table 7.12: Per kWh direct cost distribution by power capacity, scale, location and type 
 
Factor Considerations 
Production loss cost per 
kWh (US$) 
Power supply capacity High Capacity (HC) 1.64 
 Low Capacity (LC) 2.20 
   
Scale of production Large scale commercial 3.86 
 Small scale commercial 1.53 
   
Province of location Mashonaland Central 3.71 
 Mashonaland East 3.07 
 Mashonaland West 3.40 
 Manicaland 2.26 
 Masvingo 2.78 
 Matebeleland North 1.12 
 Matebeleland South 1.26 
 Midlands 1.80 
 Bulawayo 2.24 
 Harare 4.27 
   
AgricultureSub-Sector Agronomy 1.46 
 Horticulture 4.93 
 Citrus 1.25 
 Dairy 2.62 
 Floriculture 4.63 
 Ranching 0.18 
 Piggery 0.24 
 Poultry 5.04 
 Forestry and Plantations 5.86 
 Mixed Farming 2.46 
 
 
The cost variation across the type of agricultural activities is also presented in Table 7.12. 
Of the activities, farms specialising in forestry and plantations reported the highest direct 
cost per kWh of US$5.86, followed by those in poultry (US$5.04), horticulture (US$4.93) 
and ranching (US$0.18).  
 
Using the average kWh cost of US$2.79 (for the agriculture sector), the total direct cost 
incurred by surveyed farms as a result of kWh unsupplied by the utility was  calculated to 
be US$1 082 800 in 2009. The average direct cost per farm was US$6 295 and the total for 
the sector connected to the grid was US$52 116 305. 
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7.2.2.4 Characterising Direct cost for the Agriculture sector 
 
The survey also investigated whether the costs vary across agriculture sectors, electricity 
supply capacity, scale of operation and location. Table 7.13 shows the results for the 
direct cost. 
 
Table 7.13: Distribution of Direct cost in US$by power capacity, scale, location and sector 
 
Item  Considerations Mean 
US$  
Minimum 
US$  
Maximum 
US$ 
Std 
Deviation 
N 
Power supply capacity High Capacity (HC) 375617 7800 1244000 592042 78 
 Low Capacity (LC) 28583 3000 848000 189916 94 
       
Scale of production Large scale commercial 540824 3000 1244000 2110759 80 
 Small scale commercial 18223 5820 156600 79022 92 
       
Location (Province) Mashonaland Central 130396 5280 930000 161133 42 
 Mashonaland East 153907 12000 744000 305418 41 
 Mashonaland West 105500 24000 402000 112355 30 
 Manicaland 393545 48000 1244000 493334 22 
 Masvingo 305205 24000 1148000 638139 8 
 Matebeleland North 99000 3000 306000 141244 4 
 Matebeleland South 99000 6600 168000 46605 4 
 Midlands 101383 13680 330000 107906 7 
 Bulawayo 75344 47000 99600 34818 4 
 Harare 473533 36000 1182800 488872 10 
       
Agriculture Sub-Sector  Agronomy 182829 7800 480000 178092 7 
 Horticulture 325000 48000 1244000 637728 9 
 Citrus 135600 48000 240000 71679 6 
 Dairy 88000 60000 156000 34710 6 
 Floriculture 223091 60000 387000 116694 11 
 Ranching 21600 3000 42000 16622 5 
 Piggery 10800 10800 10800 0 1 
 Poultry 602684 72000 1182800 545016 11 
 Forestry/ Plantations 510321 24000 1148000 482703 14 
 Mixed Farming 116426 5280 930000 154606 102 
 
Among the agriculture sectors, horticulture, poultry and forestry/plantation farms 
reported the highest direct cost, while piggery and ranching farms reported the lowest. 
The direct cost varies proportionately with both power supply capacity and scale of 
commercial agricultural production, as HC farms and large scale commercial farms 
reported higher direct costs than LC farms and small scale commercial farms.  Table 7.13 
shows that farms in Manicaland, Masvingo and Harare provinces suffered the highest 
direct cost of power outages, while farms in Bulawayo province suffered the least direct 
cost from outages. As expected the results portray the intensity of agriculture activities in 
the provinces. 
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7.2.2.5 Direct cost as a function of duration for the agricultural sector 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between direct cost and duration by the agriculture 
sector, power supply capacity, location and by scale of agricultural commercial 
production. It was difficult to analyse cost in terms of hours as observed through the pilot 
study, thus, days were used instead.  
 
Figure 7.1a shows the mean direct cost for: 1 day; 2 days; 7 days; and 14 days to specific 
agricultural sectors.  All sectors showed significant cost for a day of outages. Farms in 
poultry production showed the highest outage cost for all four specified durations, 
followed by those in the production of flowers.  
 
Figure 7.1b compares the mean direct cost to farms by considering the capacity of 
electricity supply. High capacity (HC) farms reported a higher direct cost than low capacity 
(LC) farms. This difference is mainly due to the intensity of activities and the use of 
electricity at the farms. HC farms involve more irrigation-related types of production, 
hence the high cost of outages. McKinsey & Company (2001) and FAO (2005) have noted 
that farms practising intensive agriculture through the use of irrigation incur higher costs 
as a result of outages. The figure also reflects that the cost increases sharply as the 
number of days increases – which is the same as was found by Mittal et al. (1987) and 
Bose et al. (2006).  
 
Figure 7.1c compares the mean direct cost for the specific province of location of the 
farms. Those located in Harare province reported the highest direct cost followed by 
those in Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East provinces respectively while those 
in Matebeleland South reported the least. This  pattern also reflects the nature and 
intensity of farming activities in these provinces. For example, horticultural and poultry 
farming activities dominate in Harare because of the proximity to the market. 
Matebeleland South is mainly a ranch farming region. 
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Figure 7.1: Direct Outage cost per duration per agricultural activity, location, capacity and scale 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 7.1d compares mean direct cost in terms of scale of agricultural commercial 
operations. Large scale commercial farms reported higher outage cost than small scale 
commercial farms for all durations.  
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From all the four graphs (Figure 7.1), it can also be ascertained that a positive and 
increasing relationship exists between outage length and cost. 
7.2.2.6 Future income foregone due to hectares unplanted 
 
The survey also analysed farm loss through lost output by unplanted hectares of crops. 
Farms in wheat, tobacco and other horticultural crops which require intensive irrigation 
had to forego some hectares due to erratic power supplies. 
Table 7.14: Unplanted hectares due to outages by province for surveyed farms  
 
Province Total Wheat hectares 
unplanted  due to outages 
Total Tobacco 
hectaresunplanted due to 
outages 
Mashonaland  Central 652 350 
Mashonaland  East 582 395 
Mashonaland  West 425 290 
Manicaland 116 42 
Masvingo 25 3 
Matebeleland North 20 0 
Matebeleland South 30 0 
Midlands 118 4 
Bulawayo 50 0 
Harare 40 7 
 
 
Farmers showed the number of hectares they have foregone unplanted for the two major 
crops planted using irrigation: tobacco and wheat. In Mashonaland Central there were 
the highest (652) hectares of wheat unplanted, followed by Mashonaland East (582 
hectares) and Mashonaland West (425 hectares) while Matebeleland North reported the 
least sacrifice (20 hectares). The total hectares of unplanted wheat for the surveyed farms 
totalled 2 058 hectares. For tobacco, Mashonaland East reported the highest unplanted 
hectares (395 hectares) while Bulawayo, Matebeleland North and South reported the 
least (0 hectares). The total area of unplanted irrigated tobacco totalled 1 091 hectares 
for the surveyed farms. This finding is consistent with the analysis of TIMB (2009) and 
Ministry of Agriculture (2009) that Matebeleland provinces are not suitable for the 
growing of tobacco.  
 
Using the mean yield output per hectare for wheat and tobacco, the outage cost of 
unplanted hectares can be determined. The average yield per hectare was 1 200 
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kilograms and the average price was US$2.35 per kilogram (FAO 2009; TIMB 2009; 
Ministry of Agriculture 2009). The total cost of unplanted hectares of tobacco was 
estimated at US$3 076 620 for the surveyed farms. For wheat, the average yield per 
hectare was 3.2 tonnes (FAO 2009; Ministry of Agriculture 2009; CFU 2009). The average 
price set by the RBZ was US$360 per tonne (RBZ, 2009). The cost of outages from the 
unplanted hectares was estimated at US$2 370 816 for the surveyed farms in 2009. Other 
agricultural practices, such as greenhouses and irrigated vegetables, were also affected by 
plantings not made. 
7.2.2.8 Number made unemployed due to outages 
 
Table 7.15: Total number of workers laid-off due to outages 
Type of Agriculture activity Number laid-off 
Agronomy 222 
Horticulture 175 
Citrus 221 
Dairy 8 
Floriculture 415 
Ranching 0 
Piggery 0 
Poultry 112 
Forestry and Plantations 180 
Mixed Farming 540 
 
Unplanted hectares also have other opportunity costs. These costs come as a result of 
workers not being hired. The number laid off for each agricultural activity for the 
surveyed farms is shown in Table 7.15. Farms in mixed farming reported the highest (540) 
number of labourers laid-off, followed by farms in floriculture (415), while farms in 
ranching and piggery reported zero labourer lay-off. Some surveyed farms revealed that 
they no longer employ permanent labourers, but hire contract labourers if there is need 
during weeding and harvesting times (Canberra Farm 2010; Kanengoni Farm 2010).  
 
7.2.3 Indirect (Backup) Cost Estimation for Farms 
 
The cost which comes as an insurance measure is the compensatory aspect of investing in 
backup sources. This cost was calculated using the cost of acquiring and running backup 
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equipment by farmers. The cost of investing in backup and running the backup is 
considered as the other cost of power outage cost incurred by farmers.  
7.2.3.1 Availability and type of backup equipment used by farmers 
 
The type of backup equipment used for farm activities is shown in Table 7.16. Farms 
surveyed purchased generating and or conserving sets of equipment. The majority of 
farms (58.5%) owned generators only as backup, 25.4 percent owned generators and 
diesel pumps and 0.8 percent (1 farm) owned a generator and UPS. Two farms or estates 
(1.5%) owned small hydro stations for their agricultural use. 
 
Table 7.16: Backup equipment used by farms for their activities 
Type of Backup Equipment Frequency Percentage 
 Generator only 76 58.5 
 Small hydro stations 2 1.5 
 Diesel pump only 10 7.7 
 Generator and UPS 1 0.8 
 Generator and Diesel Pump 33 25.4 
 Generator, Diesel Pump and UPS 2 1.5 
 Diesel Pump and Solar 6 4.6 
 
From the table (7.16) it can be deduced that the majority of the farms have generators 
(gasoline generators and small hydro plants) as backup equipment. Of the generators 
owned, 6 farms reported having three generators on site and 12 farms reported having 
two generators on farm sites. These generators are used together for the farming 
activities to cover the load. Some of the farms reported using the backup for irrigation 
and greenhouses (Viljon Farm 2010; Chigamba Farm 2010; Magushungo Farm 2010). 
Some farms reported using the backup for post harvest activities , such as preserving milk, 
fruit, meat and vegetable produce (Magombezi Dairy 2010; Golden Apples Farm 2010; 
Green Valley Farm 2010).  
 
7.2.3.2 Time and frequency of backup equipment use by farmers 
 
The power outage crisis is shown by the hours and frequency of backup equipment used.  
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Table 7.17 Average hours of backup use by farms per week 
 
Average backup time  use per outage (hours) Frequency Percentage 
 1-2 3 2.3 
 3-5 28 21.5 
 6-9 93 71.5 
 10-13 5 3.9 
 14+ 1 0.8 
Table 7.17 shows the average hours of backup use by farms per week. Of the farms 
surveyed the majority (71.5%) reported that they used backup equipment between six 
and nine hours (6-9 hours) and only a single farm reported above 14 hours.  
 
Table 7.18: Frequency of backup equipment use per week by farms 
 
Frequency(times) per week Frequency(outcome) Percentage 
 1-2 3 2.3 
 3-4 44 33.8 
 5-6 78 60.0 
 7 5 3.9 
 
Table 7.18 shows the frequency of backup equipment use in 2009. From the surveyed 
farms 60 percent reported having five to six (5-6) times of backup equipment use per 
week and a few, 2.3 percent, reported between one and two (1-2) times per week. This 
reflects that many farms were using their backup equipment almost daily. 
7.2.3.3 Investment in backup equipment by farmers 
 
Farmers spend a lot of money by investing in backup equipment in a bid to reduce the 
effects of power outages. The cost of investing in different types of backup equipment 
and some descriptive statistics of the backup equipment are shown in Table 7.19. 
 
The value of backup generators for the surveyed farms ranged from a minimum of 
US$800 for a small generator to US$500 000 for one of the large generators, with a mean 
value of US$25 387. The costs of the two small hydro plants were US$2 500 000 and 
US$15 000 000.  The solar panel values range from US$320 to US$4200 and diesel pumps 
range from US$700 to US$25 000 (see Table 7.19). 
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Table 7.19: Descriptive information of the farmer’s backup equipment  
Item Considerations  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Cost (US$) Generator  800 500000 25387 138161 
 Small Hydro plants  2500000 15000000 8 500000 6000000 
 Solar Panel  320 4200 872 604 
 Diesel pump  700 25000 3913 5429 
      
Capacity Generators(kVa) 5 800 75 111.6 
 Small Hydro plants (kw) 100 1000 550 450 
 Solar Panels (kw) 10 100 50 40 
 Diesel Pumps (HP) 3 24 9 5.4 
      
Years in Use Generator 1 25 4 2.57 
 Small Hydro plants  10 15 13 2.5 
 Solar Panel 5 10 6 2.1 
 Diesel pump 3 20 8 4.6 
 
Table 7.19 also shows the capacities of this backup equipment. The generator capacity 
ranged from 5kVa to 900kVa with average capacity of 75kVa. The two small hydro plants 
have 100kW and 1 000kW capacities. The diesel pumps had a capacity ranging from 3 
horse-powers for one of the smallest pumps to 24 horse-powers for the largest pump. 
The solar panels had capacities ranging from 10kW to 100kW. 
 
The time period for owning the backup equipment is also shown in Table 7.19. The period 
in use of the generators ranged from 1 to 25 years with mean of 4 years. For diesel pumps 
the period ranged from 3 to 20 years and for solar panels it ranged from 5 to 10 years. 
 
7.2.3.4 Cost structure of backup equipment of farmers 
The mean cost of owning and running the backup equipment by the farms is shown in 
Table 7.20. 
Table 7.20: Mean cost (US$) of owning and running backup equipment by the farms 
 
Item Mean As a % of total cost 
Capital Cost Items US$  
Backup equipment cost 25387 96.4 
Installation cost (Transport, house, oil tank) 942 3.6 
Total Capital Cost 26329 100 
Operating Cost Items (per year)   
Maintenance cost  1551 7.6 
Fuel, oil and grease cost 17590 86.6 
Wage cost  1159 5.8 
Total Running Cost 20300 100 
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The mean capital cost of the backup equipment was US$26 329 and the mean running 
cost was US$20 300. Fuel, oil and grease cost was the major contributor of running cost 
(88.4%). The breakdown of average cost (capital and operating cost) by type of 
agricultural activity is shown in Table 7.21. 
 
Table 7.21: Capital and operating cost in US$ by type of agricultural activity of farms 
Type of 
Agricultural 
Activity 
Average 
Capital 
Cost 
Average 
Fuel and 
grease cost 
Average 
labour 
cost 
Average 
Maintenance 
Cost 
Average 
Running 
Cost 
Total 
Average 
cost 
Agronomy 5325 3900 6540 3800 4240 9565 
Horticulture 9429 28971 3771 3343 16086 25515 
Citrus 34150 41500 4200 3100 18800 52950 
Dairy 11692 21100 2500 3400 7000 18692 
Floriculture 15695 28636 3327 4036 16000 31695 
Ranching 5250 7500 2850 1110 5460 10710 
Piggery 1500 4200 0 1000 3000 4500 
Poultry 118620 71580 6900 27300 65780 184400 
Forestry/Plantation 270338 60200 27500 34550 42250 612588 
Mixed Farming 22184 21754 3699 4302 12755 34939 
 
Forest and plantations reported the highest average capital cost (US$270 338) of 
investing in backup equipment and piggery farms reported the least (US$1 500). This 
suggested a high demand for power by the capital equipment used in forestry and 
plantation farming activities. Some of the farms reported a high need for high powered 
generators to run the machines (Boarder Timbers Forest 2010). Poultry farms reported 
the highest fuel, oil and grease cost (US$71 580) and agronomy farms reported the least 
(US$3 900) per year. The high cost of fuel in poultry farms suggested the need to properly 
manage post harvest outputs which are perishables (chicken). Some poultry farms 
reported that they have to invest in backup equipment to avoid loss through shrinkage 
and quality of chicken (Irvines 2010; Crest 2010).    
 
Forest and plantations also reported the highest labour, maintenance and total running 
cost and piggery farms reported the least labour, maintenance and total running cost. The 
high cost to forestry and plantations reflects the capacity of the backup equipment used 
to power operating equipment and sawmill activities in most forestry farms. 
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7.2.3.4 Measuring Backup Cost for farms 
The total cost of backup power purchased by farms was computed by first annualising 
capital cost of investing in backup equipment. This was obtained by dividing the capital 
cost by years in use and discounting the result using the prevailing interest rate, i.e. 10%. 
The generator kVa generated was converted to kWh using the power factor 
(0.8kVa=kWh) in order to compute the annualised capital cost per kWh. The running cost, 
particularly fuel, oil, grease, labour and maintenance costs were also transformed to cost 
per kWh. The transformation yielded cost per kWh of unsupplied.  
Table 7.22: Backup cost per kWh by scale, agricultural activity, capacity and location 
Factor Production loss cost per  
kWh (US$) 
Power supply capacity High Capacity (HC) 1.22 
 Low Capacity (LC) 2.25 
   
Scale of Agriculture activity Large scale commercial 2.65 
 Small scale commercial 1.80 
   
Province of location Mashonaland Central 1.15 
 Mashonaland East 1.72 
 Mashonaland West 1.50 
 Manicaland 2.60 
 Masvingo 1.83 
 Matebeleland North 0.42 
 Matebeleland South 0.66 
 Midlands 1.10 
 Bulawayo 1.43 
 Harare 2.67 
   
Agriculture Sub-Sector Agronomy 0.32 
 Horticulture 2.53 
 Citrus 0.25 
 Dairy 1.62 
 Floriculture 2.83 
 Ranching 0.16 
 Piggery 0.12 
 Poultry 3.40 
 Forestry and Plantations 3.93 
 Mixed Farming 1.68 
Of the surveyed farms, the LC farms reported a higher backup cost per kWh than the HC 
(Table 7.22); a result that is consistent with those obtained by Bose et al. (2006).  Large 
scale commercial farms reported a higher per kWh cost than small scale commercial 
farms. This is due to the capacity of the backup equipment they have invested in and the 
running cost of such equipment. This finding is also in line with research by Mckinsey & 
139 
 
Company (2001), which also shows that the higher the capacity of backup equipment, the 
greater the cost of running the equipment.  
 
Among the surveyed farms, those in Harare province reported the highest backup cost 
per kWh, followed by those in Mashonaland, Manicaland and Matebeleland. The higher 
per kWh cost reflects differences in the intensity of agriculture activities in the specified 
provinces. Harare province specialises in horticultural crops and poultry, which are 
intensive practices, Mashonaland and Manicaland have the highest irrigation equipment 
infrastructure. These findings are in line with what was highlighted by Bose et al. (2006), 
that the higher the intensity of agriculture the higher the backup cost due to high 
investment in backup equipment. Table 7.22 also shows the backup cost per kWh lost for 
the surveyed farms by agriculture sectors. Forestry and plantation estates reported the 
highest cost per kWh unsupplied, followed by poultry, floriculture, horticulture and 
piggery farms.  
 
Using the mean kWh cost for the type of agricultural activity of US$1.64, it was calculated 
that the total backup cost for the surveyed farms was US$808 460 and the total sector 
backup cost was US$34 768 495. 
 
7.2.3.5 Adjusting the indirect (backup) cost for farms 
 
Adjusting  the indirect (backup) cost was done through netting off the per kWh cost 
recovery tariff a public utility company would need to charge of US$0.12 (ZESA 2009), the 
mean kWh cost of private generation was calculated to be US$1.52. The total net indirect 
(backup) cost was calculated to beUS$749 304 for the surveyed farms. The total indirect 
(backup) cost for the sector was US$32 224 459. 
 
7.2.4 Computation of Total Outage Cost for the Agricultural Sector 
 
 
The total cost was calculated by summing the direct and indirect (backup) costs. In this 
case, the total cost was calculated to be US$84 340 764 (US$52 116 305 + US$32 224 
459). 
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7.2.5 Agriculture Outage Cost Impact Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
Outage cost impact for the sector was also assessed by comparing this cost to GDP. The 
relevant proportions of the outage costs were 0.9 percent for direct cost, 0.6 percent for 
indirect (backup) cost and 1.5 percent for total cost. 
 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter found that power outages have a great influence on farms in Zimbabwe 
through the disruption of their production. The disruption can be in irrigation, harvesting 
or even post-harvest activities. Output loss was the dominant cost, making up 78.7 
percent of the total direct outage cost. The acquisition by farmers of generators accounts 
for most of the indirect (backup) cost. It is a rational decision to insure against power 
interruption losses by acquiring the backup equipment but this extra cost undermines the 
competitiveness of Zimbabwean agricultural output.  
 
Direct and indirect (backup) costs vary proportionately with power supply capacity and 
scale of operations. Small scale commercial and/or Low Capacity (LC) farms are more 
heavily affected by electricity outages than large scale commercial farms and/or High 
Capacity (HC) farms. This is due to availability of uninterrupted power supply and advance 
warning arrangements with the majority of HC farms and/or large scale commercial 
farms. 
 
The cost per kWh lost is above the unit price charged by ZESA of US$0.07, ranging from 
US$0.58 to US$5.86 per kWh direct cost and US$0.20 to US$3.93 per kWh indirect 
(backup) cost.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
ESTIMATING THE COST OF POWER OUTAGES IN THE 
ZIMBABWEAN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
 
8 INTRODUCTION 
 
Zimbabwe has a diversified manufacturing sector, producing a wide range of commodities 
from food and beverage to chemicals, clothing and metal products of all kinds. The 
manufacturing sector was developed under import substitution industrial isation policies 
of the white minority regimes prior to independence in 1980 (CZI 2009:67). The country 
endured sanctions from 1965 to 1980 and the import substitution was used as a strategy 
to ensure self-sufficiency for most of the basic consumer products (Ministry of Industry 
2009). The strategy was carried forward (largely by default) into the post-independence 
period.  
 
The industrial sector is an important contributor to the country’s GDP (14 percent), 
exports (20 percent) and employment (15 percent) (CZI 2009:68), but has been in decline 
due to various challenges emanating from general low capacity utilisation across all 
productive sectors. High among the challenges of low capacity utilisation by the sector 
has been persistent power outages (Eto et al. 2004; World Bank 2008). 
 
Reliable electricity power supply delivered on demand is vital for most industrial 
equipment (Lawton et al. 2003), but the typical Zimbabwean firm experiences power 
failures about five times per week, each one lasting for about one to six hours daily, with 
no prior warning from the power utility (CZI 2009). This imposes a huge constraint on the 
manufacturing firms and causes various costs, e.g. idle workers, spoiled materials, lost 
output, damaged equipment and restart costs (Adenikinju 2005:1). At the same time, it 
increases business uncertainty and lower returns on investment, undermining 
Zimbabwe’s growth potential and the attractiveness of the economy to external investors 
(Mangwengwende 2005:7; World Bank 2008). 
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There are essentially five ways by which firms may respond to unreliable electricity 
supply. These are choice of location, factor substitution, private provision, choice of 
business and output reduction (Adenikinju 2005:3). While all these options are seen to be 
selected by various Zimbabwean firms, the most common approach has been private  
backup provision. Firms find it necessary to provide their own electricity to substitute (or 
complement) the ZESA supply (CZI 2009). 
 
This chapter applies two methods for estimating the cost of outages, in much the same 
way as in the previous two chapters. The estimates are based on a survey of 
manufacturing firms’ costs associated with power outages.  
 
8.1 ADMINISTERING INDUSTRIAL SURVEY 
 
8.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire used in the industrial sector electricity outage cost survey was 
designed in consultation with focus groups consisting of engineers (electrical), 
statisticians (at ZESA) and representatives of organisations such as the CZI and the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part contained general questions 
about the firm/institution: i.e. location, operational hours and electricity consumption 
from the grid; amount paid for electricity consumed and the arrangement made with the 
power utility concerning load shedding. The second part included questions about the 
direct cost estimation of power outages. This part estimated actual outage cost: lost 
production; damage to equipment; idle time for workers; spoiled stocks; and restart cost. 
The third part asked questions concerning the captive generation cost for the sector: the 
cost of acquiring the captive devices and the accessories, running and maintenance costs. 
Before the questionnaire was finalised, it was tested on a smaller group of 10 firms. 
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8.1.2 Population 
 
The survey includes all industrial electricity consumers connected to the utility grid. The 
total population for industrial consumers is shown in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: ZESA Industrial Tariff Classification 
 
Tariff Class Number of Customers 
Low Capacity Manufacturing  2132 
High Capacity Manufacturing 401 
Low Capacity Commercial Services 35554 
High Capacity Commercial services 197 
Low Capacity Institutions 1458 
High Capacity Institutions 15 
TOTAL 39757 
Source: ZESA (ZEDTCO) (2009)  
 
8.1.3 Sample size and sampleselection 
 
8.1.3.1 Sample size 
 
The sample size was determined by applying the Yamane (1967) approach to sample size 
determination. The sample sizes for the selected industry electricity consumer classes are 
shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Sample sizes based on electricity tariff classification 
 
Electricity Supply Capacity 
Tariff Class 
Number of 
Customers 
Sample size of 
respondents 
Sample size as %  of  
population 
 Low Capacity  Manufacturing 2132 95 5% 
 High Capacity  Manufacturing 401 25 6% 
Low Capacity Commercial Services 23554 290 1.2% 
High Capacity Commercial Services  197 20 10% 
Low Capacity Institutions 1458 65 5% 
High Capacity Institutions 15 5 33% 
TOTAL 27757 500 1.8% 
 
8.1.3.2 Sampling selection 
 
Stratified sampling design was adopted for the Zimbabwean industrial electricity outage 
cost estimation survey. Industries were first stratified into low capacity (LC) and high 
capacity (HC) manufacturing, commercial and institutions , as per the utility classification 
shown in Table 8.1. The second stratification was in terms of the nature of activities in 
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each class. The manufacturing sector was further stratified into: Food and beverages; 
Paper, wood and rubber; Textiles and leather; Chemicals and drugs (fertiliser, petroleum, 
paint and pharmaceuticals); Engineering and construction (metal, electrical, cement, glass 
and bricks); agriculturally based and Tobacco industries. Similarly, the services were 
classified into: Wholesaling and retailing; Communications and information technology 
(IT); Hospitality, leisure and tourism; Transport and automobile services; and Commercial 
tertiary services (accounting, banking, advertising, insurance, consultancy and 
warehousing). Lastly, institutions were stratified as Education, health and government 
institution; and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and humanitarian services. 
 
The samples were drawn randomly from the sub-strata identified. The selection of the 
type and of units for the survey was based on secondary data on electricity purchased, 
sanctioned load, electricity generated by captive units and ZESA recommendations.  
 
8.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The survey was administered by the researcher and research assistants who were also 
trained in administering the questionnaires. Personally administered questionnaire 
survey, was used to collect the data in order to improve response rate and reduce mis -
information biases. The industry respondents were informed of the purpose of the 
research in advance by telephone or email. The data collection exercise was spread over 6 
months. The data from the questionnaires were then collated on Excel spreadsheets and 
the software Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS 13) and Eviews (6) were used 
for data analysis. 
 
8.2 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
8.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
A total of 260 out of the 500 questionnaires (52%) were successfully retrieved, coded and 
analysed for the direct cost method (C1) and 231 out of 500 (46.2%) questionnaires would 
be used for the indirect cost method of estimation (C2). The distribution of the firms by 
electricity supply capacity, specified industry sector, scale of production and locati on is 
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shown in Table 8.3. For the purpose of this survey, firms connected to voltage supply of 
below 300kVa were regarded as Low Capacity (LC) and those above 300kVa as High 
Capacity (HC) firms. Firms employing less than 100 were classified as small scale, firms 
employing between 100 and 250 were classified as medium scale and firms above 250, 
large scale. The industrial sector firms were further classified as either manufacturing or 
service industry.  
Table 8.3: Respondents distribution by power supply capacity, scale, location and class 
 
Item of Analysis Consideration 
Direct Method (C1) Indirect Method (C2) 
Frequency 
Percent 
of total 
Frequency 
Percent of 
total 
Power Supply Capacity HC Firms 176 67.7 79 34.2 
 LC Firms 84 32.3 152 65.8 
      
Scale of Operation Small Scale (SS) 84 32.3 63 27.3 
 Medium Scale (MS) 92 35.4 86 37.2 
 Large Scale (LS) 84 32.3 82 35.5 
      
Location Harare 95 36.5 88 38.1 
 Bulawayo 50 19.2 45 19.5 
 Gweru 13 5.0 10 4.7 
 Mutare 21 8.1 17 7.4 
 Masvingo 12 4.6 12 5.2 
 Kwekwe 13 5.0 13 5.6 
 Kadoma 11 4.2 10 4.3 
 Chegutu 8 3.1 6 2.6 
 Chinhoyi 16 6.2 10 4.3 
 Vic Falls 12 4.6 12 5.2 
 Kariba 2 0.8 1 0.4 
 Other small towns/GPA  7 2.7 7 3.0 
Industrial Sectors      
- Manufacturing  Food and Beverages 43 16.5 40 17.3 
 Paper, Wood, Rubber 33 12.7 31 13.4 
 Textile and leather 8 3.1 6 2.6 
 Drugs and Chemicals 11 4.2 10 4.3 
 Engineering/construction 42 16.2 34 14.7 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 7 2.7 7 3.0 
- Services  Wholesale and retailing 21 8.1 17 7.4 
 Communication and IT 12 4.6 11 4.8 
 Tourism and hospitality 16 6.2 16 6.9 
 Transport and automobiles 22 8.5 19 8.5 
 Commercial Tertiary Services 31 11.9 28 12.1 
 Education, Health & Gvt 10 3.8 8 3.5 
 NGOs and Humanitarian 2 0.8 2 0.9 
 Other Services 2 0.8 2 0.9 
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The electricity supply problems to the industry sector can be seen from the information 
portrayed in Tables 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7. Table 8.4 shows the frequencies of outages per 
week.  
 
Table 8.4: Frequency of weekly outages experienced by Industry 
 
Number of Outages per week Frequency Percentage 
 1-2 57 21.92 
 3-4 153 58.85 
 5-6 36 13.85 
 7 14 5.38 
 
Of the surveyed firms, 58.85 percent reported they experienced 3 to 4 outage incidences 
per week, 21.92 percent reported they experienced 1 to 2 outage incidences per week, 
13.85 percent reported they experienced 5 to 6 outage incidences per week and 5.38 
percent reported they experienced 7 or more outage incidences  per week. All firms 
reported having an outage per week in 2009. On average, firms experienced 4 outage 
incidences per week. This is slightly above the average of 3 outage incidences per week 
reported by the CZI (2009). 
 
Table 8.5: Average duration of outages in hours reported by firms 
Average outage duration Frequency Percentage 
0-1 hour 10 3.8 
2-3 hours 97 37.3 
4-5 hours 119 45.7 
6-7 hours 26 10 
8-9 hours 3 1.2 
10-12hours 2 0.8 
12+ hours 3 1.2 
 
 
Table 8.5 shows the ranges of average duration of outages reported by firms. Of the 
surveyed firms 45.7 percent reported average outage duration ranging between four and 
five hours per outage incident, followed by 37.3 percent reporting between two and 
three hours per incident and 1.2 percent (3 firms) reported 12 or more hours per outage 
incident. The average duration was found to be four hours. This is slightly above the 
average duration of three hours reported by CZI (2009). 
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Table 8.6: Uninterrupted supply and warning arrangement by firms with ZESA 
 
Type of firm Frequency Percentage 
Average  weekly 
outages 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
Firms without arrangement  205 78.8 4 4 
Firms with arrangement 55 21.2 2 3 
 
Of the surveyed firms, 78.8 percent had no arrangement with the power utility for 
uninterrupted power supply and advance warning arrangements and 21.2 percent had 
that arrangement. The findings revealed that firms having an arrangement have fewer 
outages per week than those without and they also have shorter outages than those 
without. The findings also show that the frequency and duration of outages differ, 
depending on whether there was an arrangement with the power utility by the firm for 
an uninterrupted power supply or not.  
 
Table 8.7: Proportion of total firm output/service loss caused by power outages 
 
Proportion of firm’s output/services lost Frequency Percentage 
0% Loss 4 1.53 
Less than 10% 12 4.6 
Between 10-25% 79 30.4 
Between 26-50% 85 32.7 
Between 51-75% 42 16.2 
Between 76-99% 28 10.8 
100% loss  10 3.8 
 
Table 8.7 shows that, of the surveyed firms, 3.8 percent (10 firms) reported having to shut 
down production at one time or the other in the year due to power outages, 32.7 percent 
reported between 26 and 50 percent output loss, 30.4 percent reported between 10 to 
25 percent output loss, 10.8 percent reported between 76 and 99 percent loss while 1.53 
percent (4 firms) reported no loss.  
 
8.2.1.1 Ranking of service problems by firms in Zimbabwe 
 
Respondent firms were also asked to rank the severity of service problems in Zimbabwe 
on a scale of 1 to 3: major obstacle; moderate obstacle; and no obstacle respectively (see 
Table 8.8).  
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Table 8.8: Ranking of severity of service problems by firms (percentage) 
 
Service Major Obstacle Moderate Obstacle No Obstacle 
Electricity 67.3 29.2 3.5 
Water 46.2 31.1 22.6 
Transport 17.7 56.9 25.4 
Telecommunication 21.2 53.4 25.4 
Market 54.4 37.2 8.4 
 
Table 8.8 shows that a significant number (67.3%) of surveyed firms regarded power 
outages as a major obstacle of their operations with only a small percentage (3.5%) 
regarding it as no obstacle. The result also confirms expectations of the study that the 
interruptions in electricity supply are a major obstacle to production. This finding is also 
consistent with those of Adenikinju (2003) and Adenikinju (2005:21). 
 
The market service follows electricity in a distant second, with 54.4 percent revealing the 
market as a major obstacle, 37.2 percent reporting it to be a moderate obstacle and only 
8.4 regarding it to be no obstacle.  
8.2.1.2 Overview of general questions section for firms  
 
An analysis of the data in the general question section is presented in Table 8.9. 
 
Table 8.9: Summary of descriptive statistics of firms 
 
Items Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Weekly Outages (Number) 1 10 4 1.5 
Average duration of Outages (hrs) 1 20 4 1.9 
Total number of outages (year) 52 320 180 79 
Total outage hours (year) 26 2210 1608 453 
Capacity Utilisation (%) 5 45 14 1.51 
Electricity Expenditure (US$) 405 24000000 415331 1888020 
kWhs consumed (year) 5357 17142857 296669 1348585 
Hours electricity available from Grid 260 8684 4407 2851 
Average kWh consumed per hour 1.52 20163 733 2699 
Total kWhs lost (year) 181 32571429 694747 3178220 
Revenue (US$) 45000 158000000 14394884 47276663 
 
The table shows the total number of outages ranged from a minimum of 52 to a 
maximum of 320 for the year, with an average of 180 outages for the year. The total 
outage hours ranged from 26 hours to a maximum of 2 210 hours, with an average of 
1608 hours. Using a 24-hour working day reference for the firms it translates into a 
minimum of one day, a maximum of 92 days and an average of 67 days without electricity 
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per year. By comparison, BEEPS (2008) and Limi (2008:12) reported an average of 78 days 
electricity disruption in Zimbabwe and 56 days for Africa. 
 
Table 8.9 also shows that there was considerable variation in the data across the firms. 
Electricity consumption from the grid varies from as low as 5 357 kWh per year (as low as 
14.7kWh per day) for one of the firms to as high as 17 142 857kWh per year (46 967kWh 
per day) for one of the largest firms included in the survey. Total energy lost due to 
outages range from as low as 181kWhs to a maximum of 32 571 429kWh with a mean of 
694 747kWh lost for the year.  Payments to ZESA for the electricity supply by firms in 
2009 ranged from US$405 per year for one firm to US$24 000 000 for another firm. 
Similarly, revenues from sales or provision of services generated by firms  ranged widely 
from US$45 000 to US$158 000 000.  
 
 
8.2.2 Direct Cost Estimation 
 
 
The direct costs of outages in the industrial sector were value of lost output, labour cost, 
material destruction cost, other additional cost (restart cost, damage to equipment and 
repair and maintenance cost) and total value added lost incurred by firms. The direct cost 
components were summed together to get the total direct cost. Transformations were 
also performed to calculate the cost in terms of per unit of energy (kWh) unsupplied to 
the firm by the power utility.  
8.2.2.1 Direct cost by type of cost for firms 
 
Table 8.10: Direct cost for firms by type 
 
 Cost Type Amount (US$) As % of Total 
Lost output 20521 76 
Labour cost  1304 4.8 
Destruction of material (raw materials and stocks) 4343 16.1 
Restart costs  616 2.3 
Damage to equipment 213 0.8 
Sub-Total 26997 100 
Labour cost savings 0 0 
Total Cost 26997 100 
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Table 8.10 shows the decomposition of direct cost by type incurred by surveyed firms , 
using the mean values and the proportion of each cost type to total cost. Lost output is 
the highest (76% of total cost). This finding is also in line with that of other studies such as 
by Adenikinju (2005), Bose et al. (2005) and Limi (2008). The total mean direct outage 
cost for the surveyed firms totalled US$26 997 in 2009. Using the mean of the total direct 
cost components, the total outage costs of the surveyed firms (260) was found to be 
US$7 015 220. The total cost for the sector (27757 firms) translates to US$749 355 729. 
 
8.2.2.2 Direct cost per Industry class  
 
Table 8.11 shows the decomposition of cost by industry class.  
Table 8.11: Decomposition of Direct cost by industrial classification 
 
Industry Class 
Output 
loss cost 
(US$) 
Labour 
cost 
(US$) 
Material 
destruction 
cost (US$) 
Other 
direct cost 
(US$) 
Total 
Direct 
Cost (US$) 
Manufacturing      
Food and  Beverage  850843 130544 209773 91513 1282673 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 302080 119644 205465 50845 678034 
 Textile and leather 756200 54000 289250 93750 1193200 
 Drugs and Chemicals 1467335 63273 84273 49091 1663971 
 Engineering and construction 1448229 95300 131349 68200 1743078 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 99429 12857 17143 12000 141429 
Services      
 Wholesale and Retailing 251143 35206 59794 20646 366789 
 Communication and Networking 874000 54500 46950 45800 1021250 
 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality 44000 45563 36188 15750 141500 
 Transport and Automobile services 44682 13855 15218 12682 86436 
 Commercial and Tertiary services 33081 18452 18943 17743 86219 
 Education, Health, and Gvt  13896 7580 4600 9140 35216 
 NGOs and Humanitarian Services 1000 1000 1500 1500 5000 
 Other Services (e.g.consultancy) 80000 80000 40000 18000 218000 
TOTAL     7004340 
 
Table 8.11 shows output loss cost, labour cost, material cost, other costs (restart and 
damage to equipment cost) and total direct cost. The table shows that, of the surveyed 
manufacturing firms, drugs and chemicals, and engineering and construction firms 
reported the highest output loss cost. Food and beverages reported the highest cost of 
labour and material destruction, while agro-based and tobacco firms reported the least. 
Agro-based and tobacco firms reported the lowest cost of all classes of cost. For the 
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services sectors, communication and IT firms reported the highest value of services lost 
and total direct cost. Other services (consultancy, repairs , etc.) reported the highest 
labour cost and material or information destruction cost and other costs (restart and 
damage to equipment). NGOs and humanitarian services reported the least cost of all 
classes. 
 
For some firms, outages resulted in output being discarded (Lobels Bread 2010; ZimGlass 
2010) while for others it required reworking on the same materials and additional cost in 
the form of labour and restart cost (Mukundi Plastics 2010; Eversharp 2010). In some 
cases there were long waiting periods as machines had to be reheated up to the required 
levels before any processing could start (Glyns Bolts 2010; Metalock 2010). All surveyed 
firms confirmed that idle labour had to be paid during the outage time.  
 
From the direct cost for each industry class (see Table 8.11), the total direct cost for the 
firms was obtained by summing the value of output lost, labour cost, material destruction 
cost and other cost (restart cost and damage to equipment cost). For the surveyed firms,  
the total direct cost was US$7 444 795 in 2009. The cost figure corresponds with the total 
direct cost obtained by using the mean direct outage cost figure (Table 8.10). 
 
 
8.2.2.3 Distribution of Direct cost per kWh lost by the Industrial sector  
 
 
For the surveyed firms, the direct cost per kWh lost was obtained by dividing the total 
direct cost by total number of kWhs unsupplied by the utility provider. 
 
Table 8.12 shows direct cost per kWh lost by firms using the following distinctions: power 
supply capacity, scale of operation, location and industrial classification sector. HC firms 
reported higher direct cost per unsupplied kWh than LC firms. Similarly, large scale firms 
reported higher direct cost per kWh unsupplied than small scale firms.  
 
Table 8.12 also shows that there was a high variation in the cost incurred by different 
firms. Firms located in Kwekwe reported the highest direct cost per kWh, followed by 
firms in Harare, while firms in other small towns and growth point areas reported the 
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lowest direct cost per kWh. Of the surveyed firms, those in manufacturing firms had a 
direct cost ranging between US$4 and US$19 per kWh lost. Drug and chemical producing 
firms reported the highest direct cost per kWh lost and agro-based and tobacco firms, the 
lowest. For the service sectors, the cost per kWh lost ranged between US$0.3 and US$18, 
highest for communication and IT firms and lowest for NGOs and humanitarian services. 
 
Table 8.12: Distribution of per kWh direct cost by power capacity, scale, location and class 
 
Factor                                                    Capacity 
Cost per kWh 
unsupplied 
Electricity supply capacity Low Capacity Firms (LC) 11 
 High Capacity Firms (HC) 19 
 Scale of Production Small scale 7 
 Medium scale 12 
 Large scale 18 
City of Location Harare 17 
 Bulawayo 12 
 Gweru 5 
 Mutare 10 
 Masvingo 12 
 Kwekwe 19 
 Kadoma 14 
 Chegutu 9 
 Chinhoyi 11 
 Victoria Falls 13 
 Kariba 7 
 Other Small Towns and Growth Point Areas 4 
Industry Sectors   
Manufacturing Sectors Food and Beverage  10 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 9 
 Textile and leather 8 
 Drugs and Chemicals 18 
 Engineering and construction 15 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 4 
Services Sectors Wholesale and Retailing 9 
 Communication and IT 19 
 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality 7 
 Transport and Automobile services 6 
 Commercial and Tertiary  5 
 Education, Health, and Gvt Institutions 2 
 NGOs and Humanitarian Services 0.3 
 Other Services 3 
 
Based on an average kWh cost of US$7.94, the total direct cost incurred by surveyed firms 
due to unsupplied kWhs was calculated to be US$7 286 680 in 2009. Averaging the two 
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cost figures obtained by the two approaches applied to estimate direct cost (Table 8.10 
and 8.11), the average cost for the surveyed firms was US$7 365 738, and the average 
total cost for the sector was US$747 281 135. 
 
8.2.2.4 Characterising the Direct Outage cost for Industries using direct cost 
 
Table 8.13: Distribution of outage cost for industries for the direct method (US$) 
 Item Mean 
US$ 
Minimum 
US$ 
Maximum 
US$ 
Std 
Deviation 
N 
Power supply capacity LC Industries 499281 3480 807200 195787 176 
 HC Industries 871324 39000 1057000 273238 84 
       
Scale of production Small scale 461090 3480 845000 231372 84 
 Medium scale 561948 24000 940400 124312 92 
 Large scale 980344 24000 1057000 895864 84 
       
City of Location Harare 259442 24000 1057000 373405 95 
 Bulawayo 166511 21000 928000 275943 50 
 Gweru 133415 24000 842000 108837 13 
 Mutare 169100 24000 957300 262595 21 
 Masvingo 108980 60000 319800 177498 12 
 Kwekwe 306608 51000 351000 154373 13 
 Kadoma 100924 30000 660000 251415 11 
 Chegutu 56408 24000 217620 90963 8 
 Chinhoyi 94335 3480 257000 54338 16 
 Victoria Falls 308600 48000 856000 305284 12 
 Kariba 42000 24000 60000 135.00 2 
 Other Small towns/GPA 123000 108000 138000 21213 7 
Industrial sector:       
Manufacturing Food and  Beverage  372673 23400 657000 894565 43 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 308803 60000 459600 567801 33 
 Textile and leather 199320 24000 464160 161777 8 
 Drugs and Chemicals  266397 72000 415868 71212 11 
 Engineering/construction  487307 34800 741904 117655 42 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 101429 24000 278000 88469 7 
 Services Wholesale and Retailing 366789 42000 878000 330164 21 
 Communication and IT 521250 30000 1057000 394072 12 
 Tourism and Hospitality 841500 48000 1036000 514483 16 
 Transport and Automobile 186436 24000 673200 194009 22 
 Commercial Tertiary  158219 21000 780000 215335 31 
 Education, Health and Gvt  105216 24000 480000 141891 10 
 NGOs and Humanitarian 33000 24000 42000 12728 2 
 Other Services 13000 6000 19000 6000 2 
 
Table 8.13 reports the characteristics of the direct costs to see whether costs vary across 
type of electricity supply capacity, scale of operation, location and industry sector. 
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Engineering, food and beverages and paper, wood and rubber industries reported the 
highest direct cost, while the agriculturally based and tobacco industries reported the 
lowest. The direct outage costs varied with scale of production, with large scale industries 
reporting the highest direct cost and small scale ones the lowest cost. The same 
relationship was found for power supply capacity. HC firms reported higher direct cost 
than LC firms. Table 8.13 shows that firms in Harare suffered the highest direct cost from 
power disruptions, while those in Kariba suffered the least. 
8.2.2.5 Direct cost as a function of duration for the Industrial Sector 
 
The relationship between direct cost and outage duration of firms by electricity supply 
capacity, scale of operation, location and industrial classification are shown in Figure 8.1.  
 
Figure 8.1a compares the mean direct cost for: 1 hour; 2 hours; 6 hours; and 12 hours 
outage durations by industrial sectors. The longer the duration of the outage the higher 
the outage cost. All industry sectors reported lower cost for a shorter outage duration. 
Communication and IT services firms reported the highest direct cost, sharply increasing 
with duration of outage, followed by engineering and drugs and chemicals firms . 
 
For the same duration periods, Figure 8.1b compares the mean direct cost to firms in 
terms of electricity supply capacity; namely, between HC firms and LC firms. Figure 8.1c 
compares this relationship for different locations. Firms located in Kwekwe reported the 
highest direct cost, followed by those in Harare, while those located in other small towns 
and growth point areas reported the lowest. Figure 8.1d makes a similar comparison in 
terms of scale of production. 
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Figure 8.1: Average Direct outage cost per duration per class, capacity, location and 
scale 
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All relationships shown reflect positive increasing relationships showing an increase in 
direct outage cost with an increase in outage duration time.  
 
8.2.2.6 Deterred Investment and unemployment by Industrial sectors 
 
Power outages were also analysed in terms of the effects and problems they cause such 
as unemployment (Table 8.14). 
Table 8.14: Unemployment caused by outages to firms 
Industry Sectors  Classes of Industries Number Laid off 
Manufacturing Food and Beverage   71 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 179 
 Textile and Leather 225 
 Drugs,  Chemicals and Paint  247 
 Engineering and Construction 636 
 Agro-based  and Tobacco 18 
 Services Wholesale and Retailing 19 
 Communication and IT 13 
 Tourism and Hospitality 0 
 Transport and Automobile  12 
 Commercial and Tertiary  538 
 Education, Health, and Gvt  8 
 NGOs and Humanitarian 0 
 Other services 0 
 
 
Outages result in workers being laid-off either through closure of some units (Sable 
Chemicals 2010) or inability to pay due to high operational costs (Delta 2010).  
Engineering firms reported the highest number of workers laid off, followed by firms in 
tertiary and commercial services, while firms in tourism and hospitality, NGOs and other 
services reported zero labourers laid off. 
 
8.2.3 Indirect (Backup) Cost Estimation for Industries 
 
 
Indirect (backup) cost was computed using the cost of acquiring and running backup 
equipment by firms. Firms acquired backup equipment such as generators, solar panels, 
UPS, coal boilers and gas stoves. The equipment was purchased in order for production or 
provision of service to continue as normal despite the outages. 
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8.2.3.1 Availability, type of backup equipment and use of backup equipment by 
firms 
 
The nature and type of backup equipment used by firms is shown in Table 8.15. The table 
shows that firms invested in many different types of backup equipment. Of the surveyed 
firms, 61.9 percent had private generators only as backup equipment, 27.3 percent had 
generators and UPSs and only 3 percent only had UPSs, diesel pumps and solar panels.  
 
Table 8.15: Backup equipment used by firms  
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Generator only 143 61.9 
 UPS only 6 2.6 
 Generator and UPS 63 27.3 
 Generator and Diesel Pump 8 3.5 
 Generator, Diesel Pump and UPS 2 0.9 
 Diesel Pump and Solar 1 0.4 
 Generator, Boiler and Gas 7 3.0 
 Generator and Solar 1 0.4 
 
Among the surveyed firms, 15 reported having three generators and 12 firms reported 
having two generators on site.  Some of these firms reported that the generator sets were 
used to power different production plants at the same time during outages (Sable 
Chemicals 2010; Blue Ribbon Foods 2010). Others reported that the spare generators 
were reserved as a backup to the main generator (Seedco 2010; United Bottlers 2010). 
The generators mostly used were connected to the electricity distribution box such that 
any outage triggered the generator so that it immediately provides almost substitute 
power within seconds.  
 
UPSs are common in firms in commercial tertiary services , such as accounting, banking 
and insurance for safe serving and up-keeping of data bases and savers (Barclays Bank 
2010; Eagle Insurance 2010), as well as in tourism and hospitality for maintaining 
electronic mails and data bases (RTG 2010, Africasun 2010). Firms in tourism and 
hospitality use gas stoves in place of electrical stoves due to the greater reliability of gas 
supply (Kingdom Hotel 2010; Holiday Inn 2010). Solar energy is a popular substitute for 
grid power with health and education institutions (Musami Mission Hospital 2010; Hartzel 
School 2010). The importance of the backup equipment is reflected in the proportion of 
firms’ production covered by the backup supply during outages (Table 8.16).  
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Table 8.16: Proportion of firms’ operations/services powered by backup equipment 
 
Proportion powered by own generation/savers Frequency Percentage 
1-10% 22 9.5 
11-20%  20 8.7 
21-50%  79 34.2 
51-75%  65 28.1 
76-99%  27 11.7 
100%  18 7.8 
 
About eight percent (8%) of the surveyed firms reported that their operations were 
covered in full (100%) during outages and 34.2 percent reported cover by between 21 and 
50 percent. Some firms reported that they switch off all non-core activities during 
outages (Stanbic Bank 2010; Dairyboard Zimbabwe 2010). 
 
The power crisis to firms is also shown by the average duration of backup use during 
outages (Table 8.17) and frequency of times of backup use per week (Table 8.18) 
reported by firms. 
Table 8.17: Average hours of backup use by firms per week 
Average backup time  use per outage (hours) Frequency Percentage 
1-2 30 13.2 
3-4 142 61.5 
5-6 45 19.5 
7-9 8 3.6 
10-11 3 1.3 
12+ 2 0.9 
 
The majority of firms surveyed (61.5%) used backup equipment to power operations for 
an average duration of 3 to 4 hours per outage. Considering an 8-hour working day, this 
translates into almost half (½) of the day the firm has to be powered by private sources. 
 
Table 8.18: Frequency of backup equipment use per week by firms  
 
 Frequency(times) per week  Frequency(outcome) Percentage 
1-2 55 23.8 
 3-4 120 51.9 
 5-6 36 15.6 
7 20 8.6 
Table 8.18 shows the reported frequency of use of backup equipment by firms per week. 
Among the surveyed firms, about 52 percent used backup equipment 3 to 4 times per 
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week, 15.6 percent used backup equipment 5 to 6 times per week, 8.6 percent used 
backup 7-8 times per week and 23.8 percent used backup 1 to 2 times per week. The use 
of backup time for 7 times a week shows that some firms experienced daily outages. The 
majority (76.1%) used backup equipment more than 3 times per week to power 
operations. 
 
8.2.3.2 Investment in backup equipment and period of use by firms 
 
Firms invested significant amounts in backup capital equipment. Table 8.19 shows the 
total investment devoted by firms in their own electricity backup facilities, capacity of 
backup equipment and the years of backup use.  
 
Table 8.19: Descriptive Information for backup equipment cost (US$) owned by firms 
Item Backup equipment Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cost (US$) Generator  1500 1200000 64382 118300 
 UPS  340 15000 1806 1836 
 Diesel Pump  200 6000 2526 1551 
 Gas or Coal Boiler 50 4300 985 517 
 Solar Panel 120 14000 4800 2344 
      
Capacity Generator (kVa) 10 3600 120 370 
 Diesel Pump (HP) 3 24 12 6 
 Solar Panel (kW) 10 1000 220 185 
 UPS (VA) 300 40000 6400 4865 
      
Years in Use Generator 1 15 4 3 
 UPS  1 4 2 1.8 
 Diesel pump  1 12 5 1.8 
 Gas or Coal Boiler 1 7 4 1.9 
 Solar Panel 1 7 3 1.5 
 
 
The investment cost varies with the type and capacity of backup equipment. Generators 
are the highest cost with values ranging from a minimum of US$1500 to a maximum of 
US$1 200 000 for one large generator. UPS follows generators in cost ranging from 
US$340 for one of the small UPS to US$15 000 for one of the largest UPS. 
 
The capacity of backup equipment differs with the type of equipment. The capacity of a 
generator is measured in kVa. These range from 10 kVa for one of the small generators to 
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3 600 kVa for one of the largest generators. The capacity of UPSs is measured in Volts 
Amps (VA) ranging from 300VA to a maximum of 40 000VA. Solar panels range from 
10kW to 1 000kW and diesel pumps range in horse power (HP) from 3HP to 24HP. 
 
The number of years in use of the backup equipment varied from 1 to 15 years (Table 
8.19). The mean years of use were 4 years for generators, 2 for UPSs, 5 for diesel pumps, 
4 for gas and coal boilers and 3 for solar panels.  
 
8.2.3.3 Cost structure of own generators for firms 
 
Table 8.20 shows the cost of generators. Of the running cost, fuel, oil and grease are the 
main components.  
 
 Table 8.20: Mean cost structure of own generation by firms in terms of cost items 
 
Item Cost (US$) 
As % of Total 
cost 
Capital Item   
Generator Cost 64382 98.71 
Installation cost (transport, house, oil tank) 840 1.29 
Total Capital cost  65222 100 
   
Operating Cost Item   
Fuel, oil and grease cost  15642 84.08 
Labour cost (wages and salaries) 1745 9.38 
Maintenance cost  1217 6.54 
Total Running Cost 18604 100 
 
The decomposition of cost of investing in backup equipment and that of running the 
equipment by industrial classification is shown in Table 8.21. Among firms in the 
manufacturing sector, those producing drugs and chemicals reported the highest average 
capital cost and firms manufacturing agro-based products reported the lowest capital 
cost per year.  
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Table 8.21: Capital and running cost by industry class (US$) 
 
Industry Classification 
Average 
Generator 
cost (US$) 
Average 
fuel cost 
(US$) 
Average 
Maintenance 
cost (US$) 
Average 
labour cost 
(US$) 
Manufacturing sectors     
Food and Beverage 72785 26890 1799 6305 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 136839 27652 2922 5332 
 Textile and leather 49167 33200 1425 5700 
 Drugs and chemicals 173800 46380 2620 7020 
 Engineering and construction 53962 33004 1727 6882 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 7429 29657 1621 2914 
Services sectors     
 Wholesale and Retailing 12706 18353 1288 2141 
 Communication and IT 113727 40909 3736 3632 
 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality 49344 18863 2247 3488 
 Transport and Automobile  27074 11811 1367 3244 
 Commercial tertiary services 17518 11897 1441 1243 
 Education, Health, and Gvt  20375 14550 1288 3100 
 NGOs and Humanitarian  8750 5100 1425 2700 
 Other Services 15000 6000 950 1200 
 
 
8.2.3.4 Measuring the Indirect (Backup) Cost for Firms 
 
The annualised capital cost depends on the price schedule of the generator (which was 
found to be linearly related to generator capacity), depreciation rules and the interest 
rates. The annualised generator cost was also obtained by dividing the generator cost by 
the number of years in use of the generator, taking off depreciation for each year, using 
the reducing balance method applied by most firms, at 15% per annum and then 
discounting the values using the prevailing interest rate, i.e. 10%. The generator 
annualised kVa cost was converted to kW cost using the power factor (0.8kVa = kW). 
Other capital costs, such as generator house, stabiliser, fuel and oil tanks, were also 
annualised and converted to cost per kW. The annualised generator cost plus annualised 
other capital cost yielded the total annualised capital cost per kW of electricity and was 
converted to kWh (energy terms). The operating costs were mainly fuel, oil and grease, 
labour and maintenance cost. These were also converted to cost per kWh. The annualised 
cost per kWh was also computed by summing annualised per kWh costs. The cost of 
insuring the firm against power outage per kWh by own electricity generation is the cost 
per kWh unsupplied.   
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Table 8.22: Backup cost for power capacity, scale, location and industrial classification 
Factor                  Consideration 
Cost per kWh 
(US$) 
Electricity supply capacity Low Capacity Firms (LC) 6 
 High Capacity Firms (HC) 10 
   
Scale of Production Small scale 4 
 Medium scale 8 
 Large scale 13 
   
City of Location Harare 12 
 Bulawayo 7 
 Gweru 6 
 Mutare 8 
 Masvingo 7 
 Kwekwe 10 
 Kadoma 9 
 Chegutu 5 
 Chinhoyi 4 
 Victoria Falls 8 
 Other Small Towns and GPA 3 
Industrial Sectors   
Manufacturing Industry sectors Food and Beverage  8 
 Paper, Wood and Rubber 7 
 Textile and leather 6 
 Drugs and Chemicals 10 
 Engineering and Construction 13 
 Agro-based and Tobacco 3 
Services Industry sectors Wholesale and Retailing 7 
 Communication and IT  16 
 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality 9 
 Transport and Automobile Services 3 
 Commercial and Tertiary Services  4 
 Education, Health, and Government 1.5 
 NGOs and Humanitarian Services 0.5 
 Other Services 3 
 
 
Table 8.22 shows cost per kWh for the electricity supply capacity, scale of operation, 
location and industrial class for the surveyed firms. HC firms reported a higher cost than 
the LC firms. For the scale of production, large firms reported a higher cost than the small 
scale firms. Among the surveyed firms, those in engineering reported the highest indirect 
(backup) cost per kWh and agro-based firms reported the lowest.  
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The average indirect (backup) cost per kWh lost for the industry using the industry 
classification was calculated to be US$5.15, the total outage cost of the firms surveyed, 
US$6 160 820, and the total indirect (backup) cost for the sector, US$442 549 320. 
 
8.2.3.5 Adjustment of Indirect (Backup) Cost for Firms 
 
Indirect (backup) cost was adjusted by netting off the per kWh cost recovery tariff a 
public utility company would need to charge US$0.12 (ZESA 2009) and the mean kWh cost 
of private generation was calculated to be US$5.03. The total net indirect (backup) cost 
was calculated to be US$6 017 266 for the surveyed firms and the total indirect (backup) 
cost for the sector US$432 237 491. 
 
8.2.4 Computation of Total Outage Cost for the Industry Sector 
 
 
The total cost was obtained by summing the direct and indirect (backup) costs. In this 
case, the total cost was calculated to be US$1 189 830 455 (US$747 281 135 + US$432 
237 491). 
 
8.2.5 Industry Outage Cost Impact Assessment 
 
 
The impact of the outage cost for the sector was assessed by comparing it to the GDP of 
about US$5.4 billion for 2009 (RBZ 2010). The cost of outages for the sector as a 
proportion of GDP using direct cost was 13.8 percent of GDP and indirect (backup), 8.2 
percent of GDP; 22 percent in total. These proportions are far above 1.5 percent of GDP 
reported by USAID (1988) for Pakistan and 1 percent of GDP reported by Kessides (1993) 
for India.    
 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The power supply crisis in Zimbabwe is unhealthy for development of the industrial sector 
of the economy and the government stated its desire to improve capacity utilisation, 
diversify production, attracting foreign investors, expanding import substitution and 
improving the export base for the economy away from agriculture. The findings revealed 
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that power outages have a great influence on firms through the disruption of their 
production operations. The added cost undermines the competitiveness of the industrial 
sector. The results show that the direct costs are higher than indirect (backup) cost and 
that costs also vary considerably between industrial sectors. 
 
In all industrial sub-sectors, a positive and increasing relationship between mean outage 
cost and outage duration was observed, indicating that the longer the outage duration 
the higher the outage cost. Another important finding was that the outage cost per kWh 
lost is above the unit price charged by ZESA of US$0.07; ranging from US$0.3 to US$19 for 
the direct cost and US$0.50 to US$16 for the indirect (backup) cost.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
ESTIMATING THE COST OF POWER OUTAGES IN 
ZIMBABWEAN HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
9 INTRODUCTION 
 
Households comprise over 85 percent of electricity consumers in Zimbabwe in numbers, 
and 20 percent in proportionate consumption compared to other sectors (ZESA 2008). 
The number of households connected to the national grid rose since 1980 with an 
average annual connection of 5 183 domestic consumers per annum (ZETDCO 2009) with 
the expansion of cities. The government also embarked on a path of increasing energy 
access to previously disadvantaged people through grid electricity expansion and Rural 
Electrification (RE) programmes (ZESA 2008). Household electrification (access to the grid) 
grew from 19 percent to 42 percent between 1990 and 2007 and averaged 40 percent of 
the total population of Zimbabwe (World Bank 2008), making it one of the leaders in this 
regard in Africa.  
 
Households have over the years become more and more dependent on electricity 
because of an increased use of electronic items (Layton & Moeltner 2004; ZESA 2009) and 
more and more are affected by power outages due to high frequency and longer duration 
(ZES 2009). The daily power outages greatly disrupt social and economic activities of 
households that are geared around receiving it (Fiil-Flynn 2002). Households are 
subjected to the highest risk of interruptions, as they rely on a more extensive 
infrastructure of distribution lines, substations, and transformers than larger commercia l 
and industrial users (Warwick 2000). 
 
Regardless of the specific cause of power outages, the development of efficient policies 
to reduce the risk of outages requires knowledge of the economic cost they cause to 
households (Eto et al. 2004). 
 
Although almost everyone considers the security of power supply to be very important, it 
is not known what value society places on it. Basically, households face two kinds of 
damage: the lost possibility to use their leisure time and the loss of goods (de Nooij et al. 
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2006). Households typically highlight the inconveniences of power outages rather than 
the cost (Eto et al. 2004). Loss of dignity is one of the many consequences of electricity 
outages (Fiil-Flynn 2002). Power outages are also linked to health and safety problems. 
The most common problems are respiratory,  such as breathing and coughing (Morris, 
1999:34, 41). Power outages increase the use of other fuels in homes. Use of domestic 
fuel is a major cause of human exposure to air pollution and a major contributor to 
degrading children’s health status (Terreblanche, Nel & Opperman 1992:26). An 
important reason for this is that cooking is often done inside houses with inadequate 
ventilation. This is especially true in low-income households where ventilation issues are 
largely neglected in construction (Fuggle & Rabie 1998:599). The exposure to fuel 
combustion often creates chronic irritation such as permanent eye infection, runny noses, 
hay fever and earache (Terreblanche et al. 1992:26). 
 
Other indirect issues linked to a general worsening of health include lack of access to 
important public health information supplied by television (Fiil-Flynn 2002), for example, 
influenza or AIDS awareness campaigns. Electricity outages may also have demographic 
impact, such as, increasing birth rates due to lack of entertainment (Jindar 2000).   
 
The theoretical basis for estimating cost of electricity outages is that there is a consumer 
welfare loss when there is an electricity power failure (de Nooij et al. 2006). Households 
power outage costs can be ascertained from different aspects: direct losses or expenses; 
lost leisure; and cost of investing in alternative sources. The direct losses or expenses 
approach was followed by Wood and Pupp (1992). They found outage costs ranging from 
US$0.24/kWh to US$5/kWh for households. Munasinghe (1979) used the concept of 
interruptive service contracts to estimate direct outage cost for households. He found an 
average outage cost of US$4/kWh for households. Lost leisure time was monetised by 
Becker (1965) to estimate the cost of power outages to households. The core of Becker's 
model is that people do not get utility (welfare) from money or goods alone, but from the 
combination of goods (bought with money) and time. Households produce welfare 
(utility), using time and money as inputs. The marginal utility of money decreases with the 
increasing amount of money one has, while the utility of free time increases with the 
number of hours worked.  
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One method for estimating the welfare cost experienced by households, is the Contingent 
Valuation Method (CVM). This method entails asking the respondents to state their 
willingness to pay to prevent an outage or willingness to accept compensation for an 
outage (Wacker, Subramanian & Billinton 1985; Doane, Hartman & Woo 1988a; Doane et 
al. 1988b; Beenstock et al. 1998; Layton & Moeltner 2004; and Carsson & Martinsson 
2004).  
 
The earliest electricity outage cost estimate in African households  was by Iyanda (1982), 
who applied a self-assessment methodology. He estimated an average electricity outage 
cost of US$1.19 per hour for each household. Household outage cost has also been found 
to differ according to area of residential location (Layton & Moeltner 2004). Households 
in low density areas have been found to be affected more than any other residential 
areas (Fiil-Flynn 2002). The household costs have also been found to differ with the time 
of the day, with the cost of a power supply loss being highest in the evening (de Nooij et 
al. 2006).  
 
Despite the importance of this area of study (Energy Information Administration 2001), 
there exist only a few studies on outage cost to residential customers in published 
literature for developing countries.  
 
For the sake of consistency a similar method was applied to estimate the cost of outages 
to households as was applied in the other sectors. A survey was used to elicit costs to 
households associated with power outages. The survey included both household 
characteristics and outage features. The captive generation method was also used to 
estimate cost of outages; given that households may also use backup equipment or invest 
in alternative power sources to cope with outages.  
 
9.1ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
 
9.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire used in the household electricity outage cost survey was designed in 
consultation with focus groups consisting of ZESA, household representative 
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organisations such as Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ), Harare Residence Association 
(HRA) and households. It was deemed important to understand the perceptions of the 
households regarding electricity outage, how they experienced the outages, the 
frequency of the outages, the time of the outages, the length of outages, losses they incur 
as a result of outages, alternative sources available and whether captive generation is 
common to households. The questionnaire was drawn up with these aspects in mind.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first part contained questions about the 
households’ housing considerations , vis-a-vis, form of household apartment, household 
locations; to what extent they rely on electricity and their general views on power 
outages for 2009. The second part included questions about the direct cost estimation of 
power outages. This part extracted the reported outage costs; level of household 
activities affected, material damage or destruction, household appliances damage, 
maintenance cost, other direct cost incurred and deterred investment in acquiring 
household appliances. The third part elicited the indirect (captive generation cost) for the 
household: the cost of acquiring the backup equipment and the accessories ; running cost 
of the backup equipment; and maintenance cost of such equipment. Backup equipme nt 
such as generators, paraffin/jelly stoves, gas stoves, solar panels and UPS were 
considered. Before the questionnaire was finalised, it was tested on a smaller group of 10 
respondents. After finalisation 500 questionnaires were personally administered to 
households. 
 
The household survey was administered by the researcher and research assistants, 
trained in administering the questionnaires. Face to face surveys were used to collect 
data in order to reduce mis-information biases. The potential for embedding and ordering 
effects were taken into consideration when conducting the survey. The respondents were 
informed of the purpose of the research in advance by telephone or email and before 
they were given the questionnaires to fill out. 
 
9.1.2 Population 
 
The survey includes all household electricity consumers which are connected to the utility 
grid. The total population for households is as provided in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1: ZESA Household Tariff Classification 
 
Electricity Supply Capacity Tariff Class Number of Customers 
Half-metered Domestic (HMD) 278073 
 Load Limited Domestic (LLD) 98013 
Total 376086 
Source: ZESA (ZEDTCO) (2009)  
 
9.1.3 Sample Size and Sampling Selection 
 
9.1.3.1 Sample Size 
 
The sample size was obtained by applying the Yamane (1967) approach to sample size 
determination. The sample size estimates for the selected households’ electricity 
consumers are shown in Table 9.2.  
 
Table 9.2: Sample sizes based on electricity tariff classification 
 
Tariff Class 
Number of 
Customers 
Sample size 
Sample size as %  of  
population 
Half-metered Domestic (HMD) 278073 368 0.13% 
 Load Limited Domestic (LLD) 98013 132 0.14% 
TOTAL 376086 500 0.13% 
 
9.1.3.2 Sampling Design 
 
Stratified random sampling strategy was applied for collecting primary data from 
households. Firstly, households were stratified into two distinct ZESA classes: Half-
metered Domestic (HMD) and Load Limited Domestic (LLD). From the pre-test of 
households’ questionnaire, it was found that household locations are divided into low 
density, medium density, high density, CBD and peri-urban areas.  Secondly, households 
were selected randomly from each location. 
 
9.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
 
The data collection exercise was spread over 6 months. The survey was administered by 
the researcher and trained research assistants. Questionnaires were personally 
administered to collect the data from individual household respondents. Households 
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were informed of the purpose of the research before they were given questionnaires. The 
data from questionnaires was collated using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and analysed 
using SPSS and Eviews (6).  
 
9.2 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
9.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
A total of 283 out of 500 questionnaires (56.6%) were successfully collected and analysed 
for the direct cost and 103 out of 500 questionnaires (20.6%) were analysed for the 
backup cost. The distribution of households sampled by electricity supply capacity, area 
of residence, form of occupation and city of location is shown in Table 9.3. For the 
purposes of this survey, households connected to a voltage supply of below 60Amps were 
regarded as Half-metered Domestic (HMD) and those above as load limited domestic 
(LLD). 
Table 9.3: Respondents distribution by power capacity, occupation, area and city 
 
Item of Analysis Consideration Direct Method (C1) Indirect Method (C2) 
Frequency  Percent Frequency  Percent 
Power Supply Capacity HMD 111 39.2 28 27.2 
 LLD 172 60.8 75 72.8 
      
Form of Occupation Self Owned 156 55.1 65 63.1 
 Leased 109 38.5 17 16.5 
 Company owned 18 6.4 21 20.4 
      
Residential Area High Density Areas 110 38.9 14 13.5 
 Medium Density 
Areas 
70 24.7 26 25.2 
 Low Density Areas 85 30.0 53 51.5 
 CBD 9 3.2 3 2.9 
 Peri-Urban Areas 9 3.2 7 6.9 
      
Location Harare 129 45.6 44 42.7 
 Bulawayo 26 9.2 12 11.7 
 Gweru 19 6.7 9 8.7 
 Mutare 11 3.9 8 7.8 
 Masvingo 5 1.8 3 2.9 
 Kwekwe 9 3.2 5 4.9 
 Kadoma 6 2.1 2 1.9 
 Chegutu 10 3.5 4 3.9 
 Chinhoyi 14 4.9 6 4.8 
 Victoria Falls 15 5.3 5 4.9 
 Kariba 3 1.1 0 0 
 Other Towns/GPA 36 12.7 5 4.9 
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Table 9.3 shows household respondents for the two costs (direct cost and indirect cost). 
The table also shows that most households are in Harare and own the h ouses. The 
households selected were spread across all types of location. The highest number of 
households surveyed live in high density areas and the next highest live in low density 
areas, medium density and CBD and Peri-urban areas. 
 
Households were asked about the severity of outages experienced during 2009. The 
information shown in Table 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6 reflects the crisis of electricity supply. 
 
Table 9.4: Frequency of weekly outages experienced by households 
 
 Number of outages per week Frequency Percentage 
 0 1 0.4 
 1-2 35 12.4 
 3-4 75 26.5 
 5-6 113 39.9 
 7 59 20.8 
 
Of the surveyed households, about 40 percent reported that they experienced 5 to 6 
outages per week, 20.8 percent reported they experienced outages 7 or more times of 
outage incidences per week, 12.4 percent reported they experienced 1 to 2 outage 
incidences per week and 0.4 percent (1 household) reported zero outages per week. 
Almost all households were exposed to the power outage problem, although frequencies 
differed. These findings reflect almost the same average frequency of outages as reported 
by CCZ (2009), namely 5 outage incidences per week for households. 
 
Table 9.5: Average duration of outages in hours reported by households 
 
Average outage duration (hours) Frequency Percentage 
 0 hour 1 0.4 
 0-1 hour 5 1.8 
 2-3 hours 59 20.8 
 4-5 hours 89 31.5 
 6-7 hours 42 14.9 
 8-9 hours 35 12.4 
 10-11 hours 44 15.6 
 12
+ hours 8 2.8 
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Table 9.5 shows that 31.5 percent of surveyed households experienced outages averaging 
4 to 5 hours in length per outage, 20.8 percent reported they experienced outages 
averaging 2 to 3 hours per outage incident, 2.8 percent reported experiencing the longest 
duration of 12 hours or more and 0.4 percent (1 household) reported zero hour duration 
of outage. For households, no arrangements for uninterrupted power supply and advance 
warnings were reported by respondents.  
 
Table 9.6: Proportion of total household activities loss caused by power outages 
 
 Proportion of household activities lost Frequency Percentage 
0% loss 9 3.2 
Less than 10% 27 9.5 
Between 10-25% 30 10.6 
Between 26-50% 108 38.2 
Between 51-75% 77 27.2 
Between 76-99% 25 8.8 
100% loss  7 2.5 
 
 
Table 9.6 shows that 2.5 percent of the households surveyed, reported have lost their 
normal activities totally, 38.2 percent reported between 26 and 50 percent loss of normal 
activities, 27.2 percent reported between 51 and 75 percent loss of normal activities, 8.8 
percent reported between 76 and 99 percent loss of normal activities and 3.2 percent 
reported zero loss (no change).  
 
Households were also asked to state the activities affected by power outages. Table 9.7 
shows the results. 
 
 
Table 9.7: Household activities affected by power outages 
 
Household Activities Affected Frequency Percent 
Food preparation only 17 6 
Entertainment only 14 4.9 
Studying only 12 4.2 
Food preparation and entertainment 28 9.9 
Food preparation, entertainment and studying 77 27.2 
Food preparation, entertainment and ironing 80 28.3 
Food preparation, entertainment, ironing, studying 55 19.4 
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The majority (84.9%) of the households surveyed reported that power outages affected 
their food preparation, entertainment, ironing and studying. Only a small proportion 
(15.1% of the total) identified a single activity being affected.  
9.2.1.1 Ranking of service problems by households in Zimbabwe 
 
 
The households surveyed were also asked to rank the severity of service problems on a 
scale of 1 to 3:  major obstacle; moderate obstacle; and no obstacle respectively. 
 
 
Table 9.8: Ranking of severity of service problem by households (percentage) 
 
Service Major Obstacle Moderate Obstacle No Obstacle 
Electricity 72.1 23.4 4.6 
Water 63.6 22.3 14.1 
Transport 46.6 39.9 13.4 
Telecommunication 15.9 59.4 24.7 
Market 54.8 43.1 2.1 
 
Table 9.8 shows that 72.1 percent of households surveyed regarded power outages as the 
major obstacle of their operations and only 4.6 percent regarded them as no obstacle. 
This result confirms expectations of the study that the interruptions in electricity supply 
are a major obstacle to household activities (Fiil-Flynn 2002; Carlsson & Martinsson 2004). 
Water service suspension was also considered a major obstacle by 63.6 percent of 
households surveyed. This response was also expected as water service cuts have also 
escalated in Zimbabwe’s  cities.  
 
9.2.1.2 Overview of general questions section for households  
 
An overview of the descriptive statistics elicited in the household survey’s general 
questions section is presented in Table 9.9.  
 
Table 9.9: Summary of descriptive statistics of households 
 
Items  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Number of weekly outages  0 20 5 2.07 
Average duration of outages in hours 0 20 6 3.50 
Total number of outages (year) 0 1040 240 107.83 
Total outage hours (year) 0 6320 2186 1265.77 
Monthly household income (US$) 100 5000 505.37 485.70 
Average monthly electricity expenditure (US$) 10.00 150.00 39.68 21.94 
kWhs consumed from the grid (year) 157.14 12857.14 1401.31 1880.76 
Hours of electricity available from the grid 440 8708 7173 1265 
Total kWhs lost 5.12 26727.27 1549.68 3650.76 
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The table shows that the total outage hours per year range from a minimum of zero to a 
maximum of 6 320 hours, with a mean of 2 186 hours. Using 24 hours for a day for the 
households, this translates to a maximum of 263 days and an average of 91 days without 
electricity per year. The findings of BEEPS (2008) and Limi (2008:12) reported an 
estimated average of 78 days without electricity in Zimbabwe.  
 
Electricity consumption in the survey drawn from the national utility grid varies from as 
little as 157.14 kWh per year (0.43kWh per day) for one household to as much as             
12 857.14kWh per year (35.22kWh per day) for another household. A further analysis of 
high consuming households revealed that some of the households have backyard 
industries such as welding, greenhouses and poultry, and some households sublet parts 
of their houses to three to four families. 
 
Table 9.9 also shows that monthly payments to ZESA for the electricity supply in 2008 
ranged from US$10 to US$150. Monthly household incomes ranged from US$100 to US$5  
000.  The high standard deviation for most of the variables is an indication of the variation 
across the households. All households surveyed reported that they incurred a higher cost 
of outages during winter.  
 
9.2.2 Direct Cost Estimation For Households 
 
The direct cost of outages for households was computed based on material destruction 
cost (spoilage of food stuffs in freezers and during preparation), damage and 
maintenance cost (cost of damage to household appliances, lights burnout, and cost of 
replacement or maintaining damaged appliances) and additional costs (emergency cost, 
cost of acquiring prepared food and cost of immediate alternatives; firewood, candles).  
9.2.2.1 Direct cost by type of cost for households 
 
Table 9.10 provides a decomposition of cost by type using the mean values from the 
surveyed households. The mean outage cost totalled US$86.21 in 2009 for surveyed 
households. 
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Table 9.10: Average direct outage cost for households by type for the year 
 
 
Using the total average of the direct cost components, the total outage cost of the 
surveyed households was calculated to be US$24397 and the total cost for the sector 
US$32422374.  
9.2.2.2 Direct cost per residential area 
 
Table 9.11 provides a decomposition of cost by area of residence for households. The 
table shows material destruction cost, damage and maintenance cost, other additional 
costs and total direct cost. 
 
Table 9.11: Decomposition of Direct cost in US$ by residential area for households 
 
Residential Area for 
households 
Total 
material 
cost (US$) 
Damage & 
maintenance 
cost (US$) 
Other 
additional 
cost (US$) 
Total direct 
cost (US$) 
High Density Sub-urban 2343 1239 1377 4959 
Medium density 2949 1289 1290 5528 
low Density 4265 2060 2094 8419 
CBD 940 753 884 2577 
Peri-Urban areas 1 150 935 830 2 915 
Total 11 647 6 276 6 475 24398 
 
 
Households in low density areas reported the highest of all components of direct cost and 
households in CBD areas reported the lowest; a result consistent with that of Fiil-Flynn 
(2002). The total direct cost for the 283 surveyed households was US$24 398 for 2009. 
 
9.2.2.3 Distribution of direct cost per kWh lost for the households  
 
Total direct cost was obtained by summing direct cost components. Direct cost per kWh 
lost was obtained by dividing total direct cost by the total annual kWhs of unsupplied 
electricity from the power utility grid. Table 9.12shows the results. The LLD households 
reported a higher direct cost per unsupplied kWh than the HMD households. 
 
 Cost Type Amount (US$) As % of Total 
Material destruction cost 34.93 40.52 
Damage and maintenance cost (appliances) 23.29 27.02 
Additional cost (emergency, take-away foods, e.t.c) 27.99 32.46 
Total 86.21 100 
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Table 9.12: Distribution per kWh direct cost by power capacity, occupation, area and city 
Factor                    Consideration 
Household Loss cost per 
kWh (US$) 
Power Supply Capacity HMD 0.21 
 LLD 0.37 
   
Form of Occupation Self Owned 0.21 
 Leased 0.32 
 Company owned 0.12 
   
Residential Area High Density Areas 0.20 
 Medium Density Areas 0.18 
 Low Density Areas 0.27 
 CBD 0.23 
 Peri-Urban Areas 0.08 
   
Location Harare 0.34 
 Bulawayo 0.22 
 Gweru 0.18 
 Mutare 0.21 
 Masvingo 0.24 
 Kwekwe 0.12 
 Kadoma 0.20 
 Chegutu 0.23 
 Chinhoyi 0.25 
 Victoria Falls 0.32 
 Kariba 0.06 
 Other Towns/GPA 0.16 
 
Of the occupations, leasing households reported the highest direct cost per kWh and 
households in company houses reported the lowest direct cost. Households in Harare 
reported the highest direct cost per kWh, followed by households in Victoria Falls, while 
households in Kariba reported the lowest direct cost. Among the residential areas, 
households in low density areas reported the highest direct cost per kWh followed by 
households in the CBD and peri-urban areas. 
 
Using the average kWh cost of US$0.23 for areas of residence, the total direct cost 
incurred by surveyed households due to unsupplied kWhs was US$24 437 in 2009 with an 
average cost of US$86.35 per household. For all households connected to the grid, this 
sums to US$32 475 026. Averaging the two figures obtained by using the two approaches 
to direct cost estimation, the average total direct cost for the household sector was 
US$32 448 700. 
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9.2.2.4 Characterising direct cost for households  
 
The survey also investigated the characteristics of the direct costs to determine whether 
their costs varied across areas of residence, electricity supply capacity, form of house 
occupation and city of location (see Table 9.13). 
Table 9.13: Direct cost decomposition by power capacity, occupation, area and city 
Factor                               Consideration Mean Minimum Maximum Std  
deviation 
N 
Power Supply Capacity HMD 48 0 360 68 111 
 LLD 112 80 540 91 172 
       
Form of Occupation Self owned 81 40 360 74 156 
 Leased 105 80 540 97 109 
 Company owned 59 10 288 86 18 
       
Residential Area High density  79 10 540 94 110 
 Medium density  85 15 520 64 70 
 Low density  140 80 1200 87 85 
 CBD 87 0 880 103 9 
 Peri-Urban areas 60 20 370 142 9 
       
Location Harare 126 0 1200 193 129 
 Bulawayo 98 18 540 90 26 
 Gweru 84 0 574 120 19 
 Mutare 72 20 300 84 11 
 Masvingo 69 15 660 124 5 
 Kwekwe 76 30 360 68 9 
 Kadoma 87 20 300 140 6 
 Chegutu 69 10 280 92 10 
 Chinhoyi 82 20 780 145 14 
 Victoria Falls 101 30 520 202 15 
 Kariba 28 5 120 40 3 
 Other Towns/GPA 56 10 250 87 36 
 
Among residential areas, households in low density areas reported the highest direct 
cost, followed by households in the CBD and medium density areas and peri-urban areas. 
Table 9.13 shows that direct cost also varies with electricity supply capacity.  
 
9.2.2.5 Health and safety Impacts of electricity outages on households 
 
When asked a series of questions about what safety concerns happen when there are 
outages in their homes, respondents provided a litany of concerns, from negative effects 
on hygiene to increased domestic violence in the neighbourhood (see Table 9.14). 
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Table 9.14: Other effects of electricity outages on households 
 
What safety concerns happen when electricity is out 
to your household? 
Percentage of respondents 
who said “YES” to the 
statement 
Personal hygiene is negatively affected 78 
It increases crime rate 75 
It is degrading to my family to live without electricity 68 
Women have more work 80 
It increases domestic violence in the neighbourhood 45 
 
The table shows that the gendered nature of electricity disruption is important given the 
disproportionate increase in domestic workload that falls on women in Zimbabwe with, 
80 percent reporting that electricity outages mean that “women have more work to do”. 
Women also bear the brunt of the rise in domestic violence identified by almost half 
(45%) of the respondents. About 75 percent associated outages with higher crime rates 
and 78 percent with reduced personal hygiene.  
 
When asked about health related problems, nearly half (49%) of surveyed households 
indicated that they experienced health problems related to the use of alternative sources 
of energy like coal, gas and paraffin (see Table 9.15). These results are consistent with the 
findings of other studies (Fiil-Flyne 2002; Terreblance et al. 1992; Morris 1999). 
 
Table 9.15: Health effects of electricity outages on households 
 
What health issues are associated with power 
outages? 
Percentage of respondents who 
identified the following cases (%) 
Breathing/coughing 18 
Eye problems 5 
Children drinking paraffin 8 
Children being burnt 9 
TB 3 
Other Health problems 6 
Total 49 
 
The most common health problems due to outage reported by respondents are 
respiratory problems, such as breathing and coughing (Ministry of Health and Child 
Welfare 2007). The survey also elicited reports of children being poisoned from drinking 
paraffin, children being burnt and household fires due to gas, candle or paraffin use. 
Some respondents reported that the exposure to fuel combustion creates chronic 
irritation, such as permanent or returning eye infections (Terreblanche et al. 1993:84).  
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9.2.3 Indirect (Backup) Cost Estimation for Households 
 
 
The other costs of outages are those to mitigate the effects of the outages – in the form 
of backup expenditure. The cost in this section was calculated using the cost of acquiring 
and running backup arrangements in households. 
 
9.2.3.1 Availability, type of backup equipment and use of backup by households 
 
The surveyed households were asked about the type of backup equipment used during 
power outages (Table 9.16). 
Table 9.16: Backup equipment/items used by households during outages 
Type of Backup equipment or items used Frequency Percent 
 Gas stove only 29 10.2 
 Generator only 75 26.5 
 Paraffin/jelly stove only 85 30.0 
 Solar panel only 5 1.8 
 Battery only 5 1.8 
 Gas stove and battery 1 0.4 
 Gas stove and generator 3 1.1 
 Battery and paraffin/jelly stove 5 1.8 
 Generator and paraffin/jelly stove 13 4.6 
 Gas stove, solar panel and battery 7 2.5 
 Generator, paraffin stove and battery 2 0.7 
 Gas stove, generator, paraffin/jelly and battery 9 3.2 
 Gas stove, generator, solar panel and battery 2 0.7 
 Gas stove, generator and paraffin stove 2 0.7 
 Gas stove and paraffin/jelly 4 1.4 
 Solar panel and battery 1 0.4 
 Fireplace (firewood and coal) only 33 11.7 
 Total 283 100.0 
 
The types of backup equipment varied across households. Among the households 30 
percent had paraffin or jelly stoves only, for use in place of electric stoves in case of 
power supply interruptions, 29.3 percent had constructed fireplaces for use of firewood 
and coal, 9.5 percent had gas stoves only and only 10.2 percent of the households had 
generators. Of the surveyed households, 21 percent reported having two or more backup 
units in their homes. 
 
About 1.4 percent reported all power related activities (100%) were supported by backup 
equipment, while 42.8 percent reported between 1 to 10 percent of their power related 
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activities were supported by backup equipment (see Table 9.17). Some households 
revealed that they use backup for preparation of food and lighting while others used 
backup for maintenance of alarm systems and the operation of electric gates. 
 
Table 9.17: Proportion of household activities powered/substituted by backup source 
 
Proportion of activities power by backup  Frequency Percent 
1-10% 124 42.8 
11-20% 56 19.8 
21-50% 57 20.1 
51-75% 34 12.0 
76-99% 8 2.8 
100% 4 1.4 
 
 
The power outage problem was also shown by the number of hours of backup use and 
frequency of use per week as reported by households (see Tables 9.18 and 9.19). 
 
Table 9.18: Average hours of backup use by households per outage  
 
Average backup time  use per outage (hours) Frequency Percent 
0 10 3.5 
1-2 41 14.5 
3-5 216 76.3 
6-8 15 5.3 
9-11 1 0.4 
 
Of the households surveyed, 76.3 percent reported that they used backup equipment 
between 3 and 5 hours during an outage, 14.5 percent reported use between 1 and 2 
hours, 0.4 percent (1 household) reported the maximum average hours of backup 
equipment use between 9 and 11 hours per outage and only 3.5 percent reported no 
outage being experienced.  
 
Table 9.19: Frequency of backup equipment usage per week by households 
 
Times of backup use per week  Frequency(outcome) Percentage 
 0 10 3.5 
 1-2 78 27.6 
 3-4 93 32.8 
 5-6 78 27.6 
 7 24 8.5 
 
Table 9.19 shows the frequency of backup equipment usage by households per week. Of 
the households surveyed 32.8 percent reported between 3 and 4 times of backup usage 
per week, 8.5 percent reported 7 times per week, 27.6 percent reported between 1 and 2 
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times and 5.6 times respectively, while 3.5 percent of households reported zero times.  
About 70 percent of households reported three or more times of backup usage per week 
reflecting serious power outage problems in 2009. 
9.2.3.2 Investment in backup equipment by households 
 
Investment in backup equipment by households was incurred as an insurance against the 
unreliable power supply from ZESA. This insurance has imposed huge costs on 
households.  
 
Table 9.20: Descriptive Information for backup equipment owned by households 
 
Item Backup equipment Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Cost (US$) Generator  150 2500 420 429 
 Gas stove  20 90 60 55 
 Paraffin/jelly stove 10 60 28 15 
 Solar panel 120 900 520 145 
 Battery 30 100 50 25 
      
Capacity Generator(s) (kVA) 1 15 8 5 
 Solar panel 3 24 9 12 
 Battery (Volts) 3 100 54 48 
      
Years in Use Generator ½ 5 3 1.2 
 Gas stove  1 6 4 2 
 Paraffin/jelly stove ½ 15 5 5 
 Solar panel 1 4 2 1.6 
 Battery ½ 6 3 2.3 
 
Table 9.20 shows the value of backup equipment owned by households. The value of 
generator costs reported ranged from US$150 to US$2 500 with a mean of US$420. Solar 
panels cost ranged from US$120 to US$900 with a mean cost value of US$520 and 
paraffin/jelly stoves ranged from US$10 to US$50, with a mean cost value of US$28.  
 
Table 9.20 also shows that generator capacity ranged from 1kVa to 15kVa, with an 
average capacity of 8kVa. The age of the generators varied from half to 5 years, with a 
mean of 3 years and that of paraffin stove ranged from half to 15 years. All households 
reported having bought their generators from local suppliers. As many as 36.4 percent 
(103 out of 283) of households surveyed owned generators. 
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9.2.3.3 Cost structure of backup equipment of households 
 
Table 9.21: Mean cost of owning and running backup equipment by items for households 
 
 Item Mean As a % of total cost 
Capital Cost Items   
Backup equipment cost 420 95.0 
Installation cost (Transport, house, oil tank) 22 5.0 
Total Capital Cost 442 100 
Operating Cost Items (per year)   
Maintenance cost  90 23.7 
Fuel, oil and grease cost 290 76.3 
Total Running Cost 380 100.00 
 
Table 9.21 shows that the mean capital value of generators owned by households in 2009 
was US$442 and the mean running cost was US$380. Of the running cost, fuel, oil and 
grease was the major component (76.3%).  
 
The breakdown of average cost (capital and operating cost) by residential areas for 
households is shown in Table 9.22. 
 
Table 9.22: Capital and running cost by residential area (US$) 
 
Residential 
location Area 
Average Capital 
Cost (US$) 
Average Fuel, 
oil, grease 
cost (US$) 
Average 
Maintenance 
cost (US$) 
Average Total 
Running cost 
(US$) 
High Density  296 240 77 317 
Medium Density  432 290 100 390 
Low Density  637 360 130 490 
CBD 246 207 47 254 
Peri-Urban Areas 421 240 125 365 
 
Households in low density areas reported the highest cost of investing in backup 
equipment (generators) and households in CBD reported the lowest. There were also 
fewer outages for those in CBD areas. Those in low density areas have higher average 
incomes which make it possible for them to invest in backup generators as an insurance 
against outages (Terreblanche et al. 1992). 
 
9.2.3.4 Measuring indirect cost of power outages for households 
 
The generator cost was annualised by dividing the generator cost by the number of years 
in use of the generator, taking off depreciation for each year using the prevailing reducing 
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balance method at 10% per annum and then discounting the values using the prevailing 
interest rate, i.e. 10%. The generator annualised kVa cost was converted to kW cost using 
the power factor (0.8kVa = kW). Other capital costs, installation costs, were also 
converted in the same way. The sum of annualised generator cost and capital cost gave 
the total annualised capital cost per kW of electricity. The running costs were mainly for 
fuel, oil and grease and maintenance cost. These costs were also transformed into cost 
per kWh. The sum of the annualised capital cost per kWh and running cost per kWh gave 
the total backup cost per kWh generated. Since the cost per kWh generated by 
generators is the cost of insuring the household against power outage, this cost is the 
indirect (backup) cost per kWh unsupplied. The cost per kWh in terms of power supply 
capacity, form of house occupation, residential area and city of location for the 
households are shown in Table 9.23. 
 
Table 9.23: Backup cost per kWh by power capacity, occupation, residence and city 
 
Factor                                                    Consideration 
Household Loss cost per 
kWh (US$) 
Power Supply Capacity HMD 0.50 
 LLD 0.31 
   
Form of House Occupation Self Owned 0.30 
 Leased 0.52 
 Company owned 0.35 
   
Residential Area High Density Areas 0.33 
 Medium Density Areas 0.34 
 Low Density Areas 0.44 
 CBD 0.14 
 Peri-Urban Areas 0.27 
   
Location (city) Harare 0.54 
 Bulawayo 0.21 
 Gweru 0.31 
 Mutare 0.30 
 Masvingo 0.22 
 Kwekwe 0.15 
 Kadoma 0.24 
 Chegutu 0.32 
 Chinhoyi 0.37 
 Victoria Falls 0.24 
 Other Towns/GPA 0.34 
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Among the surveyed households, HMD power supply capacity connected households 
reported a higher cost per kWh lost than LLD households. Of the household occupation, 
households leasing houses reported the highest cost and households in self-owning 
houses reported the lowest cost per kWh unsupplied. 
 
Table 9.23 also shows that households located in low density areas reported the highest 
backup cost per kWh lost while those in the CBD areas the lowest. Among the city 
locations, households in Harare reported the highest backup cost per kWh lost to outages 
and households in Kwekwe reported the lowest. The mean kWh cost of private 
generation for households using residential area was US$0.30. The surveyed households 
total annual indirect (backup) cost was US$34 655 and their mean backup cost was 
US$336 per household. This translates to an annual total backup cost of US$34489610 for 
the household sector. 
 
9.2.3.5 Adjusting the indirect (Backup) cost for households 
 
Just like other sectors, backup cost was adjusted by netting off the per kWh cost recovery 
tariff a public utility company would need to charge US$0.12 (ZESA 2009) and the mean 
kWh cost of private generation was calculated to be US$0.18. The total net backup cost 
was calculated to be US$20 793 for the surveyed households and the total backup cost 
for the sector, US$20 693 766. 
 
 
9.2.4 Computation of Total Outage Cost for the Household Sector 
 
 
The total cost was obtained by summing the direct and indirect costs. In this case, the 
total cost was calculated to be US$53 142 466 (US$32 448 700 + US$20 693 766). 
 
9.2.5 Household Outage Cost Impact Assessment 
 
The impact of the outage cost for the sector was assessed by comparing it to the GDP of 
about US$5.4 billion for 2009 (RBZ 2010). The cost of outages for the sector as a 
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proportion of GDP using the direct cost, was 0.61 percent and indirect cost, 0.38 percent; 
0.98 percent in total. These proportions are all below 1.5 percent of GDP reported by 
USAID (1988) for Pakistan and 1 percent of GDP reported by Kessides (1993) for India.    
 
9.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Outage costs vary considerably between residential locations  and over power supply 
capacity. Households were unable to quantify their direct losses due to outages. The 
research could not quantify the value over different times of the day or weekend, but 
households reported that they incur higher costs if there are outages during winter 
season. The costs of an interruption are far higher than the value of the electricity not 
delivered. The average cost per kWh not supplied to households is US$0.07 and the 
average value computed in the survey for both costs range from US$0.18 to US$0.50, 
which is much higher.  
 
There are some qualifications that should be made to the above findings. Some effects 
could not be included in this household survey, for example, the stress in households. The 
degree to which households are able to substitute activities that do not use electricity for 
activities that use electricity was difficult to ascertain.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
A CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT – FOLLOWING AN 
INDIRECT APPROACH 
 
 
10 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter assesses the credibility of estimation of outage costs applied. For credibility 
assessments two major criteria are rerelevant, namely reliability and validity (Hanley & 
Spash 1993). With any estimation, it is important that the results be checked for 
credibility. However, assessing the credibility of the estimates of the two costs of outage 
could not be done directly, only indirectly by assessing the plausibility of the response 
elicited. This plausibility was assessed by estimating predictive functions for the outage 
costs incurred in the various sectors and analysing the validity of the models.  
 
10.1 APPLICATION OF CREDIBILITY ANALYSIS 
 
10.1.1 Reliability Assessment 
 
The aim of a reliability (repeatability) test is to show that the survey can be relied upon to 
provide the same results if the survey was administered repeatedly under similar 
conditions.  
 
 
The repeatability test is a check employed to test whether the survey, if replicated under 
the same conditions, would yield the same results. Charles (1995) adheres to the notion 
that consistency with which questionnaire (test) items are answered or individual’s scores 
remain relatively the same, can be determined through the test-retest method at two 
different times. This attribute is actually referred to as stability (Golafshani 2003:599). A 
high degree of stability indicates a high degree of reliability which means the results are 
repeatable (ibid). Where the test has been employed, such as in the work of Mitchell & 
Carson (1989), on benefits of improved fresh water and in Heberlien (1986) cited in 
Hanley and Spash (1993), the repeatability test yielded stable and consistent results. 
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However, Crocker and Algina (1986:106) and Joppe (2000) report a problem with the test-
retest method of an instrument, in that the first administration sensitises the sample 
population to the subject matter and influences the responses given in subsequent re-test 
administration. Most often due to lack of resources and time, the repeatability test is not 
performed. No test for reliability (or repeatability) was administered. 
 
10.1.2 Validity Assessment 
 
 
Validity refers to the ability of an instrument to measure what it is supposed to measure 
(Zikmund 2003). Validity determines whether the research truly measures that which it 
was intended to measure, or how truthful the research results are (Joppe 2000:1).  
 
There are three facets of validity that can be looked into to assess the credibi lity of direct 
cost estimated, namely, construct, theoretical and convergent validity.  
 
 Construct validity is a test that checks if the design of the survey was according to 
the generally accepted procedure. To assess it, checks are made concerning the 
questionnaire design and the sample design. 
 
 Theoretical validity checks if the results generated are in line with economic 
theory (Hassan 2006). The yielded results are checked against objective criteria 
such as expected signs of parameters. For instance, total outage hours and total 
outage cost should have a positive relationship. The other criterion is the 
explanatory power of the model fitted to the direct assessment data depicted in 
the adjusted R-squared. Hanley and Spash (1993), recommend such value to be 15 
percent at the minimum.  
 
 Convergent validity is a test that checks whether the results of a survey share 
some sort of commonality with results where different valuation methods are 
employed. For lack of monetary resources and time this test is often not 
performed. 
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The researcher engaged the regression analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
application to establish how believable respondents responses were on which the outage 
costs were estimated in Chapters 6 to 9. 
10.1.2.1 Direct Cost Assessment and Variables 
 
The validity of the direct cost for the sector was assessed by estimating a functional 
relationship between direct outage cost (welfare loss) and outage characteristics (see 
Chapter 4). The sector direct outage cost predictive function is: 
 
        
 
                                                                                     
where: i is the customer or consumer (i = 1, 2, 3, ........, n) 
 j is the sector (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 TDCj is the total direct cost of outages for the sector 
    is a vector of characteristics of the power outage for example;  
 duration, 
 frequency 
 time of the day 
    is a vector of consumer specific observable features for example; 
 Electricity consumption in kWh,  
 Cost components (lost output, material destruction, labour cost, others)  
 Sales income,  
 Operation capacity,  
 Hours of electricity available from the grid, 
RDumi is a vector of the relevant dummies to be considered for example; 
 Availability of backup equipment (1 for backup availability, 0 otherwise) 
 Advance warning (1 for warning, 0 otherwise)  
 Geographical location   
 The zone 
 Electricity supply capacity tariff dummy (1 for HC, 0 otherwise) 
   is the constant 
    to     are coefficients of parameters 
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The relevant dependent and independent variables making up the model, together with 
expected signs of their coefficients are described in Table 10.1. 
 
Table 10.1: Description of all variables used in multiple regressions (direct) 
 
Dependent Variable Description 
Expected 
Sign 
TDC Total direct cost incurred by sectors as a result of 
power outages 
 
Independent Variables   
TONUOUT Total number of outages + 
TOUTHR Total outage hours  + 
TWHRS Total working/operational hours (business hours)  + 
CAPACITY Capacity level of operation + 
REV Revenue income from the operations - 
ELEXP Electricity expenditure - 
DACT Decline in activity (Proportion affected) + 
NEMPL Number employed + 
OPSC Own Power supply capacity  - 
DUMARR Dummy for uninterrupted supply arrangement: 1 
for arrangement and 0 otherwise 
- 
DUMABE Dummy for backup equipment: 1 for presents 
and 0 otherwise 
- 
 
TDC is calculated by summing all direct cost incurred by sectors (mines, farms, firms and 
households) as a result of outages. These include; production loss, material loss, labour 
cost, restart and maintenance cost.  
 
TONUOUT is the total number of times (frequencies) of outages experienced by sectors 
for the year 2009 (number of outages per week x numbers of weeks). 
 
TOUTHR is the total number of hours without electricity experienced by sectors for the 
year 2009 (average weekly outage hours x number of weeks).  
 
TWHRS is the total number of working hours that employees are supposed to be working 
using electricity. These depend much on the number of shifts available for the productive 
sectors (Number of shifts x shift hours x number of working days per week x number of 
operational weeks for the year 2009). 
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CAPACITY is the level of capacity utilisation by the firm, farm or mine. This is usually 
provided as a proportion of current machinery use or output to total installed/potential 
capacity or expected output.  
 
REV is the revenue income generated from the operations of the business (farming, 
mining and manufacturing/servicing) or income earned by the household from services 
rendered. 
 
ELEXP is the amount of expenditure paid by the firm, farm, mine or household for the use 
of electricity for the year 2009 (average monthly expenditure x 12 months). 
 
DACT is the decline in activity level as a proportion of the normal daily activity by the 
consumer due to outages.  
 
NEMPL is total number of people employed in the farm, mine or firm for the year 2009. 
This number was obtained by summing all permanent and casual/contract employees. 
 
OPSC is the own power supply capacity by the firm, farm, mine or household. This was 
obtained by assessing the number of kWh supplied as a proportion of what is supplied 
from the grid if things are normal. 
 
DUMARR is the dummy variable for an arrangement of an uninterrupted power supply 
from the utility. Those farms, firms, mines or households with such an arrangement were 
assigned a value of 1 and those without 0. 
 
DUMABE is the dummy variable for availability of backup system on site for the mine, 
farm, firm or household. Those farms, firms, mines or households with such an 
arrangement were assigned a value of 1 and those without 0. 
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10.1.2.2 Indirect (Backup) Cost Assessment and Variables 
 
The validity of the indirect (backup) cost for the sector was assessed by estimating a 
functional relationship between backup cost and backup characteristics (see Chapter 5). 
The sector indirect (backup) outage cost predictive function is:  
 
       
 
 
                                                         
 
 
where:     is the total indirect (backup) cost for sector j, 
    is a vector of characteristics of the power outage for example;  
 Hours of backup use per outage duration, 
 Frequency/times of backup use 
     is a vector of backup equipment specific observable features for example;  
 Backup capacity (electricity generation capacity),  
 Years of use,  
 Proportion covered by backup equipment,  
 Annual units of electricity generated from the Backup equipment,  
     is a vector of capital costs of investing in backup equipment 
RCij is a vectorof the running cost for the backup equipment for example; 
 Fuel, grease and oil cost 
 Maintenance cost 
 Labour cost (wages) 
RDumij is a vector of the relevant dummies to be applied 
 Advance warning (1 for present, 0 otherwise) 
 Time of the day or season (1 for day time, 0 otherwise) 
   is the constant 
    to     are coefficients of parameters 
 
The relevant dependent and independent variables making up the model, together with 
expected signs of their coefficients are described in Table 10.2. 
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Table 10.2: Description of all variables used in multiple regressions (indirect cost) 
 
Dependent Variable Description 
Expected 
Sign 
TIC Total Indirect (backup) Cost  
Independent Variables   
TTBEUSE Total times (frequency) of backup use  + 
THBEUSE Total hours of backup use + 
BECAP Backup capacity (kVa) + 
TWHRS Total working/operational hours (business hours)  + 
APROPCO Proportion covered by backup + 
ATUEG Annual units of electricity generated by backup + 
YBEUSE Years of backup equipment use - 
AHBEUSE Average hours of backup use + 
KWHCONS kWhs consumed from the utility grid - 
ADWA Advance warning of power outages; 1 for presents 
and 0 otherwise. 
- 
 
TIC is the total indirect (backup) cost of using the backup equipment for power 
generation during outages. This is obtained by annualising and summing capital cost 
(backup equipment cost, installation cost) and running cost (fuel, oil, grease and 
maintenance). 
 
TTBEUSE is the total number of times (frequency) of backup use per annum by the farm, 
firm, mine or household for the year 2009 (average number of times of backup use per 
week x number of weeks). 
 
THBEUSE is the total number of hours of backup use during outages by the farm, firm, 
mine or household for the year 2009 (average hours of backup use during outages x 
average number of outages). 
 
BECAP is the backup capacity, the kVa that can be produced by the backup equipment 
(generator) during the times of use (during outages). 
 
APROPCO is the average proportion/capacity of the firm, farm, mine or household 
activities covered by backup generation. This was obtained by assessing the activities 
covered by backup supply as a proportion of what is covered by electricity supplied from 
the grid. 
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ATUEG is total number of units generated by the backup generator to power the 
operations of the firm, farm, mine or household during outage times. 
 
YBEUSE is the number of years or period that the backup system(s) have been in use by 
the firm, farm, mine or household.  
 
AHBEUSE is the average number of hours that the backup has been used to power 
operations/activities by the firm, farm, mine or household.  
 
KWHCONS is the kWhs consumed by the farm, mine, firm or household from the grid (the 
total electricity expenditure ÷ cost per unit (kWh)). 
 
10.1.3 Testing the Validity 
 
In predictive analysis, two models of validity test are normally generated. These are the 
complete and reduced models. A complete model contains all the independent variables 
thought to have an effect on the dependent variable (Hanley & Splash 1993). From the 
complete model all insignificant independent variables are eliminated to get the reduced 
models. Reduced models are preferred for predictive purposes because they only include 
relevant variables. 
 
10.1.3.1 Validity Test for Mining Sector Cost (Direct and Indirect Cost) 
 
Direct Cost 
 
Table 10.3 shows the complete OLS regression results on the determinants of direct 
outage cost. Although their coefficients are not statistically significant TONUOUT, 
CAPACITY and NEMPL, they show hypothesised signs. Similarly, the presence of backup 
equipment had a reduction effect on outage cost. The adjusted R-squared of the model, 
presents how well the model fits the data adjusted, for the number of parameters being 
estimated (Mendenhall & Sincich 1996:78). It is 60.9% for the complete OLS model.  
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Table 10.3: An OLS model fit to the complete direct cost for mines 
 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 74   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -28129.32 17084.30 -1.646501 0.1047 
TOUTHR 731.958 216.0318 3.388195 0.0018 
TONUOUT 1866.269 3978.332 0.469108 0.6406 
TWHRS 245.2542 132.7248 1.847840 0.0021 
CAPACITY 32552.52 19822.12 1.642232 0.1056 
REV -0.003381 0.006383 -0.529750 0.5982 
ELEXP -0.023898 0.142720 -0.167446 0.8676 
NEMPL 249.0599 803.8103 0.309849 0.7577 
OPSC -715.7432 266.2429 -2.688309 0.0092 
DUMARR -1555517 753603.2 -2.064106 0.0432 
DUMABE -187302.8 615847.6 -0.304138 0.7621 
     
     R-squared 0.694938     Mean dependent variable 2075092. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609306     S.D. dependent variable 2519494. 
S.E. of regression 1.574822     Akaike info criterion 31.57563 
Sum squared residual 141.1435     Schwarz criterion 32.10494 
Log likelihood -1171.298     Hannan-Quinn criterion 32.13685 
F-statistic 5.052168     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.89244 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000014    
     
      
Table 10.4: An OLS model fit to the reduced direct cost for mines 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 74   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -132884.9 130477.3 -1.018452 0.3120 
TOUTHR 569.9552 173.6918 3.281417 0.0019 
TWHRS 262.0969 110.2024 2.378322 0.0001 
OPSC -676.3632 231.6361 -2.919939 0.0047 
DUMARR -167.1510 61.32401 -2.725702 0.0081 
     
     R-squared 0.658675     Mean dependent variable 2075092. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.622474     S.D. dependent variable 2519494. 
S.E. of regression 1.548057     Akaike info criterion 31.44470 
Sum squared residual 158.1485     Schwarz criterion 31.69379 
Log likelihood -1155.454     Hannan-Quinn criterion 31.54407 
F-statistic 18.19487     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.929670 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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The backward stepwise regression procedure was then used to determine the variables to 
be returned in the reduced model. The significant variables identified in the complete 
model were included in a reduced OLS model. The results are shown in Table 10.4. 
 
The results of this model provide a higher level of significance for each variable except for 
the constant. The variables; TOUTHR, TWHRS, OPSC and DUMARR are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As with the complete model, the adjusted R-squared was used 
as a measure of the overall fit. It showed that 62.2% of the variation in outage cost could 
be explained by the OLS reduced model. The adjusted R-squared value is almost similar to 
that observed in the complete model, suggesting that no statistically significant variables 
were left out of the reduced model.  
 
It is however, unadvisable to make deductions about which model is preferred for 
determining determinants based on a perceived negligible change in the adjusted R-
squared value. Additional inferential tests, such as hypothesis testing, should be used for 
this purpose (Hanley & Spash 1993). The relevant hypothesis tests in this regard are: 
 
H0: The excluded variables in the reduced model do not improve the model  
H1: At least one of the excluded variables in the reduced model improves the model. 
 
The complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better 
fits the data using F-test. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
  
           
               
    
 
      
                 
         
 
 
                     
  
                  
 
Given that the test statistic is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in favour of the alternative. It was concluded that the reduced OLS was superior 
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to the complete OLS model for determining the determinants and predictive model of 
outage cost as the omitted variables did not significantly improve the model. Using the 
reduced model the predictive model was presented as follows: 
 
                                                      
                                                           (10.3) 
The reduced OLS model predicts that (see Equation 10.3): 
 The increase in total direct outage cost due to respondents’ 1 hour increase in 
total outage hours (TOUTHR) is 569.955, ceteris paribus. This large increase is due 
to high value of mining output lost; 
 The increase in total direct outage cost due to every additional total working hour 
(TWHRS) lost is 262.06, ceteris paribus. This significant change is due to the high 
value of output expected to be produced in the additional hour by the mine ; 
 The decline in total direct outage cost due to an additional kWh supplied by own 
power generation (OPSC) is 676.363; ceteris paribus; and 
 The decline in total direct outage cost due to availability of arrangement for 
uninterrupted electricity supply or advance warning (DUMARR) to mines is 
167.152, ceteris paribus. The availability of arrangement reduces outage cost to 
mines. 
 
From the above cost function, the total direct cost for the surveyed mines was US$17 913 
845 and for the sector US$238 205 723. The predicted costs are close to the sample 
estimates though below the cost obtained for the sector (see Chapter 6). 
 
The fact that: (a) the signs of the coefficients are consistent with prior expectations, (b) 
the variables in the preferred predictive model are important determinants of direct cost 
by definition and (c) the scales prediction of the model are broadly in line with 
expectations - lend credibility to direct cost estimates of power outages for the mines. 
 
Indirect Cost 
The results obtained from fitting the complete and reduced OLS models to the surveyed 
data from the indirect cost are shown in Tables 10.5 and 10.6 respectively. 
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Table 10.5: An OLS model fit to the complete indirect cost for mines  
 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 63   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -153785.4 60773.03 -2.530488 0.0143 
TTBEUSE 613.3203 218.4250 2.807921 0.0069 
THBEUSE 30.01720 20.28574 1.479719 0.0015 
APROPCO 803.9054 578.8289 1.388848 0.1706 
BECAP 490.4783 122.2112 4.013366 0.0002 
CAPACITY 591.7607 756.7399 0.781987 0.4376 
TWHRS -1.880198 5.113894 -0.367665 0.7146 
KWHCONS -0.000406 0.000376 -1.079275 0.2853 
ADWA -12482.34 6219.736 -2.006892 0.0003 
     
     R-squared 0.923291     Mean dependent variable 1505487. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.900918     S.D. dependent variable 4637870. 
S.E. of regression 1.459876     Akaike info criterion 31.42986 
Sum squared residual 102.14     Schwarz criterion 31.94013 
Log likelihood -975.0405     Hannan-Quinn criterion 31.63055 
F-statistic 41.26747     Durbin-Watson statistic 2.026219 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Variables, APROPOCO, CAPACITY, KWHCONS and TWHRS are statistically insignificant. At 
90% for the complete OLS, the adjusted R-squared shows that the model fits the data.  
 
Using the backward stepwise regression procedure, the reduced OLS model was 
estimated (see Table 10.6). The results of the reduced model provide a higher level of 
significance for TTBEUSE, THBEUSE, BECAP, and ADWA variables (p≤ 0.01). As with the 
complete model, the adjusted R-squared was used as a measure of the fit and 90.7% of 
the variation in outage cost is explained in the OLS reduced model.  
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Table 10.6: An OLS model fit to the reduced indirect cost for mines 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 63   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -117116.4 41042.60 -2.853532 0.0060 
TTBEUSE 650.9251 213.1816 3.053383 0.0034 
THBEUSE 29.99291 17.26427 1.737282 0.0021 
BECAP 578.6821 91.31673 6.337088 0.0000 
ADWA -10338.7 5565.032 -1.857797 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.922088     Mean dependent variable 1505487. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.907105     S.D. dependent variable 4637870. 
S.E. of regression 1.413562     Akaike info criterion 31.31844 
Sum squared residual 104.14     Schwarz criterion 31.69264 
Log likelihood -975.5308     Hannan-Quinn criterion 31.46561 
F-statistic 61.54202     Durbin-Watson statistic 2.010701 
Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The adjusted R-squared value is almost similar to that observed in the complete model, 
also reflecting that no statistically significant variables were left out of the reduced 
model. From statistical theory, it is however, unadvisable to make deductions about 
which model is preferred for determining determinants based on a perceived negligible 
change in the adjusted R-squared value. Hypothesis testing should be used for this 
purpose. The relevant hypothesis tests in this regard are: 
H0: The excluded variables in the reduced model do not improve the model  
H1: At least one of the excluded variables in the reduced model improves the model. 
 
The complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better 
fits the data using F-test. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
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Thus, for predictive purposes, the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model on account of the F-test statistic value of 0.1378 being smaller than the critical 
value of 1.63. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have 
been excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected. The 
fitted regression equation is as follows: 
 
                                                         
                                                                                                            
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.4): 
 The increase in total indirect (backup) cost due to every additional time of backup 
use (TTBEUSE) is 650.925, ceteris paribus; 
 The increase in total indirect (backup) cost due to 1 hour increase in total hours of 
backup use (THBEUSE) is 29.99291, ceteris paribus. This large increase is due to 
high cost of running the backup equipment for an additional hour; 
 The proportionate increase in total indirect (backup) cost due to the respondent 
increase 1kVA in backup equipment capacity (BECAP) is 578.6821, ceteris paribus. 
The larger the capacity, the greater the cost of generating an additional unit of 
electricity; 
 The decline in total indirect cost due to advance warning to mines by the utility 
(ADWA) is 10338.7, ceteris paribus; and 
 The negative value of the constant reflects that, if the mine does not have backup 
equipment, then indirect cost cannot be measured using this approach.  
 
From the regression equation above, the total indirect (backup) cost for the surveyed 
mines was US$10 235 010 and the sector cost US$157 363 278. These costs are close to 
the cost estimated from the sample. The same facts as in the direct cost that: (a) the signs 
of the coefficients are consistent with prior expectation, (b) the variables in the preferred 
predictive model are important determinants of indirect cost by definition and (c) the 
scale prediction of the model is broadly in line with expectations – lend credibility to 
indirect (backup) cost estimates of power outages for the mines. 
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10.1.3.2 Validity Test for Agriculture Sector Cost (Direct and Indirect Cost) 
 
Direct Cost 
The results obtained from fitting the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to the survey data from 
the agricultural sector to direct cost are shown in Tables 10.7 and 10.8 for the complete 
and reduced models respectively.  
Table 10.7: An OLS model fit to the complete direct cost for farms 
 
The coefficients of TWHRS, OPSCAP, TONUOUT and DUMABE are statistically insignificant. 
The adjusted R-squared of the model represents how well the model fits the data 
adjusted for the number of parameters being estimated (Mendenhall & Sincich 1996:78). 
It is 96.2% for the complete OLS model. The backward stepwise regression procedure was 
then used to determine the variables to be returned in the reduced model. Statistically 
significant variables were then used to estimate the reduced OLS model (see Table 10.8). 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 172   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -191418.3 188193.1 -1.017137 0.3107 
TOUTHR 255.2564 132.5816 1.925277 0.0187 
TONUOUT -51.2736 328.3510 -0.156170 0.8761 
TWHRS 16.86138 12.73378 1.324146 0.1873 
REV 0.147353 0.040610 3.628491 0.0000 
ELEXP -3.026075 0.242761 -12.46525 0.0000 
NEMPL 891.9399 198.7522 4.700551 0.0000 
DUMSEAS 97924.90 55843.38 1.753563 0.0148 
OPSCAP -13680.26 45275.30 -0.302157 0.7629 
DUMABE -11569.51 49227.61 -0.235021 0.8145 
DUMARR -10532.55 5929.175 -1.776393 0.0926 
     
     R-squared 0.964233     Mean dependent variable 326549.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962246     S.D. dependent variable 1456523.  
S.E. of regression 2.444459     Akaike info criterion 27.74498 
Sum squared residual 926.2100     Schwarz criterion 28.05607 
Log likelihood -2369.068     Hannan-Quinn criterion 27.87120 
F-statistic 369.7542     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.666383 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 10.8: An OLS model fit to the reduced direct cost for farms 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 172   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -167420.5 96937.48 -1.727098 0.0860 
TOUTHR 245.9764 126.8725 2.009705 0.0255 
ELEXP -2.959290 0.236779 -12.49817 0.0000 
NEMPL 871.1820 195.7552 4.450365 0.0000 
REV 0.147116 0.038720 3.799483 0.0000 
DUMSEAS 92008.95 53863.45 1.708188 0.0143 
DUMARR -10439.461 5466.254 -1.909801 0.0975 
     
     R-squared 0.963804     Mean dependent variable 326549.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962487     S.D. dependent variable 1456523.  
S.E. of regression 2.398444     Akaike info criterion 27.65876 
Sum squared residual 943.1200     Schwarz criterion 27.80516 
Log likelihood -2370.654     Hannan-Quinn criterion 27.71816 
F-statistic 877.4647     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.626828 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
The results of this model provide statistical significance of variables at different levels: 
ELEXP, NEMPL and REV at the 1% level; TOUTHR and DUMSEAS at the 5% level; and 
DUMARR and constant at the 10% level. The adjusted R-squared at 96% shows that the 
model best fits the data. It shows that 96% of the variation in outage cost could be 
explained by the OLS reduced model. The complete and reduced OLS models were 
compared to determine which one better fits the data. The F-statistic was calculated as 
follows: 
 
  
           
               
    
 
    
                 
         
 
 
                       
   
                
 
Thus, for the predictive purposes, the reduce OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model on account of the F-test statistic of 0.4043 being less than the critical value 1.96. 
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This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have been excluded 
from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected.  
 
Using the reduced model, the predictive model was shown as follows: 
 
                                                      
                                                    
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.5): 
 The increase in total direct cost due to respondents’ 1 hour increase in total 
outage hours (TOUTHR) is 245.98, ceteris paribus. This large increase is due to the 
fact that the higher the number of outages the higher the farm output lost; 
 The decrease in total direct cost due to US$1 increase in electricity expenditure by 
farmers (ELEXP) is 2.95929, ceteris paribus; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to 1 additional labourer employed (NEMPL) is 
871.182, ceteris paribus; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to US$1 revenue (REV) earned by the farmer 
is 0.147116, ceteris paribus; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to effect of seasonality captured by the 
dummy for the season (DUMSEAS) is 92 008.95, ceteris paribus. This is due to the 
fact that farmers are most affected in the winter season where they do their 
irrigation of winter wheat or tobacco processing and seed-bed;  
 The proportionate decline in total direct cost due to availability of arrangement 
for uninterrupted electricity supply or advance warning to mines is 10439.461, 
ceteris paribus. The availability of arrangement reduces outage cost to farms; and 
 The negative intercept value is 167 420.5 indicating that if all variables are zero, 
there will be no outage cost for the farmer.  
 
From the predictive model provided above, the total direct cost for surveyed farms was 
estimated at US$1 150 240 and for the sector was US$52 146 795. These costs lie in the 
same range as those from sample estimated, though slightly above (see Chapter 7).  For 
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the agricultural sector, the fact that: (a) the signs of the coefficients are consistent with 
prior expectation, (b) the variables in the preferred predictive model are important 
determinants of direct cost by definition and (c) the scale prediction of the model is 
broadly in line with expectations – this lends credibility to direct cost estimates of power 
outages for the farms. 
 
Indirect Cost 
The complete and reduced OLS models to the backup cost were also fitted to the 
surveyed data and the results obtained are shown in Tables 10.9and 10.10 respectively. 
 
Table 10.9: An OLS model fit to the complete indirect cost (farms) 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 130   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -26207.90 15217.73 -1.722195 0.0876 
TTBEUSE 42.07902 38.70942 1.087049 0.2792 
THBEUSE 18.50155 4.748949 3.895926 0.0002 
APROPCO 460.5266 129.7461 3.549444 0.0006 
BECAP 348.3125 25.92740 13.43415 0.0000 
TWHRS 1.179736 1.248478 0.944939 0.3466 
YBEUSE(G) -4087.577 1647.771 -2.480654 0.0145 
REV -0.000521 0.000317 -1.643533 0.1034 
DUMSEAS -12611.97 10262.55 -1.228932 0.2215 
DUMARR 4707.886 5433.687 0.866426 0.3880 
     
     R-squared 0.767052     Mean dependent variable 34100.82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.749581     S.D. dependent variable 52373.76 
S.E. of regression 2.069590     Akaike info criterion 23.19321 
Sum squared residual 441.1003     Schwarz criterion 23.41379 
Log likelihood -1288.872     Hannan-Quinn criterion 23.28284 
F-statistic 43.90403     Durbin-Watson statistic 2.000142 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Although coefficients of TTBEUSE, TWHRS, and DUMARRare statistically insig nificant. The 
adjusted R-squared of 74.95% for the complete OLS shows that the model fits the data. 
 
Using the backward stepwise regression procedure the reduced OLS model was estimated 
(Table 10.10). 
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Table 10.10: An OLS model fit to the indirect cost cost (farms) 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 130   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -17962.23 7028.738 -2.555541 0.0118 
THBEUSE 21.01512 3.133491 6.706615 0.0000 
APROPCO 463.8492 127.8512 3.628040 0.0004 
BECAP 341.4671 20.60596 16.57127 0.0000 
YBEUSE  -6258.718 1176.905 -5.317947 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.752687     Mean dependent variable 34100.82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.744773     S.D. dependent variable 52373.76 
S.E. of regression 2.094682     Akaike info criterion 23.78856 
Sum squared residual 474.1007     Schwarz criterion 23.93257 
Log likelihood -1501.948     Hannan-Quinn criterion 23.84700 
F-statistic 95.10834     Durbin-Watson statistic 2.046231 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The results of the reduced model provided a higher level of significance for THBEUSE, 
APROPCO, BECAP and YBEUSE variables (p≤ 0.01). As with the complete model, the 
adjusted R-squared was used as a measure of the fit; 74.47% of the variation in outage 
cost is explained in the OLS reduced model. The adjusted R-squared value is almost 
similar to that observed in the complete model, also reflecting that no significant 
variables were left out of the reduced model. 
 
The complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better 
fits the data using the F-test. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
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From the computed F-test statistic value of 1.5411 being smaller than the critical value of 
2.93, for predictive purposes the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have been 
excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected.  
 
From the reduced model the predictive model was developed as follows: 
                                                          
                                                 
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.6): 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to an additional hour of backup use 
(THBEUSE) is 21.01512; ceteris paribus;  
 The increase in total indirect cost due to every additional percentage of 
proportion covered by backup equipment (APROPCO) is 463.8492, ceteris paribus. 
This large change is due to the high cost incurred in producing additional units 
required to provide additional power by farmers; 
 The proportionate increase in total indirect (backup) cost due to the respondent 
increase 1kVA in backup equipment capacity (BECAP) is 341.461, ceteris paribus. 
The larger the capacity, the greater the cost of generating an additional unit of 
electricity; and 
 The intercept value is 17 962.23 (negative). 
 
Using the equation above, the total estimated cost for the surveyed farms was US$760  
420 and US$33 725 840 for the sector. These costs are in line with sample estimates (see 
Chapter 7). Just like in mining – the same facts as in the indirect cost that: (a) the signs of 
the coefficients are consistent with prior expectation, (b) the variables in the preferred 
predictive model are important determinants of indirect (backup) cost by definition and 
(c) the scale prediction of the model is broadly in line with expectations – this lends 
credibility to backup cost estimates of power outages for the farms. 
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10.1.3.3 Validity Test for the Industrial Sector Cost (Direct and Indirect Cost) 
 
Direct Cost 
 
Table 10.11 showed the complete OLS regression results of the predictive model and 
determinants of direct outage cost. The coeffients of variables TWHRS, CAPACITY and 
ELEXP are statistically insignificant. At 56.42% for the complete OLS model, the adjusted 
R-squared better fits the data.  
 
Table 10.11: An OLS model fit to the complete direct cost for Industry 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 260   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -298252.2 119866.6 -2.488201 0.0135 
TOUTHR 8340.455 949.3957 8.785014 0.0000 
TONUOUT 26.89706 5.321120 5.054772 0.0000 
TWHRS 4.541159 112.2226 0.040466 0.9678 
CAPACITY 57570.51 200157.3 0.287626 0.7739 
ELEXP -0.194157 0.171491 -1.132169 0.2586 
REV 0.014166 0.006965 2.034015 0.0430 
NEMPL 3341.117 757.2461 4.412194 0.0000 
DUMARR -2563.786 779.0978 -3.290711 0.0011 
DUMABE -18404.36 9258.189 1.987901 0.0479 
     
     R-squared 0.586117     Mean dependent variable 1459480. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.564245     S.D. dependent variable 5400312. 
S.E. of regression 3.564838     Akaike info criterion 33.06348 
Sum squared residuals 3131.574     Schwarz criterion 33.25521 
Log likelihood -4284.252     Hannan-Quinn criterion 33.14056 
F-statistic 26.79780     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.827910 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The backward stepwise regression procedure was also used to determine the variables to 
be returned in the reduced model. The significant variables identified in the complete 
model were included in a reduced OLS model. The results are shown in Table 10.12. 
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Table 10.12: An OLS model fit to the reduced direct cost for Industrial sector 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 260   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -287279.4 109881.5 -2.614447 0.0095 
TOUTHR 8335.408 937.2682 8.893301 0.0000 
TONUOUT 26.77268 5.294184 5.056998 0.0000 
REV 0.010411 0.005988 1.738474 0.0833 
NEMPL 3420. 970 743.5432 4.600903 0.0000 
DUMABE -18856.59 8907.788 -2.116865 0.0004 
DUMARR -2543.362 701.773 -3.624192 0.0352 
     
     R-squared 0.577598     Mean dependent variable 1459480. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.569283     S.D. dependent variable 5400312. 
S.E. of regression 3.544172     Akaike info criterion 33.02231 
Sum squared resid 3191.582     Schwarz criterion 33.10448 
Log likelihood -4339.628     Hannan-Quinn criterion 33.05535 
F-statistic 24.37562     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.835163 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
 
     
The reduced model provided almost the same level of significance for each variable as in 
the complete model except for the constant. As with the complete model, the adjusted R -
squared was used as a measure of the fit; 56.9% of the variation in outage cost is 
explained in the OLS reduced model. The adjusted R-squared value is almost similar to 
that observed in the complete model, suggesting that no statistically significant variables 
were left out of the reduced model. The complete and reduced OLS models were 
compared to determine which one better fits the data using F-test. 
 
The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
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Thus, for predictive purposes, the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model on account of the F-test statistic value of 0.9444 being smaller than the critical 
value of 2.27. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have 
been excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected. Using 
the reduced model the predictive OLS model was presented as follows: 
 
                                                        
                                                    
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.7): 
 The increase in total direct cost due to respondents’ 1 hour increase in total 
outage hours (TOUTHR) is 8 335.408, ceteris paribus. This large increase is due to 
high value addition on the firm’s output/services  lost during the hour of outage; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to an additional single outage (TONUOUT) 
experienced is 26.77268, ceteris paribus. This large increase is due to the high 
value of output lost during the outage depending on the duration of the outage; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to US$1 change in revenue (REV) is 0.010411, 
ceteris paribus; 
 The increase in total direct cost due to an additional unit of labour employed 
(NEMPL) is 3 420.970, ceteris paribus;  
 The decline in total direct cost due to availability of backup supply (DUMABE) in 
the firm is 18 856.59, ceteris paribus; 
 The decline in total direct cost due to availability of arrangement (DUMARR) for 
uninterrupted electricity supply or advance warning to mines is 2 543.362, ceteris 
paribus. The availability of arrangement reduces outage cost to firms ; and 
 The intercept value is 287 279.4 (negative).  
 
Using the predictive model, the total direct cost for the surveyed firms was US$6 978 453 
and for the sector US$719 470 240. These costs are in line with sample estimates, though 
slightly below (see Chapter 8).  Like in other sectors, the fact that: (a) the signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with prior expectation, (b) the variables in the preferred 
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predictive model are important determinants of direct cost by definition and (c) the scale 
prediction of the model is broadly in line with expectations - this lends credibility to direct 
cost estimates of power outages for the firms. 
 
 
Indirect cost 
 
The results obtained from fitting the complete and reduced Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
models to the surveyed data from the indirect method are shown in Tables 10.13 and 
10.14 respectively.  
 
Table 10.13: An OLS model fit to the complete indirect cost for firms  
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 231   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -262463.5 1596227. -0.164427 0.8695 
TTBEUSE 1107.728 6284.936 0.176251 0.8603 
THBEUSE 37.94008 19.38052 1.957640 0.0659 
APROPCO -24204.94 15301.46 -1.581871 0.1151 
BECAP 30279.77 1492.745 20.28462 0.0000 
YBEUSE (G) 19466.38 164388.2 0.118417 0.9058 
REV -0.019860 0.008966 -2.215035 0.0278 
CAPACITY -73748.12 281568.0 -0.026230 0.7936 
TWHRS 20.07264 150.7727 0.133129 0.8942 
KWHCONS -0.089295 0.027994 -3.189791 0.0016 
DUMARR -689027.2 1052598. -0.065295 0.5134 
     
     R-squared 0.678221     Mean dependent variable 2198463. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.663595     S.D. dependent variable 9726542. 
S.E. of regression 4.605730     Akaike info criterion 33.97562 
Sum squared residual 4601.532     Schwarz criterion 34.13955 
Log likelihood -3864.743     Hannan-Quinn criterion 34.04174 
F-statistic 46.36989     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.979574 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The statistically significant coefficients, defined as significance of less than or equal to 
10% (p ≤ 0.10) were the coefficients of the variables THBEUSE, BECAP, REV and 
KWHCONS. At 67.8% for the complete OLS, the adjusted R-squared shows that the model 
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fits the data. Using the backward stepwise regression procedure the reduced OLS model 
was estimated (Table 10.14).  
 
Table 10.14: An OLS model fit to the reduced indirect cost for industry  
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 231   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -169207.3 638087.3 -0.265178 0.8632 
THBEUSE 34.51074 17.35643 1.988354 0.0587 
BECAP 29514.81 1453.890 20.30057 0.0000 
REV -0.019404 0.008408 -2.307802 0.0219 
KWHCONS -0.084043 0.027017 -3.110745 0.0021 
     
     R-squared 0.673092     Mean dependent variable 2198463. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.667306     S.D. dependent variable 9726542. 
S.E. of regression 4.615107     Akaike info criterion 33.93949 
Sum squared residual 4791.500     Schwarz criterion 34.01400 
Log likelihood -3869.394     Hannan-Quinn criterion 33.96954 
F-statistic 116.3314     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.967129 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The results of this model provided higher level of statistical significance for BECAP and 
KWHCONS at the 1% level, REV significant at the 5% level and THBEUSE significant at the 
10% level. As with the complete model, the adjusted R-squared was used as a measure of 
the fit; 66.7% of the variation in outage cost is explained in the OLS reduced model. The 
adjusted R-squared value is almost similar to that observed in the complete model, also 
reflecting that no significant variables were left out of the reduced model. 
 
The complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better 
fits the data. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
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Thus, for predictive purposes, the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model on account of the F-test statistic value of 0.9950 being smaller than the critical 
value of 2.27. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have 
been excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected. The 
fitted regression equation was as follows: 
 
                                                       
                                                                                            
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.8): 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to 1 hour increase in total hours of backup 
use (THBEUSE) is 34.51074, ceteris paribus. This increase is due to high cost of 
running the backup equipment for an additional hour; 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to an additional 1kVA backup equipment 
capacity (BECAP) is 29 514.81, ceteris paribus;  
 The decrease in total indirect cost due to an additional US$1 revenue generated 
by the firm (REV) is 0.019404; ceteris paribus; and 
 The decrease in total indirect cost due to additional 1kWh consumed from the grid 
(KWHCONS) is 0.084043, ceteris paribus.  
 
Using the regression equation above, the total indirect cost for the surveyed firms was 
US$4 982 630 and the sector cost was US$337 753 980. These costs lie in the same range 
as those from sample estimates (see Chapter 8). As in other sectors, the same facts as in 
the indirect (backup) cost that: (a) the signs of the coefficients are consistent with prior 
expectation; (b) the variables in the preferred predictive model are important 
determinants of backup cost by definition; and (c) the scale prediction of the model is 
broadly in line with expectations, lend credibility to backup cost estimates of power 
outages for the firms. 
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10.1.3.4 Validity Test for the Household Sector Cost (Direct and Indirect Cost) 
 
Direct Cost 
 
The results obtained from fitting the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to the survey data for 
the household sector cost function are shown in Tables 10.15 and 10.16 for the complete 
and reduced models respectively. 
 
Table 10.15: An OLS model fit to the complete direct cost for households  
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 283   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -1.665468 0.941340 -1.769252 0.0780 
TONUOUT 0.124197 0.294028 0.422398 0.9672 
TOUTHR 0.157543 0.048916 3.220684 0.0014 
KWHCONS -0.182681 0.024913 -7.332857 0.0000 
HHSIZ 13.54739 24.68986 0.548703 0.5837 
DUMSEAS 91.86342 105.4693 0.870997 0.3845 
DUMABE -103.5835 61.11137 -1.694996 0.0912 
     
     R-squared 0.898699     Mean dependent variable 991.2085 
Adjusted R-squared 0.895359     S.D. dependent variable 851.0021 
S.E. of regression 2.752845     Akaike info criterion 14.10818 
Sum squared 
residual 2068.836     Schwarz criterion 14.23700 
Log likelihood -1986.308     Hannan-Quinn criterion 14.15983 
F-statistic 15.64500     Durbin-Watson statistic 2.004383 
Probability(F-
statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The coefficients of TONUOUT, HHSIZ and DUMSEAS are statistically insignificant. At 89.8% 
for the complete OLS, the adjusted R-squared shows that the model fits the data. Using 
the backward stepwise regression procedure the reduced OLS model was estimated 
(Table 10.16). 
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Table 10.16: An OLS model fit to the reduced direct cost for households 
 
Dependent Variable: TDC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 283   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -1.621094 0.87277 -1.857412 0.0612 
TOUTHR 0.152318 0.035543 4.285430 0.0000 
KWHCONS -0.121398 0.019713 -6.158271 0.0000 
DUMABE -117.6054 49.86027 -2.358699 0.0390 
     
     R-squared 0.897167     Mean dependent variable 991.2085 
Adjusted R-squared 0.895311     S.D. dependent variable 851.0021 
S.E. of regression 2.753477     Akaike info criterion 16.09492 
Sum squared 
residual 2100.113     Schwarz criterion 16.17221 
Log likelihood -1988.431     Hannan-Quinn criterion 16.12591 
F-statistic 38.89920     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.983979 
Probability(F-
statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The results of the reduced model provided a higher level of significance for TOUTHR, 
KWHCONS, constant and DUMABE variables are statistically significant at the 1% level . 
The adjusted R-squared at 89.5% shows that the model best fits the data.  
 
The complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better 
fits the data. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
  
           
               
    
 
    
                     
         
 
 
                     
 
                
 
Thus, for predictive purposes, the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model on account of the F-test statistic value of 0.8254 being smaller than the critical 
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value of 2.96. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have 
been excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected. The 
fitted regression equation was as follows: 
 
                                                               
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.9): 
 The increase in total direct cost due to respondents’ 1 hour increase in total 
outage hours (TOUTHR) is 0.15, ceteris paribus. This small increase is due to the 
fact that households have difficulties in valuing their losses caused by outages; 
 The decline in total direct cost due to the respondent increase in kWh consumed 
(KWHCONS) by a single unit is 0.12, ceteris paribus;  
 The decline in total direct cost due to availability of backup equipment (DUMABE) 
for uninterrupted electricity supply to households is 117.60, ceteris paribus. The 
availability of backup equipment reduces outage cost to households; and 
 The intercept value is US$1.621 (negative). 
 
From the predictive direct cost function provided above, the total direct cost for surveyed 
households was US$23 723 and for the sector US$30 117 435. These costs are also within 
the same range as sample estimates, though slightly below (see Chapter 9).  As  in other 
sectors, the fact that: (a) the signs of the coefficients are consistent with prior 
expectation; (b) the variables in the preferred predictive model are important 
determinants of direct cost by definition; and (c) the scale prediction of the model is 
broadly in line with expectations,  lends credibility to direct cost estimates of power 
outages for the householdss. 
 
Indirect cost 
The complete and reduced OLS models of the indirect cost were also fitted to the 
household surveyed data and the results obtained are shown in Tables 10.17 and 10.18 
respectively.  
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Table 10.17: An OLS model fit to the complete indirect outage cost (households) 
 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 103   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -54.04234 14.66924 -3.684058 0.0026 
TTBEUSE -0.265291 0.676301 -0.392267 0.6957 
THBEUSE 0.525439 0.103872 5.058524 0.0000 
BECAP 9.913640 1.466630 6.759469 0.0000 
HINC 0.289502 0.059816 4.839876 0.0000 
HHSIZ 30.73123 15.36544 2.000022 0.0800 
DUMSEAS 64.64252 15.87228 4.072668 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.813696     Mean dependent variable 1386.125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.802052     S.D. dependent variable 798.6868 
S.E. of regression 1.788104     Akaike info criterion 14.64961 
Sum squared residual 294.1532     Schwarz criterion 14.82867 
Log likelihood -437.3596     Hannan-Quinn criterion 14.72213 
F-statistic 69.88095     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.955849 
Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
In the complete OLS model for the households indirect cost, the statistically significant 
coefficients, in this case defined as significance of less than or equal to 10% (p ≤ 0.10)  are 
variables THBEUSE, BECAP, HINC, HHSIZ and DUMSEAS. Only TTBEUSE is statistically 
insignificant. The adjusted R-squared of 80.2% for the complete OLS shows that the 
model fits the data. Using the backward stepwise regression procedure the reduced OLS 
model was estimated (see Table 10.18). 
 
The results of the reduced model provided a level of significance for variables as low as 
1% level (p≤ 0.01) except for the HHSIZ (household size) at 10%. As with the complete 
model, the adjusted R-squared was used as a measure of the fit; 80.3% of the variation in 
outage cost is explained in the OLS reduced model. The adjusted R-squared value is 
almost similar to that observed in the complete model, also reflecting that no significant 
variables were left out of the reduced model. 
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Table 10.18: An OLS model fit to the reduced Indirect outage cost (households) 
Dependent Variable: TIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 103   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -48.60421 14.30443 -3.397843 0.0002 
THBEUSE 0.497653 0.095640 5.203389 0.0000 
BECAP 9.930227 1.422062 6.982977 0.0000 
HINC  0.286350 0.059015 4.852156 0.0000 
HHSIZ 30.54209 15.28287 1.998452 0.0803 
DUMSEAS 63.47441 15.50753 4.093134 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.813397     Mean dependent variable 1386.125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.803778     S.D. dependent varidable 798.6868 
S.E. of regression 1.744493     Akaike info criterion 14.63179 
Sum squared residual 301.2822     Schwarz criterion 14.78527 
Log likelihood -438.5928     Hannan-Quinn criterion 14.69396 
F-statistic 84.56402     Durbin-Watson statistic 1.959611 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
From statistical theory, it is however, unadvisable to make deductions about which model 
is preferred for determining determinants based on a perceived negligible change in the 
adjusted R-squared value. Hypothesis testing should be used for this purpose. The 
complete and reduced OLS models were compared to determine which one better fits  the 
data using the F-test. The F-statistic was calculated as follows: 
  
           
               
    
 
 
      
                     
         
 
 
                     
 
                  
 
From the computed F-test statistical value of 0.7500 being smaller than the critical value 
of 1.23, for predictive purposes the reduced OLS model was preferred to the complete 
model. This result implies that the null hypothesis (that the parameters that have been 
excluded from the reduced OLS model are equal to zero) cannot be rejected.  
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From the reduced model the predictive cost function was developed as follows: 
 
                                                        
                                                                                                 
 
The reduced OLS model indicates that (see Equation 10.10): 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to an additional hour of backup use 
(THBEUSE) is 0.498; ceteris paribus;  
 The increase in total indirect cost due to increase in an additional unit backup 
capacity (BECAP) is 9.93, ceteris paribus. This increase is due to a lack of 
economies of scale and cost of running generators at individual household levels; 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to household income (HINC) is 0.286, ceteris 
paribus. This is due to the fact that high earning households spend much in backup 
generators in order to avert the power outage problems; 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to household size (HHSIZ) is 30.542, ceteris 
paribus. The larger the household size, the greater the expenditure in backup 
source and the greater the running expenses; 
 The increase in total indirect cost due to seasonality effect (DUMSEAS) is 63.474, 
ceteris paribus; and 
 The intercept value is 48.604 (negative). 
 
Using the equation above, the total estimated indirect cost for the surveyed households 
was US$27 180 and US$34 138 962 for the sector. This might signal the fact that 
households included in the survey are those of average and above average income 
earners who can afford to acquire and use generators during outages. These costs lie in 
the same range as those from sample estimates (see Chapter 9), though slightly above. As 
in other sectors, the same facts as in the indirect cost that: (a) the signs of the coefficients 
are consistent with prior expectations; (b) the variables in the preferred predictive model 
are important determinants of backup cost by definition; and (c) the scale prediction of 
the model is broadly in line with expectations, lend credibility to indirect cost estimates of 
power outages for the households. 
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10.2 CONCLUDING OVERVIEW ON VALIDITY 
 
10.2.1Broad Assessment of Validity 
 
A broad overview of the validity assessment of the estimates is presented in Table 10.19. 
It shows that most of the general validity requirements were met.  
 
Table 10.19: A Broad Overview of Validity Assessment 
 
Criteria Satisfied Comment 
Repeatability   
1. Replicate results by running method 
under same circumstance  
× No follow-up surveys have been done for the 
four sectors for both methods  
Content Validity   
1. Assess whether the study employed a 
feasible scenario 
 The study is feasible as similar ones were 
carried out elsewhere using same methods 
2. Sample size must be guided by experts 
advice and statistical sampling tools 
 User populations were obtained from ZESA. 
Yamane (1967) statistical method of 
determining the sample size was used. 
3. The questionnaire should ask questions 
in a clear and appropriate manner 
× 
 
Pilot studies were conducted and the results 
used to improve the clarity of questions. 
However, there appeared to be variations in 
the respondents’ comprehension of the 
issues.  
4. Questionnaire should minimise non-
response rate 
 Personal administration was used to distribute 
questionnaires and face-to-face interviews 
were held with those selected who were 
willing to be surveyed using the questionnaire. 
5. The survey should  include questions 
that help explain to the respondent how to 
estimate cost 
 The questionnaire did include follow up 
questions 
Construct Validity   
1.Different methods of estimating cost 
were applied 
 The questionnaire allowed comparative 
estimates of direct cost and indirect cost to be 
generated (Chapters 6-9)  
2. Generally accepted methods  
 
 
 
The direct cost and indirect cost estimation 
were generated in much the same way as 
those of  Caves, Herrige and Windle (1992), 
Uchendu (1993), Beenstock, Goldin and 
Haitovsky (1997),  Primen (2001),  Adenikinju 
(2003), Adenikinju (2005), de Nooij et al. 
(2006), Bose et al. (2006), Limi (2008), CZI 
(2008) to mention but a few. 
3.Similar results are reported × None had previously been done 
 
Source: Hanley and Spash (1993), Mendenhall and Sincich (1996) and own criteria  
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10.2.2 Specific Analysis of Validity 
 
The validity of the estimates of the outage costs of the four selected sectors of the 
Zimbabwean economy were assessed with reference to model fit and plausibility of 
coefficients. Three criteria were employed for this purpose (Hanley & Spash 1993; 
Mendenhall & Sincich 1996): 
 Statistically significant with an adjusted R-squared above 50% and a statistically 
significant F-Statistic of less than 0.05; 
 Reduced models contained the variables that they would be expected to contain;  
 The signs of the coefficients in the reduced model are consistent with theoretical 
expectations. 
With reference to the three criteria above, four ratings were constructed:  
 
 Strong support – if all three criteria are met, 
 Moderate support – if any two of the criteria are met, 
 Weak support – if only one of the three criteria is met, 
 No Support – if none of the three criteria is met. 
Table 10.20reports how the models generated in this thesis ratein terms of these criteria 
(this Chapter). 
 
Table 10.20: Models Validity Assessment 
 
Sector and Method 
Criteria 
Model 
Support 
Model 
statistically 
significant 
Contains 
Significant 
Variables 
Expected 
Signs of 
Coefficients 
Direct Cost     
Mining  X  Moderate 
Agriculture   X Moderate 
Industry   X Moderate 
Households    Strong 
Backup Cost     
Mining    Strong 
Agriculture    Strong 
Industry    Strong 
Households   X Moderate 
 
All the models were moderate to strongly supported in terms of this validity assessment.  
220 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON OUTAGE 
COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE COST OF THE 
UTILITY INCREASING ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
 
11 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There are large differences between the distribution of electricity usage and that of value 
added over the various economic sectors and households (de Nooij et al. 2006). Electricity 
Interruption in manufacturing plants, commercial service firms, mines, farms or 
households has different consequences for each sector (Mbohwa 2002). The losses 
incurred due to the disruptions can be regarded as an invisible tariff that the farms, 
mines, firms and households have to pay. This chapter gives a summation of the costs 
incurred by four sectors of the Zimbabwean economy due to power outages in order to 
derive a national outage cost figure, thereby showing the scale of economic cost wastage 
in Zimbabwe due to under-investment in power generation. The chapter also estimates  
the cost of averting power outages through expansion in the current national generation 
and calculates the percentage national outage cost of the total averting cost. The averting 
public utility investment cost not only generates the benefit of saving the outage cost, but 
also the total willingness to pay benefit of IQ1Q2J +KQ3Q4G (see Chapter 3). The 
percentage outage cost make-up of this benefit includes the waste cost being incurred in 
Zimbabwe by insufficient investment in power generation and management.  
 
11.1 COMPARING SECTOR IMPACTS 
 
11.1.1 Outage Severity 
 
 
The sectors were asked about the severity of outages during 2009 and the information 
shown in Figures 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3 reveals the crisis of electricity supply. 
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Figure 11.1: Frequency of weekly outages incidences experienced by sectors 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1 shows that households reported the highest proportion on 7 or more outages 
incidences per week, followed by mining, agriculture and industry. This reflects ZESA 
priorities – households are the lowest priority and are the first to be load shedded.  
 
Figure 11.2: Average duration of outage incidences experienced by sectors (in hours) 
 
 
 
The agricultural sector reported the highest inrespect of the longest duration of outages 
(12 or more hours per outage incident), closely followed by mining and industry which 
reported the least hours (Figure 11.2).  
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Figure 11.3: Average frequency and duration of outages experienced by sectors per week 
 
 
 
Agriculture, mining and households reported an average of 5 outage incidences and the 
industrial sector reported the least, namely 4 outage incidences per week (Figure, 11.3). 
The average outage incidences are in line with the average outage frequencies reported  
by CZI (2007) and CCZ (2007). The agriculture and mining sectors were exposed to the 
highest durations per outage incident and the industrial sector the least. The 
proportionate loss caused by electricity outages  are shown in Figure 11.4. 
 
Figure 11.4: Average proportion of total output/service loss due to power outages 
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All the sectors reported high proportions of total output loss but mining reported the 
highest. This finding is in line with the results reported by the CZI (2009) that mining and 
industry are the hardest hit sectors by power outages and households are the least as 
well as the findings of de Nooij et al. (2006) and Clement and Shanaka (2008). 
 
11.1.1.1 Ranking of electricity service problem by sectors 
 
A comparative ranking of the electricity infrastructure limitation on economic activity by 
sector is shown in Table 11.1. 
Table 11.1: Ranking of electricity services by sectors (percentage) 
 
Sector Major Obstacle Moderate Obstacle No Obstacle 
Agriculture 74.9 23.4 1.7 
Industry 67.3 29.2 3.5 
Mining 87.8 8.1 4.1 
 Households 72.1 23.4 4.6 
 
All were negatively impacted on but the mining sector was found to be worst affected. 
 
Table 11.2: Summary of descriptive statistics  
 
Item Agriculture Industry Mining Households 
Average Total Number of outages (Year) 265 180 232 240 
Average Total  Outage hours (Year) 2152 1608 1080 2186 
Average Electricity expenditure (US$) 27655 415331 104558 139 
Average kWh consumed from the grid (Year) 19753 296669 174682 1401 
Average Hours electricity available from the grid 3849 4407 6599 7173 
Average Total kWh lost  (Year) 4858 694747 69761 1550 
 
The highest numbers of average total outages were reported in the agricultural sector 
and least in the industrial sector. The sectors incurring the highest costs due to outages 
were industry and mining. 
 
11.1.2 Summing Direct Cost 
 
The direct cost estimations were done by estimating the value of lost output, labour cost, 
material cost, other additional cost (restart cost, damage to equipment and repair and 
maintenance cost) for mining, agriculture and industry sectors and using lost food and 
cost of damage and replacement of household appliances for households. 
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11.1.2.1 Outage cost by type of cost for sectors 
 
Table 11.3 reports the direct cost by type using the mean values from the surveyed 
respondents in all sectors. 
 
Table 11.3: Direct outage cost for sectors by type (US$) 
 
 
Lost output or food stuffs made up the greatest proportion of the direct cost component; 
a similar finding to those of Adenikinju (2003), Bose et al. (2006) and de Nooij et al. 
(2006). The highest average total direct cost was incurred in the mining sector and lowest 
cost in the household sector. 
 
The total outage cost for all sectors is calculated in Table 11.4. 
Table 11.4: Total direct cost for the sectors (US$) 
 
Sector Total Direct Cost  (US$) 
Agriculture 52116305 
Industry 747281135 
Mining 249736248 
Households 32448700 
Total 1081582388 
 
It is concluded that outages directly cost the Zimbabwean economy about US$1.08 billion 
in 2009. This estimate does not include indirect impact even though aspects such as 
political instability induced the outage problem (UNDP 2009). 
 
11.1.3 Indirect Cost Sector Comparison 
 
 
The backup equipment used for the cost estimation was generators owned and used by 
respondents during outages.  
 
 Cost Type Agriculture Industry Mining Households 
Lost output/food stuffs 5258 20521 219059 34.93 
Labour cost  431 1304 22745 - 
Destruction of material (stocks) 637 4343 1816 9.10 
Restart costs/emergency cost  110 616 5313 18.19 
Damage to equipment 240 213 6156 23.29 
Total 6677 26997 255089 86.21 
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11.1.3.1 Investment in backup equipment by sectors 
 
Respondents from all sectors reported additional investment in backup equipment to 
mitigate against the unreliability of ZESA supplies. It is a significantly high additional cost 
to mines, farms, firms and households in acquiring and running the backup equipment 
(generators) because this power can be produced much cheaper by the public utility 
company (ZESA). The average cost, capacity and period in use of generators for each 
sector is shown in Table 11.5. 
Table 11.5: Descriptive information for the generators owned by sectors 
 
Consideration Agriculture Industry Mining Households 
Cost (US$) 25387 64382 120727 420 
Capacity (kVa) 75 120 135 8 
Period in Use (Years) 4 4 5 3 
 
Of all the sectors, mining incurred the highest average value of cost of investing in 
generators and households, the lowest; a result consistent with the findings of Clement 
and Shanaka (2008). As would be expected, mines also reported the highest average 
generator capacity (kVa) and households, the least. Mines require high power voltage for 
their operations and the costs of them being without power are very serious (trapped 
miners underground).  
 
Figure 11.5: Proportion of sector operations/activities powered by backup equipment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of all the sectors, the highest proportional operations were covered by investment in 
backup equipment in agriculture. 
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11.1.3.2 Cost structure of own generations by sectors 
 
The mean cost structure of running own backup equipment by the sectors in terms of 
capital cost and operating cost items is summarised in Table 11.6.  
Table 11.6: Mean cost structure of own generation by sectors in terms of cost items (US$) 
 
Consideration Mining Agriculture Industry Households 
Capital Item US$ US$ US$ US$ 
Generator cost (US$) 120727 25387 64382 420 
Installation cost (transport, house, oil & fuel tank) 1170 942 840 22 
Total Capital cost  121897 26329 65222 442 
     
Running Cost Item     
Fuel, oil and grease cost  28807 17590 15642 290 
Labour cost (wages and salaries) 1165 1159 1745 - 
Maintenance cost  1424 1551 1217 90 
Total Running Cost 31396 20300 18604 380 
 
Of all the sectors, mining reported the highest total capital investment cost, followed by 
industry; households were the lowest. The mining sector also incurred the highest 
running cost, followed by agriculture. Households incurred the lowest.  
 
Table 11.7: Average per kWh and total indirect cost by sectors 
 
Sector Cost per kWh lost (US$) Total indirect cost  (US$) 
Agriculture 1.64 32224459 
Industry 5.15 432237491 
Mining 6.20 162107136 
Households 0.30 20693766 
TOTAL  647262852 
 
As would be expected, the mining sector reported the highest total indirect cost per kWh 
(US$6.20) and the households sector reported the lowest cost per kWh (US$0.30) lost. 
The industrial sector reported the highest total indirect cost (US$432 237 491) and 
households the least (US$20 693 766). Summing the backup costs shows that the country 
incurred almost US$0.65 billion in 2009 due to this category of outage cost.  
 
11.1.4 Total Outage Cost Sectoral Comparison 
 
 
The total outage cost was obtained by summing direct cost and indirect cost (Table 11.8). 
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Table 11.8: Total outage cost by sectors 
 
Sector Direct Cost (US$) Total indirect cost  (US$) Total outage cost (US$) 
Agriculture 52116305 32224459 84340764 
Industry 747281135 432237491 1179518626 
Mining 249736248 162107136 411843384 
Households 32448700 20693766 53142466 
TOTAL 1083656982 628638452 1712295434 
 
The industrial sector reported the highest total outage cost and households the lowest. 
The country incurred about US$1.8 billion in 2009 due to outages; almost 33% as a 
proportion of GDP (US$1.8 billion/US$5.4 billion); where the GDP for Zimbabwe was 
US$5.4 billion in 2009. 
 
Outage cost impact for the sectors was assessed using the GDP of about US$5.4 billion for 
2009 (RBZ 2010). The results are shown in Table 11.9. 
 
Table 11.9: Total outage cost impact on GDP for the sectors (percentage) 
 
Sector Total Outage Cost Impact on GDP Assessment  (%)  
Agriculture 1.6 
Industry 22.1 
Mining 7.7 
Households 1.24 
All Sectors 32.64 
 
The industrial sector reported the highest total outage cost impact as a percentage of 
GDP and households the lowest. 
 
11.2 COST OF EXPANDING OWN GENERATION 
 
11.2.1 Cost of Expanding Own Generation Capacity 
 
The reason why the cost of expanding own generation capacity is incurred is because of 
the failure to increase generating capacity and management thereof in order to meet 
demand. Large scale investment in electricity generation requires a lot of capital. The 
power utility engineers estimated the cost of improving the current generators and 
output in order to more than meet demand would be as shown in Tables 11.10 and 11.11 
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(see also The Electrical Energy Development Plan, 2000). With this capacity Zimbabwe 
could even become a net exporter of electricity.  
 
Table 11.10: Cost of improving existing national generating plants  
 
Power Generators Number 
of Units 
Size (MW) Total Generation 
Expected (MW) 
Total Improving 
cost (US$) 
Hwange  phase 1 4 120 480 45000000 
Hwange  phase 2 2 220 440 30000000 
Kariba 3 240 720 36000000 
Bulawayo phase1 2 15 30 2200000 
Bulawayo phase2 3 30 90 8000000 
Munyati  phase1 2 10 20 2000000 
Munyati  phase2 5 20 100 10000000 
Harare  phase1 2 7.5 15 1200000 
Harare  phase2 a 2 10 20 1500000 
Harare  phase2 b 2 20 40 3000000 
Harare  phase3 2 30 60 5000000 
TOTAL 30  2015 143900000 
 
Table 11.11: Capital cost of constructing new generating units/plants 
 
Power Generators Number 
of Units 
Size 
(MW) 
Total Generation 
Expected (MW) 
Total Improving 
cost (US$) 
Hwange  unit7 1 150 150 225000000 
Hwange  Unit8 1 150 150 225000000 
Batoka  4 200 800 1200000000 
Kariba South Extension 2 150 300 450000000 
Gokwe North 3 320 960 2500000000 
Lupane Gas Turbine 2 150 300 500000000 
TOTAL   2660 5100000000 
 
In addition, about US$450 million is required to restructure the transmission 
(transmission and distribution lines and transformers). The total capital cost required is 
about US$5.7 billion (143.9 million + 5100 million + 450 million). The average life span of 
each new plant is about 40 to 50 years.  
 
Zimbabwe does not need all the suggested generating units to be in place at the moment 
to solve its current power outage problems. The country currently only needs an 
additional generation capacity of 950MW; a shortfall that can be met through extension 
of existing generating units (Hwange Thermal Power Station units 7 and 8 are capable of 
generating 300MW and Kariba Hydro Power Station extension is capable of generating 
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300MW) and two units of the four possible Hydro Power Plant units at Batoka generating 
400MW (200MW each).  Such an expansion would only require ZESA to finance about 
US$1.5billion additional investment, less than that lost in outage cost in the year 2009. 
 
11.2.1.1 The Cost of financing capital investment in own generation 
 
The financing of own power generation projects will require funding from either the 
domestic market or international development banking institutions . Such projects cannot 
be funded by short term sources. SAPP (2009) highlighted that funding of such long term 
capital projects is a problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are a number of proposed 
power generation projects in the pipeline in the SAPP but funding has not yet been 
secured for the projects to kick start (Chikova 2009). There is a finance gap for power 
utilities’ long term capital project in SAPP (SAPP 2009). Table 11.12 shows the parastatal 
loan terms from a few selected potential lending institutions and from the domestic 
market. 
 
Table 11.12: Selected parastatal loan terms from banks/institutions/countries  
 
Creditor Bank or Institution 
Average 
Maturity (Years) 
Average Interest 
rate (%) 
Grace period 
in Years 
African Development Bank (AfDB) 15 3.75 2 
World Bank (WB) 20 1.26 7 
Namibia – Nampower 5 5.25 1 
South Africa 12 5.50 2 
Japan 22 4.10 2 
China 11 4.92 1 
Domestic (long term bonds) 15 5.11 2 
 
The World Bank offers relatively cheap finance with quite a reasonable maturity period. 
Japan and China have reasonable interest rate charges, but the average maturity period 
from China is too short for major projects. South Africa and the domestic market charge 
the highest rates of interest. The Namibia power utility Nampower is currently funding 
rehabilitation of the existing Hwange thermal power units, but the maturity period is too 
short for the type of projects proposed in Table 11.11. 
 
A key factor influencing the lender is the capacity of ZESA to service and repay the loan 
taken. The interest and maturity values at the above interest rates for a 20-year loan of 
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US$5.1 billion are shown in Table 11.13 and for a 20 year loan of US$1.5 billion are shown 
in Table 11. 14. 
 
Table 11.13: Potential ZESA loan and interest from selected banks/institutions/ 
countries 
 
Creditor Bank or Institution 
Principal loan 
amount  (US$) 
Interest to be 
paid for (US$) 
Total  maturity 
amount (US$) 
African Development Bank (AfDB) 5100000000 2868750000 7968750000 
World Bank (WB) 5100000000 1285200000 6385200000 
Namibia – Nampower 5100000000 1338750000 6438750000 
South Africa 5100000000 3366000000 8466000000 
Japan 5100000000 4600200000 9700200000 
China 5100000000 2760120000 7860120000 
Domestic (long term bonds) 5100000000 3909150000 9009150000 
 
 
Table 11.14: ZESA loan requirement from banks/institutions/countries (US$) 
 
Creditor Bank or Institution 
Principal loan 
amount  (US$) 
Interest to be 
paid for (US$) 
Total  maturity 
amount (US$) 
African Development Bank (AfDB) 1500000000 843750000 2343750000 
World Bank (WB) 1500000000 378000000 1878000000 
Namibia – Nampower 1500000000 393750000 1893750000 
South Africa 1500000000 1035000000 2535000000 
Japan 1500000000 1353000000 2853000000 
China 1500000000 811800000 2311800000 
Domestic (long term bonds) 1500000000 1149750000 2649750000 
 
The World Bank, Namibia- NamPower and China offer the cheapest potential sources of 
funding. 
 
11.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
The current cash flow needed to solve ZESA’s immediate electricity under-supply problem 
from the cheapest external source (World Bank) is US$1.88 billion (versus US$2.7 billion 
from the domestic market).  The estimated total power outage cost for 2009 alone as a 
proportion of capital investment cost requirement to solve outage problems is about 94 
percent.  
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Discounting the capital cost of investing in all suggested generating units with the 40 year 
average life expectancy, using 10% as discounting factor, the per annum capital cost is 
about US$49 million per year. Adding annual maintenance, accessories and ru nning cost, 
takes this figure upto less than US$0.1 billion. Given the total outage cost estimated, it is 
economic that the optimal decision for the utility is to invest in additional generating 
capacity.  
 
11.4 OVERALL CONCLUSION 
 
The challenges presented by electricity as a scarce resource are closely linked to the lack 
of investment expansion in power generation, poor electricity demand side management 
policies, and poor planning and administration of electricity infrastructure. The 
consequences of not adjusting electricity supply to meet demand are power supply 
interruptions and the cost of production loss, damage to equipment, material 
destruction, restart cost, idle productive time, firm relocation cost, consumer welfare loss 
and higher cost of providing alternative backup sources from required backup equipment.  
 
The problem is not unique to Zimbabwe – Eto et al. (2004), Mangwengwende (2005), 
Adenikinju (2005), Bose et al. (2006), de Nooij et al. (2006), World Bank (2008), identify 
similar costs of electricity outages in other countries. Interventions are needed. The main 
intervention is the improvement in electricity supply through investment in generation 
capacity expansion at national level or at regional power pool level . 
 
The cost of electricity supply outages in Zimbabwe in 2009, was estimated to be US$1.8 
billion – massive for a country the size of Zimbabwe. The continuation of the existing 
state of power under-supply is undermining the development of mining, farming and 
industrial sectors of the economy and the government’s desire to diversify production, 
the export base of the economy and to improve people’s well being. Not only do frequent 
power outages adversely affect output in productive sectors, they prompt firms to 
disinvest in Zimbabwe and to discourage new firms from locating or investing in the 
country (Mangwengwende 2005). The power outage problem reduces the rate of job 
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creation, accelerates loss of jobs, reduces households’ income and lowers tax receipts for 
central and local government. 
 
Each outage has an impact on different sectors increasing with the duration of outage. 
The decision to acquire a backup is a rational decision on the part of the firm (industry, 
mine or farm) or household electricity consumer in order to protect it from larger losses 
arising from frequent and long power fluctuations, but not a socially efficient one. The 
public utility can generate this power cheaper by harnessing economies of scale. 
 
11.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Based on the estimates made of the cost of power outages in Zimbabwe, this study 
recommends to the government and the power utility (ZESA), the following. 
11.5.1 Recommendations to Government 
 
a) Large scale expansion in generation capacity  – First and foremost, the country 
cannot afford to immediately begin investing in large scale electricity generation 
expansion schemes. The relevant engineering expertise must be contracted to 
advise at the soonest. Expansion is possible at the source for both thermal plants 
(coal mines) and hydro power plant and at other suggested generation sites for 
both thermal and hydro generation to solve supply deficiency problems. The 
capital expenditure required is currently estimated at about US$5.8 billion, 
enough to make Zimbabwe a net exporter of electricity or US$1.88 billion to solve 
the current outage problems. Large scale national generation projects have 
several attractive features, mainly the exploitation of economies of scale. 
 
b) Raising finance – Raising the capital requirement will require government 
guarantees for the repayment of such loans on maturity. The cheapest source 
would be the World Bank. Meeting the requirements for borrowing from this 
source will be advantageous to Zimbabwe.  
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c) Tariff setting - There should be a clear division of authority a mong policy makers 
and tariff setters when pricing electricity. One of the major causes of the problem 
as identified in the thesis is incorrect pricing. The unit price per kWh is below the 
cost of generating the unit. This practice is unsustainable and should cease. 
Under-cost recovery will: 
 most likely deter potential lenders from advancing loans to Zimbabwe to 
generate additional power; and 
 distort economic choices in the economy, resulting in inefficiency.  
 
Higher (cost recovery) tariffs will induce more energy efficient building design, 
greater private sector participation in power generation, appropriate adjustments 
in demand for power and the adoption of efficient technologies. 
 
d) Laws governing the industry – Concurrent with setting cost-recovery tariffs, the 
laws and regulations governing the electricity supply industry should be changed 
so that Independent Power Producers (IPPs) can be allowed to invest in the power 
sector.  The failure by the power utility to expand generation capacity over the 
past 24 years further justifies the need to speedily implement this policy option 
because public utility failures in the sector are very costly. 
 
e) Effective strategic policy and planning – The lack of strategic policy and planning 
for the electricity sector at central government level is a critical weakness and has 
contributed to the current outage problems. The Government should focus on 
integrated interventions rather than peace-meal solutions. An articulate plan for 
the sector will allow government to move beyond the “firefighting” that has 
reduced its ability to plan for exogenous shocks, such as drought.  
 
f) Reduce over reliance on regional electricity power pool and imports – It is clear 
that creating a required power pool and being connected to the pool, does not 
ensure reliability of power supply on its own. When the whole region is 
simultaneously facing power supply problems, other countries are not as willing to 
export as they choose to first meet their domestic demand requirements. It is a 
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better strategy for a country to have sufficient internal capacity and to use the 
pool for short-term assistance, such as during major breakdowns in generation or 
faults in transmission. 
g) Be innovative in planning to meet the demand for power in Zimbabwe – 
Zimbabwe has many natural advantages in power generation; including green 
options. Hydro power is not the only non-fossil fuel dependent power generating 
option in which Zimbabwe has an advantage. Solar photovoltaic systems can 
provide electricity to communities, industries and national grid. Zimbabwe 
experiences an insolation of 2 000 kW/m2 per year, uniformly across the country 
and across the season. This level is five times more than it is in Spain, the leading 
country in solar energy generation.  
 
11.5.2 Recommendations to the Power Utility (ZESA) 
 
On the basis of own funds, ZESA has been unable to expand its electricity generation 
capacity since 1985 (ZESA 2009). Its oldest thermal plants, which contribute  about 
360MW, are more than 40 years old and there are limited benefits of upgrading them, 
since they are located far away from the coal mines. The issue of investing in capacity 
expansion has been dealt with under recommendations to government. What falls within 
ZESA’s scope is the proper maintenance of the installed capacity. The following 
recommendations are therefore made. 
 
a) Funding for internal maintenance and operations – To maintain existing 
generating units requires funding. ZESA needs to review its revenue collection 
system so as to collect more of the revenue due to it. The current system of 
paying after consumption results in considerable bad debts cost. 
 
b) Consumer behavioural change programmes and Power Conservation Programme 
(PCP) – The consumers are currently unconcerned about efficient energy use 
because of distorted (low) pricing and an inefficient revenue collection system, 
but even if these problems were immediately attended to, the need for rationing 
power will remain a requirement in the medium term. ZESA needs to implement 
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consumer behavioural change programmes at firms, mines, farms and homes. The 
concept proposal for the Power Conservation Programme draws heavily from the 
publication “Implementing Power Rationing in a Sensible Way: Lessons Learned 
and International Practices (ESMAP Report 305, 2005)” which commends the 
energy rationing applied in Brazil as a best practice to cope with an energy crisis. 
PCP key elements are: quota allocations- allow for differentiation of customers by 
class; penalties- penalty tariff rates for energy use above the allocated quota; and 
cut-offs- for a specific period for repeated offenders consuming beyond allocated 
quota. These changes would encourage switching off from the grid supply all 
unnecessary equipment or appliances during certain times, for example geysers, 
at home during the day. Such a practise can release much needed electricity for 
other consumers. Similarly, ZESA should incentivise the use of energy saver bulbs, 
appliances and equipment.  
 
c) Price differential (on and off-peak hours) – The power shortage problem is most 
acute during peak times. Higher tariffs should be charged during on-peak hours to 
encourage consumers to schedule their activities during off-peak times.  
 
d) Advance warning – One of the main problems consumers face is being caught 
unaware by outages. Advance warnings about outages save costs and are an 
important management function. Information on outages need to be 
communicated to consumers in terms of time and duration on a regular basis 
before the incidences take place in order that proper planning (rescheduling of 
work, postponing operations, calling employees during time of supply, prepared 
backup supplies, etc.) can be effected by consumers to minimise the damage and 
cost. 
 
e) Retaining critical staff – Another major problem is the lack of retention strategies 
for the critical staff by the power utility. The utility has emerged as a source of 
recruitment for neighbouring countries due to poor human resource policies. 
Some outage problems are linked to poor maintenance of the grid. A pool of 
qualified staff is important for the maintenance of generation plants and 
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transmission wires which are critical for efficient power supply. Attractive and 
competitive wages and allowances (medical, transport, school fees, 
accommodation) and provision of loans (car and housing)   must be implemented 
as measures to curb skills flight from the utility. 
 
f) Prioritisation of sectors and times – ZESA should load shed customers based on 
value addition through use of electricity and on the basis of cost incurred due to 
loss of power.  
 
11.6 QUALIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
This thesis has estimated the cost of power outages to four sectors in Zimbabwe. 
However, as in all empirical studies, certain limitations are brought to light which should 
be considered when making interpretations and conclusions with regard to findings of the 
inquiry. In as much as costs have been estimated and greater understanding of the effects 
and damages of power outages to the sectors attained, new avenues for future research 
have also been revealed. The following qualifications and recommendations are put 
forward for future research of this nature. 
 
The sample frame (population) was compiled from ZESA sources, but it has not been kept 
upto date. The cost information was compiled on the basis of a self-evaluation by 
respondents. Once off individual self evaluation measures to assess cost will never be 
exactly accurate as they are not supported by evidence and become increasingly prone to 
error. Individuals may provide responses depending on their mood during the time of 
interview (completion) and as a way of expressing their anger to the power outage 
problem. 
 
Some cost effects were not included, for example, the stress in households, time of the 
day, day of the week, the measured value of damage to material and equipment of 
sectors and value of work that could have been done during outages. The inclusion of 
more effects would improve understanding of the full impact of outages . The degree to 
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which firms and households are able to substitute activities that do not use electricity for 
activities that do use electricity was not captured.  
 
This thesis did not examine the institutional reforms that can enhance the efficiency of 
the public sector electricity supply in Zimbabwe. There is need for an in-depth study of 
the institutional structure of ZESA and how effective reforms  could be carried out to 
ensure its effectiveness, including issues such as corporate governance. 
 
Possible roles for Independent Power Producers (IPP) and privatisation were fleetingly 
mentioned, but this is a very important area for further research. The literature argues 
that IPPs can play a significant role in improving power supply.  
 
Another important related area of study is an assessment of optimal power generating 
capacity enhancement from a regional (Sothern African Power Pool (SAPP)) perspective. It 
is quite conceivable that a regional response to the problem could yield interesting new 
insights. SAPP has potential from numerous hydro and thermal power generating sources. 
If funding is initiated properly by members to generation of great magnitude such as 
Grand Inga project in Democratic Republic of Congo, excess power could be bought by 
countries such as Zimbabwe, possibly cheaper than by generating own power. Therefore, 
a study of SAPP electricity generation potential and how effective it can supply electricity 
could be carried out to ascertain how effective it could assist in addressing the 
Zimbabwean under supply problem. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Mining Questionnaire 
Mining Questionnaire No//……... 
Economics and Economic History Department 
5th Floor, Main Building 
P.O. Box 77000 
Port Elizabeth 
South Africa 
 
Dear Respondent 
 
Please fill in the questionnaire. Its aim is to estimate the cost of electricity power outages in 
Zimbabwe during 2009. Your responses will be treated as confidential.  
The questionnaire was designed by Nyasha Kaseke. For further information you are free to 
contact the researcher on: Cell (Zim): +263 712 576 546; (SA) +27766878938. 
Emails:nykaseke@gmail.com or nykaseke@yahoo.com or the supervisor (Prof. S.G. Hosking) on: 
Phone: +27 (0) 415042638: Email Stephen.hosking@nmmu.ac.za 
Your co-operation would be highly appreciated. 
 
1. When completing this questionnaire, please answer in respect of the site or facility where 
you are located. Do not include other mine, or anything outside the mining 
site/community. 
2. If a question is difficult for you to answer, please give your best guess. 
3. A power outage refers to a complete loss of electricity at the site.  
4. The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete. 
5. Please use US$ as your currency measure or indicate clearly which alternative currency 
you are using.  
6. The cost relates to the year 2009. 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Name of Mine.................................................City/Town…………………….. 
 
2. Which mineral are you extracting?  (e.g. Gold, Platinum, Coal, Tin, Copper, etc: Please 
specify) ……………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Which of the following most closely correspond to your mine’s normal hours of operation 
at this location? This would be when most employees or other occupants are present, and 
would include all shifts. Please do not include hours when only security and janitors are 
present. (Circle one number) 
1. 8 hours a day, 5 days a week 
2. 8hours a day, 7 days a week 
3. 12 hours a day, 5 days a week 
267 
 
4. 12 hours a day, 7 days a week 
5. 24 hours a day, 5 days a week 
6. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
 
4. How many (frequency) outages does your mine location experience? (just circle or tick 
one or specify) 
a. Per week 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
b. Per Month 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
5. On average, what is the duration of the outages in hours? (Just circle one or Specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify hours).................. 
 
6. What was your total revenue earned from the mine (unit or site) last year (2008)? 
(Tick/Specify – revenues are in US$) 
 
7. What was your electricity expenditure or consumption for last year? (Cost in US$- Just 
tick one box or specify) 
 
 
8. Does your mine site have any form of special arrangement with the power utility in terms 
of electricity supply?  (please circle)  YES   NO 
 
 
9. If NO, skip this question, If YES, what form of arrangement? (Please specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………............ 
 
10. On a scale of 1 to 3 to production or service delivery, where 1-Mojor obstacle, 2-Moderate 
obstacle and 3-No obstacle; rank the severity of the following Infrastructure problems to 
your operations. (Just Tick one of three boxes for each) 
Infrastructure  1. Major Obstacle 2. Moderate Obstacle 3. No Obstacle 
Electricity outages    
Water crisis    
Transport problem    
Telephone Network    
 
SECTION B: DIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
11.  On average how much has your mine’s operations been disrupted as a result of outages? 
(Tick one). 
Activity level Tick here 
0-50000 50001-100000 100001-500000 500001-1000000 1000001-2000000 Other.............. 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other (specify)……........... 
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Decline by 0%  (Activities as usual)  
Decline by less than 25%  
Declined by 26-50%  
Declined by 51-75%  
Decline by 76-99%  
Decline by 100% (no activity at all)  
 
12.  Using current outages similar to outages happened last year, what is the value of average 
output lost as a result of one outage of the following duration? (Provide figure for each 
total output loss per week) 
  1Hour  US$.............................. 
  2Hours  US$.............................. 
  6Hours US$.............................. 
  12Hours US$............................. 
 
13.  On average, what were your monthly production losses as a result of outages for last 
year? (Cost in US$ - Tick or Specify the amount) 
 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……........... 
 
 
14.  Can you specify/estimate other costs per month your mine site experience due to outages 
using the following cost categories? (Tick or Specify the amount) 
a. Labour cost (wages paid to unengaged staff) Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$..................... 
 
b. Material cost(Damage/spoilage to material in process or stock)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……............. 
 
c. Additional cost (Restart, damage to equipment, emergency cost)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……............. 
 
15.  How many labourers did your mine employ in 2008? …………….employees. 
16.  How many labourers were laid-off as a result of power outages? ……….employees. 
17.  What value of investment in expansion of the mine operations had been deterred as a 
result of the power outage problem? (Specify the amount)US$................................... 
SECTION C: INDIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
18.  Does your organisation have electricity backup equipment? (Tick)  Yes O No  O 
 
19.  If YES, which of the following has your mine installed as backup power to deal with power 
outages? (Circle all that apply) 
Back-up generator(s) 1 
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Small hydro/thermal generating plant 2 
Solar panel(s) 3 
UPS 4 
Other (Specify)..................................................................................... 5 
 
20.  Approximately how much money has your mine invested in the purchase of the power 
backup equipment for the facility? (Write in figures) 
Backup Generator US$......................................................... 
Diesel pump(s)  US$......................................................... 
Small hydro/thermal US$........................................................ 
Solar Panels  US$........................................................ 
UPS   US$....................................................... 
21.  What were the costs incurred in installation of the backup equipment? (Cost in US$) 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other……........... 
 
22.  What were the costs associated with running the backup system(s) per month? (Just Tick 
or specify cost under the following cost categories) 
a. Maintenances (spare parts, oil and grease) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1000-2000 Other……........... 
 
b. Fuel (Petrol/Diesel) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1000-2000 Other……........... 
c. Labour (wages) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1000-2000 Other……........... 
 
23.  Approximately what percentage of your mine’s total electrical load is currently covered by 
the backup system during outages? (Tick relevant box for the device(s)) 
Proportion covered by Backup equipment Tick here 
1-10%  
11-20%  
21-50%  
51-75%  
76-99%  
100%   
 
24.  What is the capacity of the backup equipment in kWh? (Just Tick or specify) 
0-20 kWh 21-50 kWh 51-100 kWh 101-150 kWh 151-200 kWh Other …...........kWh 
25. On average how many hours did you use your backup equipment (generator) during 
outages? ( Tick or specify number of hours)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
26.  On average how many times (frequency) per week? (Tick or specify frequency) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
27.  For how long have you been using the backup equipment? (Tick or specify years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)..................... 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix B: Farming Questionnaire 
 Farming Questionnaire No//……... 
Economics and Economic History Department 
5th Floor, Main Building 
P.O. Box 77000 
Port Elizabeth 
South Africa 
Dear Respondent 
Please fill in the questionnaire. Its aim is to estimate the cost of electricity power outages in 
Zimbabwe in 2009. Your responses will be treated as confidential.  
The questionnaire was designed by Nyasha Kaseke. For further information you are free to 
contact the researcher on: Cell (Zim): +263 712 576 546; (SA) +27766878938. 
Emails:nykaseke@gmail.com or nykaseke@yahoo.com or the supervisor (Prof. S.G. Hosking) on: 
Phone: +27 (0) 415042638: Email Stephen.hosking@nmmu.ac.za 
Your co-operation would be highly appreciated. 
1. When completing this questionnaire, please answer in respect of the site or facility where 
you are located. Do not include other farm, or anything outside the farming community. 
2. If a question is difficult for you to answer, please give your best guess. 
3. A power outage refers to a complete loss of electricity at the site.  
4. The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete. 
5. Please use US$ as your currency measure or indicate clearly which alternative currency 
you are using.  
6. The cost relates to the year 2009. 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Name of farm............................Location (eg Mash West)……………………….  
 
2. In which agricultural sector does your farm activity fall under (eg Agronomy, 
Horticulture, Citrus, Dairy, Floriculture, Mixed farming, Ranching (beef), Piggery, 
Poultry, etc: Please specify) ……………………………………………………… 
 
3. What crop/animals do you grow or keep? (Please specify crop/animals) 
.............................................................................................................................. 
 
4. What is the size of your farm? (Specify the area in hectares)……………….. Ha 
 
5. Which of the following most closely correspond to your farm’s normal hours of 
operation at this location? This would be when most employees or other occupants are 
present, and would include all shifts. Please do not include hours when only security 
and janitors are present. (Circle one number) 
7. 8 hours a day, 5 days a week 
8. 8hours a day, 7 days a week 
9. 12 hours a day, 5 days a week 
10. 12 hours a day, 7 days a week 
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11. 24 hours a day, 5 days a week 
12. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
 
6. How many (frequency) outages did your farm location experience? (Just circle one 
or specify number of outages) 
a. Per week  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
b. Per month 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
7. On average, what was the duration of the outages in hours? (Just circle or Specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify hours).................. 
 
 
8. What was your total revenue earned from the farm (unit) last year (2008)? 
(Tick/Specify – revenues are in US$) 
 
9. What was your electricity expenditure for month for last month? (Cost in US$-Just 
tick one box or specify)  
 
 
10. Which season does the firm usually pay high electricity charges? (Tick) 
Summer O  Winter  O 
 
11. Does your farm site have any form of special arrangement with the power utility in 
terms of electricity supply?  (please circle)  YES  
 NO 
 
12. If NO, skip this question, If YES, what form of arrangement? (Please specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………... 
13. On a Scale of1 to 3 to production or service delivery, where 1-Major obstacle, 2-Moderate 
obstacle and 3-No obstacle; rank the severity of the following Infrastructure problems to 
your operations. (Just Tick one of three boxes for each) 
Infrastructure  1.Major Obstacle 2. Moderate Obstacle 3. No Obstacle 
Electricity outages    
Water crisis    
Transport problem    
Telephone Network    
 
SECTION B: DIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
14. On average how much has your farm’s operations been disrupted as a result of 
outages? (Tick one). 
0-50000 50001-100000 100001-500000 500001-1000000 1000001-2000000 Other.............. 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other (specify)……........... 
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Activity level Tick here 
Decline by 0%  (Activities as usual)  
Decline by less than 25%  
Declined by 26-50%  
Declined by 51-75%  
Decline by 76-99%  
Decline by 100% (no activity at all)  
 
15. Using current outages similar to outages happened last year, what is the value of 
average output lost as a result of one outage of the following duration? (Provide 
figure for each time in terms output loss) 
  1Day  US$.............................. 
  2Days   US$.............................. 
  1Week  US$.............................. 
  2Weeks US$............................. 
16. On average what were your monthly production losses as a result of outages for last 
year? (Cost in US$ - Tick or Specify the amount) 
 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……........... 
17. Can you specify/estimate other costs per month your farm experience due to 
outages using the following cost categories? (Tick or Specify the amount) 
a. Labour cost(wages paid to unengaged staff) Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$..................... 
 
b. Material cost (Damage/spoilage to material in process or stock)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$..................... 
 
c. Additional cost(Restart, damage to equipment, emergency cost)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$..................... 
 
18. How many labourers did your farm employ in 2008?………………….employees. 
19. How many labourers were laid-off as a result of power 
outages?.................employees 
20. How many hectares of land did you leave out unplanted due to the problem of 
power outages last year? (Please specify) : Crop e.g.  Wheat ……………….. Ha 
       Tobacco......................... Ha 
       ........................................ Ha  
SECTION C: INDIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
21. Does your farm have electricity backup equipment? (Tick)    Yes O No  O 
 
22. If YES, which of the following has your farm installed as backup power to deal with 
power outages? (Circle all that apply) 
Back-up generators 1 
Small hydro/thermal plant 2 
Diesel Pump(s) 3 
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Solar panels 4 
Other (Specify)..................................................................................... 5 
 
23. Approximately how much money has your farm invested in the purchase of the 
power backup equipment? (Write in figures) 
Diesel pump  US$......................................................... 
Backup Generator  US$......................................................... 
Small hydro/thermal US$........................................................ 
Solar Panels  US$........................................................ 
  
24. What were the costs incurred in installing the backup equipment? (Cost in US$) 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other……........... 
25. What were the costs associated with running the backup system(s) per month? 
(Just Tick or specify cost under the following cost categories) 
a. Maintenances (spare parts, oil and grease) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
b. Fuel (Petrol/Diesel) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
c. Labour (wages) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
26. Approximately what percentage of your farm’s total electrical load is currently 
covered by the backup system during outages? (Tick relevant box) 
Proportion covered by Backup equipment Tick here 
1-10%  
11-20%   
21-50%   
51-75%   
76-99%   
100%   
 
27. What is the capacity of the backup equipment in kWh? (Just Tick or specify) 
0-20 kWh 21-50 kWh 51-100 kWh 101-150 kWh 151-200 kWh Other …...........kWh 
28. On average how many hours did you use your backup equipment (generator) during 
outages? ( Tick or specify number of hours) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
29. On average how many times (frequency) per week? (Tick or specify times) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
30. For how long have you been using the backup equipment? (Tick or specify years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)..................... 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix C: Industry Questionnaire 
 Industry Questionnaire No//……... 
Economics and Economic History Department 
5th Floor, Main Building 
P.O. Box 77000 
Port Elizabeth 
South Africa 
Dear Respondent  
Please fill in the questionnaire. Its aim is to estimate the cost of electricity power outages in 
Zimbabwe in 2009. Your responses will be treated as confidential.  
The questionnaire was designed by Nyasha Kaseke. For further information you are free to 
contact the researcher on: Cell (Zim): +263 712 576 546; (SA) +27766878938. 
Emails:nykaseke@gmail.com or nykaseke@yahoo.com or the supervisor (Prof. S.G. Hosking) on: 
Phone: +27 (0) 415042638: Email Stephen.hosking@nmmu.ac.za 
Your co-operation would be highly appreciated. Please read the following instructions: 
1. When completing this questionnaire, please answer in respect of the site or facility 
where you are located. Do not include other offices, branch locations, plants, stores 
or subsidiaries. 
2. If a question is difficult for you to answer, please give your best guess. 
3. A power outage refers to a complete loss of electricity at the site.  
4. The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete. 
5. Please use US$ as your currency measure or indicate clearly which alternative 
currency you are using.  
6. The cost relates to the year 2009. 
SECTION A: GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Name of organisation........................................City/Town ………………………..  
 
2. In which of the following industrial categories does your organisation fall under (Please Tick 
and Specify if not matching categories given below)  
Manufacturing e.g.    Services e.g 
O  Food and Beverages    O Wholesale and Retailing 
O Automobiles and Transport   O Communication  
O Electrical and Glass    O Finance, Accounting and Consultancy 
O Other (specify)…………………………O ……………………………..  
3. In which of the following industrial/commercial site is your organisation located? (just circle 
one) 
Industrial Site 1 
Central Business District (CBD) 2 
Shopping Mall/Complex 3 
Growth Point Area 4 
Other 5 
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4. Which of the following most closely correspond to your organisation’s normal hours of 
operation at this location? This would be when most employees or other occupants are 
present, and would include all shifts. Please do not include hours when only security  and 
janitors are present. (Circle one number) 
13. 8 hours a day, 5 days a week 
14. 8hours a day, 7 days a week 
15. 12 hours a day, 5 days a week 
16. 12 hours a day, 7 days a week 
17. 24 hours a day, 5 days a week 
18. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
 
5. How many (frequency) outages did your organisation experience? (Just circle one or specify 
number of outages)  
a. Per week 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
b. Per Month 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
6. On average, what was the duration of the outages in hours? (Just circle one or Specify) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify hours).................. 
 
7. What was the total revenue earned from the organisation location site last year (2008)? 
(Tick/Specify – revenues are in US$) 
 
8. What was your electricity expenditure or consumption for last year?  (Cost in US$-Just tick 
one box or specify) 
 
9. Does your organisation site have any form of special arrangement with the power utility in 
terms of electricity supply?  (please circle)  YES   NO 
 
10. If NO, skip this question, if YES, what form of arrangement? (Specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
 
11. On a scale of 1 to 3 to production or service delivery, where 1-Major obstacle, 2-Moderate 
obstacle and 3-No obstacle; rank the severity of the following Infrastructure problems to 
your operations. (Just Tick one of three boxes for each) 
Infrastructure  1. Major Obstacle 2. Moderate Obstacle 3. No Obstacle 
Electricity outages    
Water crisis    
Transport problem    
0-50000 50001-100000 100001-500000 500001-1000000 1000001-2000000 Other.............. 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other (specify)……........... 
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Telephone Network    
SECTION B: DIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
12. On average, how much has your organisation’s operations/services been disrupted as a 
result of outages? (Tick one). 
Activity level Tick here 
Decline by 0%  (Activities as usual)  
Decline by less than 25%  
Declined by 26-50%  
Declined by 51-75%  
Decline by 76-99%  
Decline by 100% (no activity at all)  
 
13. Using the current outages similar to outages happened last year, what is the value of 
average output/services lost as a result of one outage of the following duration? (Provide 
figure for each time in terms of output/service loss)       
1Hour  US$.............................. 
  2Hours  US$.............................. 
  6Hours  US$.............................. 
  12hours US$............................. 
14. On average what were your monthly production losses as a result of outages for last year? 
(Cost in US$ - Tick or Specify the amount) 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……........... 
15. Can you specify/estimate other costs per month your organisation experience due to 
outages using the following cost categories? (Tick or Specify the amount) 
a. Labour Cost (wages paid to unengaged staff) Cost in US$  
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$..................... 
 
b. Material cost (Damage/spoilage to material in process or stock)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$……............. 
 
c. Additional cost (Restart, damage to equipment, emergency cost)  Cost in US$ 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other US$ ……............. 
 
16. How many employees did your firm employ in 2008?………………….employees. 
17. How many employees were laid-off as a result of power outages?………….employees. 
18. What value of investment in expansion of the firm site has been deterred as a result of the 
power outage problem? (Specify the amount)US$..................................... 
SECTION C: INDIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
19. Does your organisation have electricity backup equipment? (Tick)  Yes O No  O 
 
20. If YES, which of the following has your firm/organisation site installed as backup power to 
deal with power outages? (Circle all that apply) 
Back-up generator(s) 1 
Small hydro/thermal generating plant 2 
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Diesel Pump 3 
Solar panel(s) 4 
UPS 5 
Other (Specify)..................................................................................... 6 
 
21. Approximately how much money has your organisation invested in the purchase of the 
power backup equipment for the site? (Write in figures) 
Backup Generator US$......................................................... 
Small hydro/thermal US$........................................................ 
Solar Panels  US$........................................................ 
UPS   US$........................................................ 
Diesel Pump  US$......................................................... 
22. What was the cost incurred in installing the backup equipment? (Cost in US$) 
0-1000 1001-2000 2001-5000 5001-10000 10000-20000 Other……........... 
23. What were the costs associated with running the backup system(s) per month? (Just Tick or 
specify cost under the following cost categories) 
a. Maintenances (spare parts, oil and grease) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
b. Fuel (Petrol/Diesel) - Cost in US$ per month.  
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
c. Labour (wages) - Cost in US$ per month. 
0-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other……........... 
 
24. Approximately what percentage of your organisation’s total electrical load is currently 
covered by the backup system during outages? (Tick relevant box for the device(s)) 
Proportion covered by Backup equipment Tick here 
1-10%  
11-20%   
21-50%   
51-75%   
76-99%   
100%   
25. What is the capacity of the backup equipment in kWh? (Just Tick or specify) 
0-20 kWh 21-50 kWh 51-100 kWh 101-150 kWh 151-200 kWh Other …...........kWh 
26. On average how many hours did you use your backup equipment (generator) during 
outages? ( Tick or specify number of hours)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
27. On average how many times (frequency) per week? (Tick or specify frequency/times) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
28. For how long have you been using the backup equipment? (Tick or specify years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)..................... 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix D: Household Questionnaire 
 Household Questionnaire No//……... 
Economics and Economic History Department 
5th Floor, Main Building 
P.O. Box 77000 
Port Elizabeth 
South Africa 
Dear Respondent 
Please fill in the questionnaire. Its aim is to estimate the cost of electricity power outages in 
Zimbabwe in 2009. Your responses will be treated as confidential.  
The questionnaire was designed by Nyasha Kaseke. For further information you are free to 
contact the researcher on: Cell (Zim): +263 712 576 546; (SA) +27766878938. 
Emails:nykaseke@gmail.com or nykaseke@yahoo.com or the supervisor (Prof. S.G. Hosking) on: 
Phone: +27 (0) 415042638: Email Stephen.hosking@nmmu.ac.za 
Your co-operation would be highly appreciated. 
 
1. When completing this questionnaire, please answer in respect of the house where 
you are staying. Do not include other houses, or anything outside your current 
resident. 
2. If a question is difficult for you to answer, please give your best guess. 
3. A power outage refers to a complete loss of electricity at the site.  
4. The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete. 
5. Please use US$ as your currency measure or indicate clearly which alternative 
currency you are using.  
6. The cost relates to the year 2009. 
 
 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1.  City/Town of location ……………………. 
 
2. What form of possession? 
 
Self owned   Leased  Other……………………………….. 
 
 
3. Which form of house does your accommodation (house) fall under?  (Circle) 
Flat 1 
Detached house(stand alone –main house) 2 
Semi-detached (back-to-back) 3 
Cottage 4 
Other 5 
 
4. In which residential location is your house/apartment located (Just circle one) 
High density sub-urban 1 
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Medium density sub-urban 2 
Low density sub-urban 3 
Central Business District (CBD) 4 
Peri-Urban areas 5 
Growth Point Area 6 
Other 7 
 
5. How many (frequency) outages did your household experience per week in 2008? 
(Tick/Specify)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
 
 
6. On average what is the duration of the outages in hours? (Specify).................hours 
 
 
7. What is the size of your household? (Specify the number)........................... people  
 
 
8. How many members of the household fall under the following categories? (Specify) 
Employed  
Retired/Unemployed/studying  
 
 
9. What was the average household income per month? (Income in US$-Please Tick/Specify) 
 
 
10. What was your electricity expenditure or how much was on your electricity bill for last 
month? (Cost in US$-Just tick one box or specify)  
11. On a scale of 1 to 3 to household activities, where 1-Major obstacle, 2-Moderate 
obstacle and 3-No obstacle; rank the severity of the following Infrastructure problems 
to your household in 2008? (Just Tick one of three boxes for each) 
Infrastructure  1. Major Obstacle 2. Moderate Obstacle 3. No Obstacle 
Electricity outages    
Water crisis    
Transport problem    
Telephone Network    
Market    
 
 
SECTION B: DIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
 
12. On average, how much has your household’s activities been disrupted as a result of outages 
in 2008?  (Tick one level of activity disruption). 
Activity level Tick here 
0-100 101-200 201-300 301-500 501-1000 1001-2000 Other.............. 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 Other (specify)……........... 
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Decline by 0%  (Activities as usual)  
Decline by less than 25%  
Declined by 26-50%  
Declined by 51-75%  
Decline by 76-99%  
Decline by 100% (no activity at all)  
 
13. Can you specify/estimate costs per month your household experience due to outages using 
the following cost categories? (Tick or Specify the amount) 
a. Material cost (Spoilage to food stuffs in stock/freezer)  Cost in US$. 
 
b. Damage and Maintenance cost (Damage to household appliances, lights burn-out and 
replacement/maintenance cost of damaged appliances) Cost in US$. 
 
c. Additional cost (emergency cost, cost of buying already prepared food stuffs, cost of 
alternative sources of power e.g. firewood, candles, etc.)  Cost in US$. 
14. Using current outages similar to outages happened last year, what were the actual 
household activities lost as a result of electricity power outage? (Tick/Specify all the 
activities that apply) 
Food preparation  
Entertainment (television, radio,games)  
Washing and ironing of clothes  
Other (specify)...................................................................  
.....................................................................................  
 
15. What are the other things that happens when there are outages (Tick) 
 Yes No 
Food gets spoiled   
Personal hygiene is negatively affected   
It increases crime rate   
It is degrading to my family to live without electricity   
Women have more work   
It increases domestic violence in the neighbourhood   
 
16. Are there health related issues caused by outages? (Specify)...................................... 
17. Have you been deterred from buying certain household appliance(s) due to the problem of 
electricity outages? (Tick)    Yes  O  No   O 
 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 Other (specify)……........... 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 Other (specify)……........... 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 Other (specify)……........... 
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SECTION C: INDIRECT COST ESTIMATION 
18. Does your household have electricity backup equipment? (Tick)  Yes O No  O 
 
19. If YES, which of the following has your household holds/installed as backup to deal 
with power outages? (Circle all that apply) 
Gas Stove 1 
Back-up generators 2 
Paraffin/Jelly stove 3 
Solar panels 4 
Battery 5 
 
20. Approximately how much money has your household invested in the purchase and 
installation of the power backup equipment for the house? (Specify cost) 
Gas Stove   US$......................... 
Backup Generator US$......................... 
Paraffin/Jelly stove US$......................... 
Solar Panel(s)  US$......................... 
Battery   US$......................... 
21. Approximately what percentage of your household’s total electrical load is currently 
covered by the backup system during outages? (Tick relevant box) 
Proportion covered by Backup equipment Tick here 
1-10%  
11-20%   
21-50%   
51-75%   
76-99%   
100%   
22. What are the appliances covered by the backup system? (Tick all that apply) 
Appliances covered by Backup System Tick here 
Lights and alarm  
Electric stove  
Television, decoders and  Radio  
Other. (Specify)..............................................  
23. What are the costs of running the backup system(s) per month? (Tick/specify) 
a. Fuel/Gas (petrol, paraffin, diesel, jelly) (cost in US$ per month) 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-150 Other……........... 
 
b. Maintenance and additional (spare parts) (cost in US$ per month) 
0-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-150 Other……........... 
24. On average how many hours did you use your backup equipment (generator) during 
outages? ( Tick or specify number of hours) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
25. On average how many times (frequency) per week? (Tick or specify times) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
26. For how long have you been using the backup system? (Tick or specify years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other (specify)................ 
THANK YOU FOR ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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